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This dissertation explores how financial incentives affect physician behavior on 
dimensions of healthcare quality and spending in privately insured markets, by assessing indirect 
impacts (e.g. effects not directly targeted) of payment reforms for perinatal care. Studies focus on 
two payment changes to assess effects on: payer-related spillovers, racial disparities, and variation 
by providers’ baseline quality. 
Chapter 1 evaluates spillover effects of a 2014 and 2015 Medicaid payment reform in four 
states that discontinued payment for Early Elective Deliveries (EEDs), a low-value service, on low-
value quality measures among commercial enrollees. Results show a small, but significant decrease 
in EEDs in the commercial sector. There is no evidence of physician-induced demand, under which 
the rate of more profitable services would increase in response to negative income shocks. 
Spillovers were concentrated in for-profit hospitals, where financial objectives were aligned 
between physicians and hospitals. Findings indicate that reducing fees for low-value services can 
be welfare-improving, through positive impacts on healthcare quality across payers. 
Chapter 2 examines the effect of a 2013 multi-payer bundled payment program for 
perinatal episodes in Arkansas on place-based racial disparities in private insurance markets. This 
incentive shifted financial risk to physicians by offering a risk-adjusted case rate for the entire 
episode, rather than reimbursing separately for each service. Results show increased quality 
improvement in areas with a high proportion of White patients in the short-term; however, areas 
with a high proportion of Black patients equalized gains in the long-term. This study highlights the 
role of physician payment on racial disparities, and suggests a need for financial incentives that are 
directly tied to racial equity to achieve equitable short-term gains. 
Chapter 3 leverages an episode-based payment program with compulsory provider 
participation to test whether baseline quality is associated with divergent impacts on quality and 
spending. Although areas with low performing providers at baseline achieved larger improvements 
in quality measures directly linked to payment, areas with high performing providers at baseline 
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saved 16.2% more across episodes, through reduced hospital prices and volume of services. Results 
suggest that under mandatory reforms, reducing costs in low performing areas may be difficult 
without compromising quality. 
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Physician reimbursement is the financing mechanism under which insurers pay doctors for 
care. As such, it plays a significant role in the healthcare system, shaping the amount and type of 
medical care that a physician provides. The traditional payment system in both public and private 
insurance markets in the U.S. is fee-for-service (FFS), where doctors are paid for each service 
performed, regardless of the quality or outcome of care. As recently as 2016, 71% of overall 
physician revenue was derived from FFS payments, a number that has remained fairly constant in 
the last decade, despite a decrease in the number of practices receiving some FFS income (Rama, 
2017). Since physicians are not held financially accountable for their patients’ outcomes under this 
payment system, FFS has incentivized the overprovision of services, leading to an increase in 
overall healthcare costs over time (Ikegami, 2015). As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), 
total healthcare spending has more than doubled since 1975, increasing from 7.9 percent to 17.6 
percent (MedPAC, 2019). Nonetheless, quality of care is incommensurate with the level of 
spending, as the U.S. ranks the lowest on health performance indicators among comparable nations 
(Chee, Ryan, Wasfy, & Borden, 2016).  
Government policies have, for decades, introduced new approaches to physician payment, 
experimenting with public and private sector reforms to balance the dual considerations of 
beneficiaries’ access and quality of care against adequacy of payment rates to support provider 
costs and access to capital, while also ensuring an efficient use of healthcare services (MedPAC, 
2020). This has generally involved moving payment systems away from FFS towards value-based 
payments that impose financial risk on physicians to generate cost savings and increase quality of 
care. Still, a longstanding issue of health economics is the optimal design of these financial 
incentives – how can government policies design physician payment as a means of improving 
quality of care and the resultant health outcomes, while minimizing healthcare expenditures? 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) accelerated the movement towards value-based care 
delivery and payment models, while simultaneously reducing the annual increase in payment rates 
 
 2 
in public insurance markets to generate savings (Blumenthal & Abrams, 2020). Value-based 
programs are budget-neutral, meaning that providers receiving higher payments do so at the 
expense of the other participants, introducing concerns that penalties may disproportionately 
impact physicians serving disadvantaged populations (Gilman, Adams, et al., 2015). This is 
problematic because vulnerable populations, such as those with higher-than-average medical and 
social needs, incur high healthcare costs and tend to have poor outcomes (Joynt Maddox, 2018). In 
2016, the costliest 5 percent of beneficiaries accounted for 40 percent of annual Medicare spending; 
in contrast, the least costly 50 percent accounted for only 5 percent of spending (MedPAC, 2019). 
In five federal value-based programs, providers predominantly serving medically and socially 
vulnerable patients had an 18% greater probability of being penalized under value-based payment 
(Joynt Maddox, 2018). In 2016, these physicians and hospitals operated at an average profit margin 
of 1.6 percent, relative to the national average of 7.8 percent (Greenberg, 2020). Redistributing 
payment away from providers with the highest resource needs can exacerbate disparities over time 
and stimulate other downstream effects (Damberg, Elliott, & Ewing, 2015).  
In addition to the financial ramifications on physicians serving high-risk patients, financial 
incentives are also associated with clinical implications. Since the implementation of the ACA, 
growing financial challenges have led to increased rural and safety net hospital closures, 
exacerbating overcrowding at neighboring facilities and reducing access to care (Khullar, Song, & 
Chokshi, 2018; Sachs et al., 2019). In both private and public insurance markets, the financial 
implications of healthcare payment reform for high-risk patient populations has also led to 
increased physician gaming. Prior research has found this to include the avoidance of high-risk 
patients, overprovision of care among beneficiaries in health plans outside of the incentive program, 
and hesitancy to participate in value-based reimbursement if the financial outlook is uncertain 
(Mendelson et al., 2017). 
The presence of these unintended consequences stems from the notion that efforts to design 
financial incentives predominantly focus on improving quality for the “average” patient, rather than 
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specific populations. Further, payment reforms lack uniformity across markets and clinical settings, 
leading to wide variation in incentive magnitude, payment methodology, and cost and quality 
metrics. This makes financial incentives difficult to study, and also imposes an undue 
administrative burden on physicians and hospitals (Mendelson et al., 2017). Inattention to indirect 
impacts – effects not directly targeted by the incentive – across populations and payers can lead to 
an inadequate understanding of the effects of payment reform, and may hamper the potential to 
leverage financial incentives as a tool for improving care across populations and settings. 
1.1. Economic Framework for Understanding the Role of Financial Incentives 
on Physician Behavior 
The policy debate on how to pay physicians is illustrative of a broader body of economic 
research on physician agency. Physician agency is the idea that doctors make treatment decisions 
on behalf of their patients due to asymmetric information; because physicians train extensively to 
learn appropriate diagnoses and treatments, they serve as medical “experts” to their patients, who 
lack the knowledge to make autonomous treatment choices (Mcguire, 2000). However, a 
complicating factor in this relationship is a physician’s desire to maximize profits, which can lead 
to a violation of agency if the patient would not make the same choice if they had all of the same 
information. This means that the financial incentive a physician receives has potential to lead to an 
overabundance or shortage of services for the patient, if this behavior raises physician income. To 
achieve the optimal level of healthcare consumption, insurers have increasingly incorporated 
financial incentives into reimbursement design that impose financial risk on physicians for 
healthcare spending and quality of care, to encourage perfect physician agency. 
This theory is supported by empirical studies that highlight violations of physician agency, 
under which physician behavior deviates from traditional economic principles in response to 
financial incentives. In 1958, Reuben Kessel found evidence of price discrimination, in which 
physicians scaled the price of care by patient income; wealthier patients faced higher prices to 
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finance charity care for sicker patient who could not afford to pay the average price. This behavior 
contradicted standard economic principles; typically, profit-maximizing firms eliminate this 
practice in competitive markets due to inefficiency. Instead, doctors would be expected to establish 
uniform prices for identical services to stimulate demand among affluent patients. This paper 
introduced the idea that physicians did not strictly prioritize the maximization of profit; they also 
sought to improve patient well-being (Kessel, 1958). In 1978, Victor Fuchs observed a direct 
relationship between an increased supply of surgeons and market price, despite steady patient 
demand. This result was unexpected because in traditional economics, increased competition is 
correlated with a reduction in price. This study introduced the notion that physicians have the ability 
to influence patient demand, independent of the payment rate (Fuchs, 1978). Finally, Thomas 
Rice’s 1983 study observed an increase in the volume of services supplied in the presence of 
negative income shocks. This challenged a very basic norm in economics, in which supply falls 
with the price. It gave rise to the existence of physician-induced demand, a type of imperfect 
physician agency where practitioners prompt patients to consume more than the optimal amount of 
care to increase profits (Rice, 1983). These studies highlight the unique nature of physician 
behavior, and the need to better understand how financial incentives put forth by variation in prices 
impacts the provision of healthcare. Other research has found that cost-increasing losses that arise 
under FFS can be mitigated by incentives that introduce financial risk bearing to physicians 
(Mendelson et al., 2017; Town, Wholey, Kralewski, & Dowd, 2004). However, the overall welfare 
effects depend on the magnitude of the physician response, and variation in effects across payers 
and patient populations (Baicker, Chernew, & Robbins, 2013). 
An ongoing public policy debate is the translation of these ideas into the design of 
physician reimbursement. In the 1980s, economists Thomas McGuire and Randall Ellis postulated 
that if physicians undervalue benefits to patients relative to profits, then cost-based reimbursement 
leads to the overprovision of care, while capitated payment results in a shortage of services for 
patients (Ellis & McGuire, 1986). This idea, coupled with empirical findings, led to the 
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proliferation of mixed reimbursement policies aimed at concurrently containing costs and 
improving quality. Examples include the prevalence of pay-for-performance policies in public and 
private insurance and the design of bundled payments, which shift financial risk to physicians 
through shared savings and penalties for specific episodes of care. However, more recent evidence 
has begun to highlight unintended consequences of these approaches, including avoidance of high-
risk patients and widening disparities for marginalized patient and provider populations (Joynt 
Maddox, 2018; Mendelson et al., 2017). These findings underscored a need to shift the design of 
financial incentives towards holding physicians accountable for specific populations. The most 
prominent example is the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Direct Contracting Model 
launched in April 2021, which introduced downside risk to physicians serving patients dually 
enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, a population with high medical needs. 
While the majority of markets have introduced value-based payment reforms, how these 
policies affect patients beyond the overall population is poorly understood. This dissertation 
explores specific types of financial incentive policies to better understand the downstream effects 
on beneficiaries insured by other payers, racial minorities, and populations with low quality of care. 
1.2. Importance of Perinatal Care 
Financial incentives have been implemented across many clinical services, but perinatal 
care is a unique setting to explore their indirect effects. From a medical perspective, perinatal care 
is clinically salient. In the U.S., childbirth is the top expenditure category for hospital payments 
made by Medicaid and private insurers, yet maternal mortality is higher than all other developed 
countries (Carroll, 2017; Truven Health Analytics, 2013). Since 2013, average inpatient costs for 
maternal and child health have increased by 32 percent, compared to overall hospital spending, 
which grew by 4.8 percent in the same time frame (Kamal & Cox, 2018; Truven Health Analytics, 
2013). Between 2000 and 2014, the rate of deaths due to complications from pregnancy and 
childbirth worsened by 26.6 percent in the U.S., while the global rate improved by 38 percent 
(MacDorman, Declercq, Cabral, & Morton, 2016). Over half of U.S. hospitals lag below the 
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national target in quality scores, suggesting significant room for improvement (Consumer Reports, 
2017). Vulnerable populations, such as low-income mothers and racial minorities, are 
disproportionately affected, making it especially urgent to address this issue among these patients 
(Kozhimannil, Hardeman, & Henning-Smith, 2017). 
From an economics perspective, perinatal care also offers an ideal setting for studying 
financial incentives, since it has features expected to enhance generalizability. First, volume is 
relatively independent from physician decision-making (e.g. compared to elective arthroplasty, 
which requires a pre-surgical appointment), increasing the likelihood that physician behavior stems 
directly from payment changes, rather than confounders that would influence treatment decisions. 
In other words, the decision to have a baby is usually a family one, and is not typically influenced 
by the physician, whereas the volume of other services common to studying financial incentives is 
more dependent on physician discretion. Second, perinatal care has features that have been linked 
to stronger provider responses, including high variation in quality and costs, and the presence of 
elective services with practical treatment substitutes (Chou et al., 2006). These unique 
characteristics make perinatal care a conducive setting to enact financial incentives, in that changes 
in treatment patterns are anticipated to be driven by supply-side, rather than demand-side, factors 
(Town et al., 2004). Finally, intrapartum delivery is emergent, and under the federal Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, every U.S. hospital with an emergency room is compelled to 
treat patients who arrive in labor. This presents a distinct opportunity to explore the quality of care 
across a range of substitutes. The role of financial incentives is typically assessed in clinical settings 
that rely on a binary indicator for whether a patient received treatment, so it is difficult to discern 
whether a lack of treatment is equivalent to subpar treatment. 
1.3. Summary of Chapters 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine the impact of financial incentives on physician 
behavior on dimensions of healthcare quality and spending for beneficiaries in private insurance 
markets. This is done by assessing three indirect impacts (e.g. effects not directly targeted) of 
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payment reforms for perinatal care: spillover effects, racial disparities, and variation by providers’ 
baseline quality. 
Payment reform policies have traditionally started at state and local levels. In 2014 and 
2015, four states passed a Medicaid policy that discontinued payment for Early Elective Deliveries 
(EEDs), a low-value mode of childbirth defined as a scheduled, non-medically necessary induction 
of cesarean section before 39 weeks’ gestation. The aim of the policy was to leverage a reduction 
in the price of low-value care to incentivize physicians to reduce EEDs, which are convenient for 
the physician and patient to schedule, but are not clinically beneficial. While previous evidence has 
shown significant reductions in EEDs in the Medicaid population, no studies have examined 
indirect impact of the policy in the non-Medicaid population (Allen & Grossman, 2019; Dahlen, 
Mccullough, Fertig, Dowd, & Riley, 2017).  
In Chapter 1, this policy is used as a case-study to understand whether effects of lowering 
the price of a low-value service in Medicaid spillover to privately insured patients. This chapter 
assesses whether the policy leads to positive spillovers, under which desired physician behavior 
extends beyond the target population, as well as unintended consequences. Using data from 
Medicare Hospital Compare and the Truven MarketScan Claims and Encounters Data from 2013 
to 2017, difference-in-difference analyses were conducted on measures of low-value care across 
all payers. Analyses explore whether the Medicaid payment policy prompted physicians to reduce 
the rate of EEDs in the all-payer population (e.g. a positive spillover), and if this effect was 
accompanied by an increased provision of a more profitable service to compensate for lost income 
(e.g. physician-induced demand). The hypothesis was that the Medicaid payment reform would be 
associated with a payer-related spillover through a reduction in EEDs in the commercial sector, and 
a welfare-reducing increase in physician-induced demand through low-risk c-sections, which are 
less time-intensive and more profitable, but riskier than vaginal deliveries.  
The results show a small, but significant 3.35% decline in all-payer EEDs in states with 
the Medicaid payment policy compared to control states, with no evidence of physician-induced 
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demand. One major question is whether observed spillovers are prompted by financial or 
reputational drivers of physician behavior, such as the type of hospital in which a physician is 
employed. In general, non-profit and for-profit hospitals have different objective functions, where 
non-profits aim to maximize profits and quality, whereas for-profits focus predominantly on 
income. As a result, physicians in for-profit hospitals, driven by financial objectives, may respond 
more strongly to changes in service profitability. Findings are consistent with this expectation, as 
analyses show larger spillovers in areas with a higher share of for-profit hospitals. This study finds 
that the Medicaid payment policy had small, but positive impacts on healthcare quality for 
commercially insured patients. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of a mandatory, multi-payer episode-based payment 
program on place-based racial disparities. The policy was implemented in 2013 in Medicaid and 
private insurance markets in Arkansas to reduce perinatal spending and improve quality for the 
“average” patient, but little is known about whether there were differential impacts on vulnerable 
populations, including racial minorities. Assessing place-based, rather than individual racial 
disparities, enables an assessment of how the interaction between race and socioeconomic drivers 
contributes to variation in policy effects across markets. Relative to FFS, episode-based payments 
shift financial risk to physicians by offering a single, risk-adjusted case rate for the entire course of 
care, rather than reimbursing providers separately for each service. Under this policy design, 
providers that keep costs below a risk-adjusted target threshold and meet certain benchmarks on 
quality measures earn a portion of the savings, while those that exceed it incur a financial penalty. 
Holding providers accountable for quality and costs of care during the episode creates a financial 
incentive to coordinate care and improve the patient experience across both dimensions.  
In this chapter, commercial claims from the Truven MarketScan Database from 2010 to 
2016 were used to examine whether the episode-based payment program differentially impacted 
physician behavior in areas with a high proportion of Black patients relative to areas with a high 
proportion of White patients. Difference-in-difference-in-differences analyses were conducted to 
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assess how the policy affected quality of care across three phases of the care continuum, including 
prenatal, intrapartum, and postpartum services. Results show that in the short-term, there were 
significantly greater quality improvements in areas with a high proportion of White residents, but 
that areas with Black patients were able to close the gap in the long-term. This study aims to refine 
the understanding of the role that physician incentives play on racial disparities, which is a critically 
important question given current inequalities in healthcare and the potential for payment policies 
to help close or widen this gap.  
Chapter 3 leverages a multi-payer episode-based payment program in Arkansas with 
compulsory provider participation for Medicaid and commercially insured enrollees, to test 
whether baseline quality was associated with heterogeneity in effects across quality and spending 
outcomes. In federal programs, bundled payment participation is typically voluntary, making it 
challenging to identify the impact of program participation on episode savings and quality 
improvement, particularly if providers with high quality at baseline differentially choose to 
participate. This policy is distinct from the conventional Medicare bundled payment structure by 
requiring participation across all providers and targeting younger patients insured by Medicaid and 
private payers. To date, little is known about how effects vary across providers with different 
baseline characteristics. It is important to explore variation in the impacts of such programs, since 
the “average” effect may attenuate towards the null if providers with different baseline 
characteristics experience divergent effects.  
This chapter uses the Truven MarketScan commercial claims database from 2010 to 2016 
in a difference-in-differences-in-differences design. I find that geographic areas with high 
performing providers at baseline were able to generate significantly greater savings through 
reduced hospital prices and volume of services. Geographic areas with low performing providers 
at baseline achieved larger improvement in quality measures directly linked to payment. However, 
neither of these differential effects were sustained in the long-term. The findings help to inform 
 
 10 
whether the effects of mandatory versus voluntary payment reform are expected to vary, to offer 
insight into future state and federal bundled payment design. 
Together, these three papers form a body of work demonstrating the indirect impact of 
financial incentive design on physician behavior with respect to healthcare quality and spending 
among privately insured enrollees. Chapter 1 examines the spillover effects of a Medicaid payment 
reform that discontinued payment for a low-value service. Chapter 2 focuses on the role of a multi-
payer bundled payment program on racial disparities, to gain a better understanding of how 
physician incentives can be used to address current inequalities in healthcare. Finally, Chapter 3 
assesses whether episode-based payments with compulsory provider participation are associated 
with heterogeneity in effects by providers’ baseline performance, across quality and spending 
outcomes. 
These studies suggest that financial incentives remain an important determinant in shaping 
the amount and type of medical services that physicians supply, and need to be considered when 
designing physician payment reforms. This dissertation presents evidence on the importance of 
incentive design in perinatal care, particularly when considering the indirect impacts on specific 
patient populations, including beneficiaries insured by other payers and vulnerable populations. For 
racial minorities and patients that typically experience low quality of care, because of 
disproportionate barriers to accessing care and the potential for drastic improvement in health from 
treatment, financial incentives that facilitate quality improvement across the continuum of care are 
a necessity. The analyses in this dissertation can help to inform public policy to ensure that as value-
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2. Understanding Spillover Effects of Medicaid Payment Reform for a Low-
Value Service in the Privately Insured 
2.1. Introduction 
Physician behavior is a key driver of health outcomes and spending, as many medical 
services are not directly demanded by a patient, but requested by a doctor on the patient’s behalf 
(Chandra & Skinner, 2012; Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Kessler & McClellan, 1996; Smith, Saunders, 
Stuckhardt, & McGinnis, 2013). One factor driving physician decision-making is the financial 
incentive that he or she receives. It is well established that under the prevailing payment model, 
fee-for-service (FFS), physicians are influenced to overprescribe low-value care to maximize their 
income (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Ikegami, 2015; Mendelson et al., 2017). Low-value care, defined 
as the provision of a medical procedure that provides little or no benefit to patients, deviates from 
the social optimum, and has potential to cause harm or incur unnecessary costs (Brownlee et al., 
2017; Brownlee, Saini, & Cassel, 2014; Mafi et al., 2017; Maratt et al., 2019; McGlynn et al., 
2003). To address this concern, many states and payers have adopted policies that move payment 
systems away from traditional FFS towards reimbursement that aligns spending with quality. These 
approaches often aim to discourage the provision of low-value care by incorporating lower 
physician earnings for these services (MedPAC, 2019). While a large body of literature examines 
physicians’ direct response to these payment incentives, few papers focus on indirect responses 
such as whether there are spillover effects to payers and services outside of the target population.  
Economic theory suggests that physicians may respond to lower payment for a low-value 
service by reducing the provision of the service across all payers (e.g. a positive spillover) and/or 
by increasing the provision of a more profitable service to compensate for lost income (e.g. 
inducing demand), but there is little empirical evidence on this question. Understanding these 
indirect effects is critical to developing a full understanding of physician behavior under 
reimbursement changes. Positive spillovers indicate that the desired physician behavior can have 
welfare-improving benefits beyond the population of interest, while physician-induced demand is 
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an unintended consequence that can introduce harm to patients. Whether these indirect behavioral 
responses transpire concurrently, and the drivers of these effects, can help policymakers to 
determine the far-reaching implications of payment reform, and the contexts in which physicians 
are likely to customize or standardize care across patients. 
This paper explores how discontinuing Medicaid payment for Early Elective Deliveries 
(EEDs), a low-value mode of childbirth defined as a scheduled, non-medically necessary induction 
or cesarean section (c-section) prior to 39 weeks gestation, affects privately insured patients. I use 
the Hospital Compare and Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims databases to address the 
following questions, comparing the effect of Medicaid nonpayment to other financial and non-
financial incentives in a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis: (1) does the change in Medicaid 
payment prompt a payer-related spillover, in the form of a reduction in EEDs in the commercial 
sector? (2) is there evidence of physician-induced demand through an increase in low-risk c-
sections, which are less time-intensive and more profitable, but riskier than vaginal deliveries? and 
(3) are variations in spillovers consistent with financial or reputational drivers? 
In perinatal care, fee reductions associated with low-value EEDs emerged as a promising 
option to reduce long-term hospital costs. In 2010, EEDs constituted nearly 20% of all U.S. hospital 
births, exceeding the patient safety target of 5% (Main et al., 2010). Because EEDs can be 
conveniently scheduled and are paid at the same rate as full-term deliveries under FFS, there are 
strong incentives to continue their provision. EEDs pose significant dangers to mothers, including 
increased risk of infection and postpartum hemorrhage. They have no known clinical benefits, but 
may be appealing to physicians to enable a convenient schedule and to mitigate perceived liability 
concerns (Choosing Wisely, 2013). However, EEDs often generate higher medical expenses 
compared to full-term, spontaneous births.  
Since Medicaid covers 45% of births, Medicaid programs in Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, 
and Mississippi adopted policies that discontinued physician reimbursement for EEDs between 
January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2015 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019). Physicians 
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were only eligible to receive payment for births prior to 39 weeks’ gestation if it was properly 
documented as medically necessary. This provided a financial incentive to reduce overuse of this 
service because continuing its supply would forego the average $7,213 that a physician earns per 
Medicaid birth (Caughey et al., 2009). Several states adopted a range of other approaches. Some 
states implemented Medicaid pay-for-performance programs, which provided physicians with a 
bonus payment if they achieved a goal EED rate. Other states implemented non-financial 
approaches, including voluntary “hard stop” initiatives, which encouraged hospitals to take a 
pledge to end the provision of EEDs, and quality improvement collaboratives, which aimed to 
educate physicians and expecting mothers about the dangers of EEDs through multi-stakeholder 
advocacy and public reporting. 
I investigate indirect effects of the Medicaid payment policy on low-value care among the 
commercially insured, and compare effects to four groups with varying financial and non-financial 
incentives, including: (1) no policy aimed at curbing EEDs, (2) a voluntary “hard stop” initiative, 
(3) a quality improvement collaborative, and (4) a Medicaid pay-for-performance program. To date, 
studies have measured the Medicaid policy’s direct effects (Allen & Grossman, 2019; Dahlen et 
al., 2017). These studies find a mean 16% decline in Medicaid EEDs. Prior work has not examined 
indirect effects of the policy in the non-Medicaid population, nor has it compared the impact of the 
Medicaid payment policy to other financial and non-financial approaches. I aim to fill this gap by 
exploring whether effects of the Medicaid nonpayment policy spilled over to the commercial sector, 
and how these effects varied by policy approach. 
I find that the observed change in Medicaid EED volume extended to the commercial 
sector. All-payer EEDs declined 3.35% in treatment states relative to states with no policy to reduce 
EEDs. The Medicaid payment policy also lowered all-payer EEDs by 3.92% and 3.58% compared 
to states with a hard stop policy and a pay-for-performance payment program, respectively. 
Hospital Compare data do not allow me to disentangle the direct result in Medicaid from a spillover 
to privately insured patients; to gain insight into this question, I examine whether effects increased 
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in geographic areas with a higher share of Medicaid patients. Effects did not vary with the Medicaid 
rate, providing suggestive evidence that commercial patients were impacted. 
I also find no evidence of inducement-related spillovers, under which the income lost from 
EEDs would prompt an increase in other low-value services (e.g. low-risk c-sections) (McGuire & 
Pauly, 1991). On average, reimbursement for c-sections is 50% higher than vaginal deliveries. C-
sections can also be dangerous for low-risk women (Teleki, 2017). Given that there were no 
significant changes in low-risk c-sections, there is no evidence that physicians compensate for lost 
income by increasing the provision of more profitable services.  
Finally, I find a larger positive spillover in areas with a higher share of for-profit hospitals. 
Physicians in for-profit and non-profit hospitals might have different priorities (e.g. practitioners 
in non-profit hospitals may have reputational objectives, while those in for-profits have financial 
ones), suggesting that the response to financial incentives may vary (Dranove, Garthwaite, & Ody, 
2017; Horwitz, 2005; Newhouse, 1970). This result may indicate a stronger response to financial 
incentives by physicians in a for-profit setting, where physician and hospital financial objectives 
are aligned. It may also highlight barriers to changing physician practice patterns when their 
objectives are reputational, rather than financial. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this analysis is one of the 
first to study payer- and service-related spillovers of financial incentives in the same setting. This 
examination lends insight into how physicians customize care, an important factor in understanding 
the full effect of reimbursement changes. Second, Medicaid nonpayment provides a unique 
opportunity to study a major incentive to reduce low-value care. Most value-based payments cap 
downside risk at approximately 3%, while the policy of interest imposes a 100% penalty. Third, 
this policy presents a novel opportunity to study indirect effects of financial incentives on physician 
behavior, and to understand the impact at a system level. Studying a physician’s financial incentives 
in the context of perinatal care has several advantages. Perinatal care is clinically salient. Since 
2013, average inpatient costs have increased 32%, while overall hospital spending has only grown 
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by 4.8% (Kamal & Cox, 2018; Truven Health Analytics, 2013). Nonetheless, the U.S. experiences 
the highest maternal mortality rate of all developed countries (Carroll, 2017). Over half of U.S. 
hospitals lag below the national target in quality scores, suggesting much room for improvement 
(Consumer Reports, 2017). Volume is also relatively independent from physician influence (e.g. 
compared elective arthroplasty, which requires a pre-surgical appointment), and repeat birth is 
unpredictable. Thus, the physician response is expected to stem directly from the payment reform 
as opposed to potential confounders (Carroll, Chernew, Fendrick, Thompson, & Rose, 2018), 
increasing the potential to generalize results to other settings. Perinatal care has features linked to 
strong provider responses, including variation in quality and costs, and presence of elective services 
with practical treatment substitutes (Chou et al., 2006). 
I show that reducing Medicaid payment for low-value services provides two broad results: 
(1) it discourages overprovision of low-value care in the non-Medicaid population, and (2) it leads 
to modest spillovers to the non-Medicaid population, which are smaller than the direct effect in 
Medicaid. I further illustrate that physicians are generally more responsive to financial incentives 
when it aligns with hospital objectives. I also highlight important tools for incentive design, 
including: (1) a financial penalty for low-value care can lead to stronger spillovers than a financial 
bonus, (2) a mandatory incentive can be more effective than a voluntary one, and (3) a policy with 
interdisciplinary collaboration and educational components can be as successful as a financial 
incentive. These comparisons provide greater understanding of payment reform, such as how to 
structure incentives, determine participation, and incorporate education and teamwork elements. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on incentives including 
the policy landscape and prior literature. Section 2.3 lays out the theoretical framework. Section 
2.4 describes the analytic dataset and empirical strategy. Section 2.5 discusses the main results. 




2.2.1. Literature on Indirect Physician Responses to Financial Incentives 
There is a large body of economic literature investigating how physicians, and healthcare 
providers more generally, respond to financial incentives. Two distinct streams of literature focus 
on indirect effects; this includes spillovers, or the extent to which a financial incentive directed 
towards patients with one insurance type affects patients with other insurance types (Frank et al., 
2007; Glied & Zivin, 2002; Tai-Seale, McGuire, & Zhang, 2007), and physician-induced demand, 
where physicians, acting as agents on behalf of patients (who lack medical knowledge to make 
autonomous treatment decisions), request additional volume of services in response to negative 
income shocks (Evans, 1974; McGuire & Pauly, 1991).   
First, spillovers are difficult to predict, as there is debate over whether physicians adhere 
to “custom made” or “ready-to-wear” treatments (e.g. addressing an individual patient’s needs on 
a case-by-case basis or treating a broad class of patients with a standardized “norm,” respectively) 
(Frank et al., 2007). On one hand, doctors have demonstrated an inclination to treat a “modal” 
patient, rather than differentiate by insurer, to circumvent communication, cognition, coordination, 
and capability costs. This suggests that when a physician’s dominant payer alters payment 
incentives, the behavioral response may spillover to other populations (Frank et al., 2007; Glied & 
Zivin, 2002; Tai-Seale et al., 2007). Spillovers from Medicare to privately insured patients have 
also been observed with non-financial incentives (Barnett, Olenski, & Sacarny, 2020). On the other 
hand, empirical work supports the notion that physicians customize care across patients, as varying 
payment rates from public and private insurers have led to significantly different utilization 
patterns, waiting times, and number of follow-up visits (Jürges, 2009; Lungen, Stollenwerk, 
Messner, Lauterbach, & Gerber, 2008; Newhouse & Marquis, 1978; Schwierz, Wübker, Wübker, 
& Kuchinke, 2011). Despite evidence in both areas, there is little understanding of the 
circumstances under which physicians use custom made versus ready-to-wear treatments. 
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Developing a greater insight into the factors that lead to variation in spillovers is critical to 
understanding physician responses to payment reforms.  
Second, prior studies on physician-induced demand support this theory for Medicare and 
commercial payment changes, particularly when procedures are intense and elective (e.g., heart 
attack treatment, advanced imaging, and c-sections) (Clemens & Gottlieb, 2014; Coey, 2015; Foo, 
Lee, & Fong, 2017; Gruber & Owings, 1996; Jacobson, Earle, Price, & Newhouse, 2010; Yip, 
1998). Under these conditions, inducement becomes more desirable because the profit margin tends 
to be high and the service tends to require minimal time. In contrast, the limited literature on fee 
changes in Medicaid have found no evidence of inducement, arguing that non-Medicaid findings 
cannot be generalized since Medicaid patients are a small share of a physician’s patient pool and 
prices tend to be low (Alexander, 2015; Gruber, Kim, & Mayzlin, 1999). More research on 
inducement and other unintended consequences of Medicaid incentives is imperative for 
developing state policies aimed at reducing low-value care. I expand the empirical literature on 
spillovers and induced demand by examining concurrent dynamics between substitution and 
income effects from Medicaid to commercial patients. 
The magnitude of indirect effects may vary based on financial and/or reputational market 
factors. For example, a physician’s objectives may change depending on whether they are 
employed by a for-profit or non-profit hospital. Theoretically, non-profits seek to maximize quality 
and income, while for-profits are predominantly focused on income (Newhouse, 1970). Thus, for-
profit hospitals tend to be more sensitive to payment changes. Prior studies have demonstrated that 
for-profit hospitals are more likely to offer high-margin services than non-profit hospitals. For-
profit hospitals also varied the quantity of a given service with price changes over time, suggesting 
greater responsiveness to service profitability (Dranove et al., 2017; Horwitz, 2005). These 
differences intensified with hospital size and market competition (Horwitz, 2005; Moon & Shugan, 
2020; Rosko, Al-Amin, & Tavakoli, 2020). However, because non-profit hospitals offer a wider 
range of services (both profitable and unprofitable), they may have a competitive advantage over 
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for-profit hospitals. As a result, overall differences in profits by hospital type are usually 
insignificant (Lakdawalla & Philipson, 1998, 2006; Moon & Shugan, 2020). There is little research 
on how physicians employed by different hospital types respond to value-based payment changes, 
especially with respect to indirect effects. 
2.2.2. Policy Landscape on Incentives in Perinatal Care 
At the federal level, providers are only encouraged by non-financial means to reduce EEDs. 
In February 2013, the Choosing Wisely campaign, in conjunction with the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), released an official federal guideline discouraging 
EEDs. Since 2007, several states adopted policies employing financial or non-financial incentives 
aimed at reducing EEDs across all payers, in an effort to generate perinatal care cost savings and 
improve birth outcomes. 
In this study, I evaluate the effect of a state level Medicaid policy change that stopped 
physician payment for EEDs. The first state to implement this strategy was Texas in 2011. Since, 
ten other states have enacted the same policy (New York, New Mexico, Nevada, Montana, South 
Carolina, Louisiana, plus the four treatment states). Reducing or eliminating payments for a given 
service is advantageous from a policy perspective due to its simplicity. It is methodologically 
straightforward, which serves as a strong predictor of effectiveness. Studies show that incentives 
are most conducive to behavior change and decreased gaming when there is a clear, one-to-one 
relationship between the behavior and reinforcement (Town et al., 2004). Further, this payment 
policy largely retains a FFS structure, the preferred payment by physicians (Bain, 2017; Ikegami, 
2015). I compare the spillover effects of this policy to three other policies that have similar goals 
and offer either financial or non-financial incentives to physicians. 
 Another approach that leverages financial incentives is Medicaid pay-for-performance 
reimbursement, which offers a bonus payment to physicians that achieve a benchmark EED rate. 
In 2010, Washington launched the Safety Net Assessment Act, which gave hospitals a 1% increase 
in their Medicaid reimbursement for reducing EEDs from one year to the next (Association of State 
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and Territorial Health Officials, 2014). Colorado adopted a similar program in 2011, called the 
Hospital Quality Incentive Payment (HQIP) Program. HQIP offers volume-adjusted payments 
based on Medicaid discharges and quality achievement on five performance measures (one of 
which is EEDs) (Colorado Medicaid, 2016). Wisconsin rolled out the Obstetric Medical Home 
(OBMH) program between 2011 and 2013, which pays the obstetrician an additional $1,000 for 
each Medicaid patient that attends ten prenatal visits and a postpartum visit within 60 days of birth. 
OBMH practitioners are given an additional $1,000 bonus per positive birth outcome, including 
full-term births (Agrawal, 2017). Differences between discontinuing payment for EEDs and 
providing a bonus for EED performance in Medicaid applies behavioral economic principles of 
prospect theory, under which individuals value gains and losses of the same magnitude 
asymmetrically. In other words, they lose more utility from a penalty than they gain from an 
equivalent bonus. From a behavioral perspective, this suggests that when faced with uncertainty 
(e.g. reimbursement changes for EEDs), financial penalties will be more effective than bonuses; 
physicians, aiming to avoid financial losses, will reduce the provision of low-value care, even if it 
means suboptimal expected utility (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 There are two main approaches that utilize non-financial incentives. The first is a “hard 
stop” policy, under which hospitals voluntarily pledge to ban EEDs by requiring hospital review 
and approval for any delivery before 39 weeks’ gestation without documented indication. Eleven 
states (Arkansas, Arizona, California, Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Tennessee, and Oklahoma) implemented these initiatives between 2009 and 2013. This 
policy adds an effort-related cost to providing an EED to discourage their use. These programs 
target hospitals with a relatively higher share of Medicaid births, but all hospitals are encouraged 
to participate. The pledge to reduce EEDs applies to the overall hospital rate, and is not payer-
specific. The second approach is a quality improvement collaborative, which takes on a range of 
structures. They generally involve a coalition of professional, clinical, and non-governmental 
organizations rolling out educational awareness campaigns on the dangers of EEDs and low-risk c-
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sections for expecting mothers and delivering obstetricians. Many programs go a step further by 
requiring hospitals to report their EED rates, to track performance and promote accountability. This 
strategy is two-pronged, as it attempts to change the culture surrounding provision of EEDs through 
education and multi-stakeholder buy-in, while also publicly comparing physicians with their peers 
to enact social pressure and change norms. 
2.2.3. Effects of the Medicaid Payment Policy 
Empirical studies have measured the Medicaid policy’s direct effects in single state 
analyses using a DD framework (Allen & Grossman, 2019; Dahlen et al., 2017). Dahlen et al. 
(2017) examined the impact of the 2011 Texas Medicaid payment change implemented 
concurrently with a voluntary hard stop policy, finding a 14% significant decline in the EED rate 
compared to control states. The largest impacts were observed among minority patients. Birth 
outcomes also improved significantly, with birthweight increasing by 6 ounces (Dahlen et al., 
2017). Allen and Grossman (2019) explored the effects of the Medicaid policy and a voluntary hard 
stop policy in South Carolina. The study found that the payment policy (which was implemented 
in both commercial and Medicaid markets) reduced EEDs by 16.6%, while the hard stop policy 
reduced them by 12.7%, relative to controls. The decline in EEDs was higher for Medicaid than 
commercial patients (18.9% versus 16.6%, respectively) (Allen & Grossman, 2019). Byanova 
(2015) also assessed the joint effects of a hard stop initiative and Medicaid nonpayment in Texas, 
finding that Medicaid and non-Medicaid EEDs declined by 18.5% and 5.9%, respectively. The 
study also observed a 13.1% increase in the non-Medicaid total c-section rate, attributing this to 
demand inducement (Byanova, 2015). Existing work has not examined indirect effects of the policy 
in the non-Medicaid population, and no studies have adopted a multi-state analysis. Further, studies 
have not directly compared the impact of the Medicaid payment policy to other financial and non-




2.3. Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1. Model 
 In this section, I develop a theoretical framework for understanding why variation in 
spillovers occurs in response to financial incentives, in the context of low-value services. In 
particular, I am interested in how physicians adjust the provision of care in the commercial sector 
in response to Medicaid nonpayment of a low-value service. I begin with a physician utility model 
in the style of Ellis and McGuire (1986), where a physician selects a quantity of services to 
maximize utility over profits (𝜋) and patient well-being (𝐵) (Ellis & McGuire, 1986). I extend the 
framework by considering how a physician may vary behavior across payers and services. In 
particular, the utility model 𝑈 allows flexibility for a physician to choose a different quantity of 
care for Medicaid (𝑥𝑚) and non-Medicaid (𝑥𝑛) patients across services 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑘: 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛼HOSP[𝐵(𝑥𝑗,𝑚) + 𝐵(𝑥𝑗,𝑛)]
𝐾
𝑗=1 + 𝛿𝜋(𝑥𝑗,𝑚) + (1 − 𝛿)𝜋(𝑥𝑗,𝑛)   [1] 
In [1], profit is a function of the income for Medicaid and non-Medicaid services (𝜌𝑚 and 
𝜌𝑛), defined by net earnings after subtracting monetary costs from total reimbursement; non-
financial, or implicit, effort-related costs (𝑒); and quantity of care selected across Medicaid and 
non-Medicaid patients (𝑥𝑚 and 𝑥𝑛): 
𝜋(𝜌, 𝑒; 𝑥𝑚 , 𝑥𝑛)          [2] 
The model adds two unique components. First, it considers the share of a physician’s 
patients that are insured by Medicaid, 𝛿, and the remaining proportion insured by non-Medicaid 
payers (1 − 𝛿). Second, it assumes that the weight a physician places on patient benefits varies by 
the type of hospital that a physician is employed. In practice, a physician’s preference contains a 
weight for agency, α, which represents the marginal rate of substitution, or the rate at which the 
physician is willing to trade off one dollar of hospital profit for one dollar of patient benefit, such 
that 1 > 𝛼 > 0. If a physician were to serve as perfect agent for the patient, then 𝛼 = 1, and then 
the physician weights their profit equally to the patient’s benefit. I assume that 𝛼 varies with the 
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index HOSP, or the type of hospital that a physician is employed (non-profit, for-profit, or public), 
and that all else equal, the physician serves as a better agent when employed by a non-profit, relative 
to a for-profit, hospital (𝛼FORPROF < 𝛼NONPROF).  
For simplicity, I explore the case where k represents E for EEDs, C for low-risk c-sections, 
and V for full-term vaginal deliveries. The distinction between these services is that E and C are 
low-value, and V is high-value, so the implicit costs of providing E and C (e.g. concerns about 
harming the patient, uncertainty as to whether the service is appropriate) are relatively higher. The 
marginal profit is higher for C than for the other services. The first-order conditions (FOCs) for 
Medicaid and non-Medicaid treatment are: 
𝛼HOSP[𝐵′(𝑥𝐸,𝑚) + 𝐵′(𝑥𝐶,𝑚) + 𝐵′(𝑥𝑉,𝑚)] + 𝛿[𝜋
′(𝑥𝐸,𝑚) + 𝜋
′(𝑥𝐶,𝑚) + 𝜋
′(𝑥𝑉,𝑚)] = 0  [3] 
𝛼HOSP[𝐵′(𝑥𝐸,𝑛) + 𝐵′(𝑥𝐶,𝑛) + 𝐵′(𝑥𝑉,𝑛)] + (1 − 𝛿)[𝜋
′(𝑥𝐸,𝑛) + 𝜋
′(𝑥𝐶,𝑛) + 𝜋
′(𝑥𝑉,𝑛)] = [4] 
 In general, I assume that 𝜋′(𝑥𝑗,𝑛) > 𝜋
′(𝑥𝑗,𝑚), or the marginal profit is higher for non-
Medicaid patients for a given service, as prices tend to be higher on average. Assuming that 
marginal patient benefits are equal across payers (e.g. 𝐵′(𝑥𝐸,𝑚) = 𝐵′(𝑥𝐸,𝑛), 𝐵′(𝑥𝐶,𝑚) = 𝐵′(𝑥𝐶,𝑛), 










       [5] 
 When the Medicaid payment policy is implemented, the marginal profit for Medicaid 
EEDs, 𝜋′(𝑥𝐸,𝑚), drops significantly. Since the payment policy is only implemented in Medicaid, 
the marginal profit for non-Medicaid EEDs remains relatively higher, and the gap widens relative 
to pre-policy implementation: 𝜋′(𝑥𝐸,𝑚) < 𝜋′(𝑥𝐸,𝑛). Intuitively, the volume of Medicaid EEDs will 
fall with the price, a result that has been demonstrated empirically (Allen & Grossman, 2019; 
Byanova, 2015; Dahlen et al., 2017). Since the right and left terms are equivalent, it follows that 
the total marginal profit among non-Medicaid services, 𝜋′(𝑥𝐸,𝑛) + 𝜋
′(𝑥𝐶,𝑛) + 𝜋
′(𝑥𝑉,𝑛), increases 
with 𝛿, or share of Medicaid patients. Based on this result, it is likely that the mix of services 
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changes among the non-Medicaid population after implementation of the Medicaid payment policy, 
but whether and how physicians choose to substitute depends on the spillover mechanism. 
2.3.2. Mechanisms for Spillovers 
Spillovers may arise through several mechanisms. One likely avenue is through use of 
ready-to-wear treatments, or common practice patterns across patients, regardless of insurance type 
(Frank et al., 2007). This may transpire as a physician’s strategy to combat the challenges of 
customizing care for patients insured by different payers. It may also result from learning new skills 
while treating Medicaid patients, and applying them to non-Medicaid patients (Baicker et al., 2013; 
Chernew, Baicker, & Martin, 2010). In the model, this is represented by marginal profits for EEDs, 
𝜋′(𝑥𝐸,𝑛), decreasing in 𝛿 because of implicit, non-monetary costs of continuing to provide the 
service. The magnitude of the response is expected to rise as a physician gains Medicaid patients, 
with practice patterns converging towards the “modal” patient (Glied & Zivin, 2002). Spillovers 
are also more likely to arise when patients have similar clinical reasons for seeking care (e.g. 
childbirth). In these circumstances, it is likely that the physician can use the same standards of care 
across patients, potentially leading to improvements in outcomes and cost savings (Chernew et al., 
2010). If a reduction in non-Medicaid EEDs is accompanied by an increase in full-term vaginal 
deliveries, the spillover may be a welfare-improving, as it offsets services where the marginal cost 
exceeds net patient benefit (Baicker et al., 2013). 
 Another channel for spillovers is through physician-induced demand, under which 
physicians respond to negative income shocks by increasing volume or intensity of services, 
beyond the optimal amount (McGuire & Pauly, 1991). Inducement is “costly” for the physician, in 
the sense that it may cause harm to the patient; thus, it will only occur when the profit margin is 
high and the time cost is low. Spillovers of a fee change in one market may be characterized by 
inducement in more profitable sectors, since the physician has alternate avenues through which to 
recoup income. In particular, inducement is likely to occur when a substitutable, more profitable, 
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and less time intensive service exists through which to pursue inducement (Chernew et al., 2010; 
McGuire & Pauly, 1991). In the model, I may observe physician-induced demand through the effect 
of the Medicaid payment policy on low-risk c-sections among non-Medicaid patients. In this 
setting, it is possible that the physician seeks to recover income lost for EEDs by increasing the 
volume of a more profitable service, such as low-risk c-sections. As the marginal profit for low-
risk c-sections increases compared to its substitutes, inducement-related spillovers are expected to 
rise. These effects are also likely to amplify when exposure to the fee change, measured by 𝛿, 
increases, because physicians must induce more to account for a greater proportion of lost income. 
This spillover suggests that policy efforts to reduce spending in Medicaid may be cost-increasing 
in the commercial sector, due to higher profitability among privately insured patients. 
2.3.3. Physician Behavior by Hospital Type 
The degree to which spillovers occur may be influenced by the physician’s hospital type. 
Non-profit hospitals have a distinct objective function, under which they aim to maximize profits 
and quality, rather than focusing predominantly on profits (Newhouse, 1970). This is represented 
in the model by varying physician agency, 𝛼, by hospital type, where patient benefits are considered 
more important by physicians in a non-profit hospital setting (𝛼FORPROF < 𝛼NONPROF). In general, 
this framework suggests that in the absence of financial incentives, physicians in non-profit 
hospitals maintain higher levels of quality, and lower supply of low-value services, relative to those 
in for-profits. It also implies that practitioners in non-profit hospitals may be less attentive to 
changes in the financial environment, including payment incentives aimed at reducing low-value 
care. In contrast, physicians in for-profit hospitals, driven by financial objectives, are likely to 
respond more strongly to changes in service profitability (Dranove et al., 2017; Horwitz, 2005). 
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2.3.4. Testable Predictions 
In this analysis, I empirically test model predictions by investigating whether there were 
spillovers of EEDs and low-risk c-sections to the commercial sector after implementation of the 
Medicaid payment policy.  
2.3.4.1. First, I test whether spillovers are prompted by ready-to-wear 
treatments.  
Under this mechanism, I expect there to be a greater reduction in EEDs as policy 
exposure, or the share of Medicaid patients, rises. This would signal convergence 
of physician practice patterns towards a modal patient. 
2.3.4.2. Second, I test if spillovers arise from physician-induced demand. 
In this case, I expect the Medicaid payment policy to increase low-risk c-sections 
among the commercial population, as this service is less time consuming and more 
profitable compared to EEDs. Further, I anticipate the effects of induced demand 
to be higher in areas where c-sections are more profitable relative to vaginal 
deliveries, and where the magnitude of profit loss is greatest (e.g. in areas with 
more Medicaid patients). 
2.3.4.3. Third, I test if variation in spillovers is driven by a physician’s 
hospital setting. 
If so, I expect to observe a stronger reduction in EEDs in areas with a greater share 
of for-profit, rather than non-profit and public hospitals, where objectives are 





2.4.1. Analytic Data Set 
The data for the main outcome, EED rate, is Medicare’s Hospital Compare Database from 
2013 to 2017. Hospital Compare is a comprehensive, hospital-level database containing quality 
measures reported as part of a mandatory initiative, the Medicare Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) 
Program. It was formed through a public-private collaboration between Medicare and the Hospital 
Quality Alliance in 2002, to improve quality of U.S. hospitals by making information on hospital 
performance publicly accessible to consumers. Hospital Compare data are collected and updated 
from hospitals on a quarterly basis; all hospitals are required to submit rates for a set of quality 
measures, except critical access hospitals, which may voluntarily submit their data. 
Hospital Compare data confer several advantages. First, all measures are validated and 
endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF), the only consensus-based healthcare organization 
in the U.S., as defined by the Office of Management and Budget. NQF endorsement is the gold 
standard for quality metrics, as it uses a transparent, evidence-based, and consensus-based process 
driven by experts. Second, the mandatory nature of the Hospital Compare data allow longitudinal, 
hospital-level data to be easily accessible for research. Unlike voluntary reporting, this ensures that 
there are no systematic omissions in the data set, which improves representativeness and 
generalizability. Finally, Hospital Compare relies on multiple data elements, including 
administrative data and medical records, which can improve completeness and accuracy. The data 
also have some limitations. All measures are aggregated to a single all-payer rate, so insurer- and 
physician-specific rates cannot be identified. Further, since hospitals are responsible for self-
reporting data, differences in hospital size, types of patients, and sampling strategies may reduce 
standardization, and thus, measure precision may be limited. Finally, Hospital Compare began 
publicly reporting perinatal care measures in 2013, which limits the length of the pre-policy period 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016; National Quality Forum, 2019).  
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To create the analytic data set, I merge the Hospital Compare database to several other data 
sources. All data sets are aggregated to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level and linked 
using a concatenated State-MSA identifier to obtain a consistent unit of analysis. State-MSA is the 
smallest common indicator across all data sets. To aggregate the Hospital Compare data, I use the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s U.S. Postal Service’s Zip Code Crosswalk. 
Since Zip Codes often overlap the boundaries of multiple MSAs, duplicate Zip Code records exist 
in the crosswalk (one per Zip Code-MSA pair). To ensure that the EED rate is proportionately 
counted within and across MSAs, and to account for population differences within a Zip Code, I 
multiply each EED numerator and denominator by the ratio of residential addresses as a weight. A 
residential ratio weight is available for each Zip Code-MSA pair, with the sum of weights for each 
Zip Code equaling 1.0 (Wilson & Din, 2018). 
For the second outcome variable, low-risk c-sections, I use the Truven Marketscan 
Commercial Claims Database, which links paid claims and encounter data with detailed patient 
information across sites and types of providers over time. Data are available for an extended pre-
policy period, so I use data from 2010 to 2017. The MarketScan database is a convenience sample 
of enrollees in commercial employer and health plans, but it includes proprietary claims from over 
36 million hospital discharges (Johns Hopkins, 2016). This enables identification of the change in 
low-risk c-sections among the privately insured. These data are collected across broad geographic 
areas to represent treatment patterns and costs in the U.S. I use several maternal and clinical 
characteristics as covariates. One limitation is that a major insurer dropped out of the MarketScan 
data in 2015. To avoid differential selection into the database over time, I limit the sample to the 
employer population, which remains stable over the study period. 
For the remaining covariates, I link to additional data sources (the U.S. Census Bureau’s  
American Community Survey (ACS), the Health Resources and Services Administration’s Area 
Health Resource File (AHRF), the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, and the 
National Practitioners Data Bank (NPDB)). The ACS has publicly available data on demographic 
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and employment characteristics for all counties. AHRF includes data on health professions and 
facilities, hospital utilization, and spending. Both are extracted at the county-level, and then 
aggregated and linked at the State-MSA level. The AHA data contains hospital-level information, 
so I collapse it to the State-MSA level using a county to MSA crosswalk, and then link it to the 
main data set. The AHA Survey is the most widely used database for hospital-level information, 
with an average response rate of 83%. The AHA estimates certain measures for non-reporting 
hospitals, or those that submit incomplete survey information, using U.S. Census and other 
national-level data sources. Finally, I use the state-level NPDB, a web-based repository containing 
information on state-level medical malpractice payments (AHA, 2018; HRSA, 2019; NPDB, 2019; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). 
The final analytic sample consists of 3,951 State-MSA-quarters between 2013 and 2017. 
This includes 553 State-MSA-quarters among treatment states; 436 State-MSA-quarters among 
states with no EED-related policies; 1,135 State-MSA-quarters among states with hard stop 
policies; 1,352 State-MSA-quarters among states with quality improvement coalitions; and 475 
State-MSA-quarters among states with Medicaid pay-for-performance programs. 
2.4.2. Empirical Strategy 
The identification strategy is a difference-in-differences (DD) framework comparing 
treatment states (GA, IN, MO, and MS) to four sets of control states, including those with: (1) no 
policy to curb EEDs, (2) a voluntary hard stop policy, (3) a quality improvement collaborative, and 
(4) a Medicaid pay-for-performance program. The analysis spans one pre-implementation year 
(2013) and three post-implementation years (2015-2017). The EED Medicaid policy acts as a 
source of exogenous variation, where physicians in GA, IN, MO, and MS are subject to 
discontinued reimbursement for Medicaid EEDs, while control states are not, leading to a quasi-
experimental design. This approach is modeled on earlier work comparing direct effects of the 
Medicaid payment policy on utilization and birth outcomes within a single state (Allen & 
Grossman, 2019; Byanova, 2015; Dahlen et al., 2017). Each state implemented the Medicaid 
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payment policy between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2015. Due to the variation in treatment 
timing, I begin the post period in 2015. By omitting 2014 (the period in which states were launching 
the Medicaid payment policy at different time points), I ensure that each state has the same pre- 
and post-period. This aims to avoid biasing estimates by including later-treated states in the 
comparison group before treatment begins (Goodman-Bacon, 2018). 
The control groups represent types of initiatives aimed at curbing EEDs in other states. 
This strategy is twofold. First, it mitigates the threat of contaminating the true effect of the Medicaid 
payment policy of interest by directly comparing states that have employed a single approach. It 
also enables comparing the Medicaid payment policy to other financial and non-financial incentive 
structures. The policies in each comparison group were enacted prior to 2014. The main control 
group includes eight states with no policies in place to reduce EEDs (ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, and WY). The Medicaid pay-for-performance comparison group has three states (WA, CO, 
and WI). For non-financial incentives, the hard stop policy group includes eleven states (AR, UT, 
DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, and OK), and the quality improvement initiative group has 
eleven states (AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT).  
The DD identification strategy relies on the untestable assumption that treatment states 
would have similar trends to the control group if the policy had not been implemented. If trends are 
parallel in the pre-policy period, even if there is a difference in magnitude, I assume that differential 
changes in the post-period are driven by the policy, rather than inherent differences between 
regions. For each control group, I compare pre-policy trends in EEDs and low-risk c-sections to 
trends in the treatment states. All groups have statistically similar trends. 
I estimate the impact of the Medicaid payment policy using the following equation: 
𝑌𝑚𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ Treat𝑠 + 𝛽2 ⋅ Post𝑡 + 𝛽3 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Post𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗 ⋅ 𝑍𝑚 + µ ⋅ 𝑉𝑠 + 𝑚𝑠𝑡  [6] 
  In [6], 𝛽3 is the coefficient of interest, and it represents the aggregate effect of the 
Medicaid payment policy. 𝑌𝑚𝑠𝑡  is the expected value of the outcome, discussed further below. It is 
indexed by State-MSA m; in state s; at time t, which is representative of pre/post policy 
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implementation. Treat is a binary variable that denotes the presence of the Medicaid payment 
policy, and Post is a binary variable that indicates the policy post-period. 𝑉𝑠 and 𝑇𝑡  are state and 
year fixed-effects, respectively.  
𝑍𝑚 is a vector of time-varying State-MSA-level controls, which account for maternal 
characteristics, healthcare factors, and demographic and economic variables that may influence 
physician practice patterns. Maternal characteristics, drawn from the MarketScan data, include the 
percent of commercially insured mothers that are over 35 years old, the percent with a hospital 
length of stay over four days (the number of days typically covered by the insurer), and cost sharing 
quartile bins (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020). Healthcare factors, extracted from 
AHA, AHRF, NPDB, and the MarketScan databases, include hospital characteristics (percent of 
hospitals that are non-profit, percent of hospitals that provide obstetric services, beds per 1,000, 
and percent of patients that are insured by Medicaid), primary care practitioners per 1,000, and 
financial attributes (average price differential between commercial c-sections and vaginal 
deliveries, and malpractice risk, defined as the average obstetric-related malpractice payout). 
Demographic characteristics from the ACS include percent of the population with less than a high 
school education, percent of the population with more than a college education, and percent of the 
population that is Black. Finally, economic characteristics from the ACS and AHRF include percent 
uninsurance, percent unemployment, and percent poverty.  
I add dummy variables for the number of waves that a State-MSA appears in the data. I use 
wild bootstrapped standard errors, resampled 1,000 times and clustered at the State-MSA level. 
This accounts for covariance in geographic areas over time by multiplying the residual from each 
observation in a given cluster with a random variable that mimics the correlation in each cluster 
(Mackinnon, 2015; Roodman, Nielsen, Webb, & Mackinnon, 2018). This method is appropriate 
when there are few treated clusters and residuals are heteroskedastic, leaving traditional standard 
error approaches prone to over-rejection (Cameron & Miller, 2015; Colin Cameron, Gelbach, & 
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Miller, 2008; Conley & Taber, 2005) (Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4). All models are estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares. 
The primary outcome is the all-payer EED rate, defined as the percent of patients in the 
State-MSA-quarter with elective vaginal deliveries or elective cesarean births between ≥ 37 and < 
39 weeks’ gestation completed, excluding individuals with conditions justifying elective delivery 
prior to 39 weeks. Justifiable conditions include comorbidities in the prenatal period (e.g. 
hypertension, diabetes, eclampsia, breech, and fetal abnormalities), and pregnancy complications 
(e.g. prolonged labor, fetal distress, or premature rupture of membranes) (Glantz, 2005). I measure 
this rate using the Joint Commission’s Perinatal Care-01 (PC-01) methodology. Hospital Compare 
mandated that all hospitals with annual births totaling 1,100 or more submit PC-01 for public 
reporting, beginning January 1, 2013 (Joint Commission, 2019). I rely on this measure instead of 
commercial claims because International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes 
lack the granularity needed to properly measure gestational age for EEDs. ICD-9 provides a single 
code for 37 or more completed weeks gestation, making it impossible to identify early-term births 
that occur between 37 and 39 weeks. The secondary outcome in this study is low-risk c-sections, 
defined as the percent of nulliparous women with a term, singleton baby in a vertex position 
delivered by c-section. I follow the methodology developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ), using Inpatient Quality Indicator (IQI) 33 (Agency for Healthcare Quality 
and Research, 2016). PC-01 and IQI 33 aggregate a rolling four-quarter measure rate, to ensure an 
adequate denominator size. Both measures are endorsed by the NQF as a consensus standard for 
hospital care.  
Since PC-01 is all-payer, I cannot disentangle the direct result within Medicaid versus the 
spillover to privately insured patients. I conduct additional analyses to gain insight into this question 
by examining whether effects increase in geographic areas with a high share of Medicaid patients, 
split at the median level in the pre-policy period. I expect that if effects spilled over to the 
commercial sector, then the reduction in EEDs would remain constant across different levels of the 
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policy exposure, measured by the Medicaid share. There is also some overlap in outcomes, as early 
elective c-sections are captured by both measures, but I cannot identify the degree of overlap. This 
can mask important effects if early term c-sections are decreasing, while full-term c-sections are 
increasing. To account for this, I avoid double-counting early inductions and c-sections using Allen 
and Grossman’s (2019) approach, which treats inductions as the “absorbing state.” In other words, 
if a patient’s claim indicates both an induction and a c-section, I assume that the induction occurred 
first and exclude these observations from the low-risk c-section measure. There is little evidence to 
suggest that this is a substantial concern (Allen & Grossman, 2019). 
I pursue a variety of robustness checks. First, I repeat the analyses using multiple group 
propensity score weights proposed by Stuart et al. (2014). Propensity scores aim to reduce selection 
bias by constructing a control group similar to the treatment, weighting units on a set of observed 
covariates. This reduces extrapolation of the counterfactual and aggregates a large number of 
confounders into a simple scalar (Stuart et al., 2014). However, when treatment and comparison 
states come from different underlying populations, propensity scores can introduce regression to 
the mean bias by selecting the “unusual” individuals from each of the two populations (e.g., those 
with lower values in the treatment group and higher values in the control group) (Daw & Hatfield, 
2018); this introduces a tradeoff between improved covariate balance (with propensity scores) and 
regression to the mean bias (without propensity scores). I use an unweighted approach for the main 
analysis, but run supplemental models with multiple group propensity score weights.  
Second, I employ an event study to determine if results are robust to standardized 
implementation timing. I also run sensitivity tests for alternate samples and outcomes. In the third 
sensitivity analysis, I re-run analyses using alternate treatment groups by dropping one treatment 
state at a time. Fourth, I re-estimate the models using individual quarterly outcome rates, rather 
than rolling four-quarter rates. Fifth, I re-run analyses excluding observations that did not report 
outcomes for all waves of data. Sixth, I test whether results are sensitive to inclusion of non-
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metropolitan areas. Finally, I re-run models with a smaller unit of analysis to determine whether 
inferences are stable with a larger sample size. 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Validity of Study Design 
Table 2-1 summarizes State-MSA characteristics in treatment and control states, before and 
after implementation of the Medicaid payment policy. Differences in maternal and healthcare 
characteristics are relatively small in the pre-policy period. Prior to the Medicaid payment policy, 
treatment states had fewer mothers over 35 years old, more births with LOS over 4 days, and greater 
average cost sharing, compared to the main control group. Treatment states also had more Medicaid 
patients, fewer non-profit hospitals, fewer hospitals that provide obstetric care, lower density of 
primary care physicians, and a smaller price differential between c-sections and vaginal deliveries 
among the commercial population. Hospital beds per 1,000 were consistent between the groups. 
Demographic and economic differences were greater. On average, the population in treatment 
states was less educated, and more likely to be Black, uninsured, unemployed, or impoverished 
compared to the main control group. Differences in the other control groups are similar for most 
variables; however, I observe a few contrasts. The quality improvement control group was 
marginally less educated than the treatment group. The pay-for-performance control group had 
slightly fewer mothers over 35 years old and fewer births with LOS over four days. Quality 
improvement and pay-for-performance groups had a higher share of Medicaid patients; these 
groups, along with the hard stop policy group, also had fewer hospital beds per 1,000.  
There is little evidence of differential changes in State-MSAs after the Medicaid payment 
policy is implemented. The gap in maternal age, as well as price differential between c-sections 
and vaginal deliveries, decreased, while differences in the Medicaid share increased. Average cost 
sharing rose across all intervention groups, while the uninsurance rate dropped. Other maternal, 
healthcare, demographic, and economic characteristic evolved similarly over time. 
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As discussed earlier, the DD approach relies on the assumption that trends in treatment and 
control states would evolve similarly without the Medicaid nonpayment policy. Although I cannot 
test this directly, I analyze pre-implementation trends to assess validity of the analysis. Figure 2-1 
and Figure 2-2 plot unadjusted quarterly means of EEDs and low-risk c-sections, respectively. The 
red lines represent outcome trends in the treatment group and the blue lines represent outcome 
trends in each control group. Visual inspection suggests that EEDs follow similar pre-policy trends 
in treatment and control groups (Figure 2-1), while other outcomes are noisier (Figure 2-2). To 
verify that pre-trends are statistically similar, I run formal tests to assess differential pre-trends 
(Table 2-5). I use the main model specification, but limit inclusion to the pre-policy period. The 
coefficient of interest is the interaction between treatment and a linear quarter-year time trend. I 
find no statistically significant differences in trends, with the magnitude of all differences below 
1%. These results are consistent with a valid identification strategy. But, since I cannot observe the 
counterfactual, it is important to apply a critical lens to the theoretical considerations. 
One concern is that controlling for factors that are theoretically associated with higher levels 
of the outcome at baseline may mask important differences in trends (Kahn-Lang & Lang, 2018; 
Roth, 2019). For example, treatment states have fewer non-profit hospitals, which may contribute 
to lower initial levels of quality. This context is helpful for highlighting variation across groups, 
and provides a possible explanation for visual differences in pre-trends. Parallel counterfactual 
trends might be violated if the “common shocks” assumption is not upheld (e.g. if one group has a 
policy shock not experienced by the other group) (Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Ryan, Burgess, & 
Dimick, 2015). Similarly, part of the parallel counterfactual trends assumption is that covariates 
experience similar changes in magnitude and direction across treatment and control groups. To my 
knowledge, there are no obvious time-varying unobservable characteristics that would confound 
the policy effect. Medicaid expansion did not affect eligibility for pregnant women, who were 
already eligible up to 200% of the federal poverty line (Carroll et al., 2018). Synchronous federal 
policy (e.g. Choosing Wisely guideline advising against EEDs) may contribute to declining trends, 
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but I expect these policies contribute equally to both groups (Figure 2-5). Based on these factors, I 
infer that counterfactual trends are parallel, further validating the study design. 
2.5.2. Effect of Medicaid Payment Policy on Early Elective Deliveries 
I first assess the effect of the Medicaid payment policy on EEDs, the primary target of the 
policy. Regression estimates of [6] are displayed in Table 2-2. Relative to the main control group, 
I find that EEDs decreased by 3.35% after the policy was implemented (95% Confidence Interval 
(CI): -6.69, -0.12). I observe larger effects in the treatment group compared to the hard stop policy 
group and the pay-for-performance group, with EEDs declining by 3.92% (95% CI: -6.98, -0.82) 
and 3.58% (95% CI: -6.73, -0.61), respectively. I estimate a smaller, insignificant decrease in EEDs 
compared to quality improvement programs. These results show that Medicaid nonpayment 
achieved its intended goal of reducing statewide all-payer EEDs, with a stronger response observed 
in comparison to a voluntary non-financial incentive and a financial bonus, but not an education-
driven collaborative approach. 
Next, I study whether the effect of the Medicaid payment policy varies by policy exposure, 
or the share of Medicaid patients (Table 2-3). I find no evidence of differential changes in EEDs 
between areas with a higher versus lower proportion of Medicaid patients. When comparing the 
Medicaid payment policy to the main control group, there is an insignificant decline in EEDs of 
1.17% in areas with fewer Medicaid patients (95% CI: -5.69, 7.57). No comparison groups have 
significant differences. Since changes in all-payer EEDs do not vary by the share of Medicaid 
patients, my analysis suggests that both commercial and Medicaid patients were affected by the 
Medicaid payment change, and is suggestive of a spillover to the privately insured. 
To understand what is driving the decrease in EEDs, I estimate whether effects of the 
Medicaid payment policy on EEDs vary across providers and areas with different financial and 
reputational characteristics. To do so, I modify [6] by adding an interaction term that multiplies 
treatment, post-policy period, and a binary variable for the characteristic of interest. 
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I first examine whether there are heterogeneous effects by the commercial price differential 
between c-sections and vaginal deliveries in a given geographic area (Table 2-3). A lower price 
difference means a relatively greater profit for physicians who substitute a low-value service (an 
EED) with a high-value service (a full-term vaginal delivery). This presents a larger incentive to 
reduce EEDs if physicians consider tradeoffs in treatment decisions across the entire choice set. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, I find a greater effect of the Medicaid payment policy in areas with 
a lower price differential, for all comparison groups. This difference is marginally significant 
between treatment states and pay-for-performance states, as areas with a lower price differential 
exhibit a 4.67% greater decline in EEDs compared to areas with a higher price differential (95% 
CI: -0.80, 10.15). Effects relative to other control groups are not significant. 
I also assess whether effects of the Medicaid payment policy vary between areas with a 
higher versus lower proportion of for-profit hospitals (Table 2-3). I find the reduction in EEDs to 
be greater in areas with more for-profit hospitals among treatment states. This difference is 
significant in treatment states compared to states with hard stop policies (β: 6.53%; 95% CI: -13.13, 
-0.02) and pay-for-performance initiatives (β: 7.65%; 95% CI: -13.74, -1.39). These results are 
consistent with my conceptual model, which suggests that physicians in for-profit hospitals may be 
more responsive to changes in service profitability compared to physicians in non-profit hospitals. 
2.5.3. Effect of Medicaid Payment Policy on Low-Risk C-Sections  
 In Table 2-4, I study the effect of the Medicaid payment policy on supply of low-risk c-
sections, to explore whether physician-induced demand is present in the commercial sector. If 
physicians are inducing demand to recoup profits lost from EEDs, I would expect to see an increase 
in low-risk c-sections in treatment states. I find little evidence of changes in low-risk c-sections. 
There is a small, statistically insignificant increase of 1.21% in low-risk c-sections in the treatment 
group compared to the main control group (95% CI: -1.36, 3.66). Since low-risk c-sections are 
declining across all groups, I can interpret this as a smaller decrease within treatment states. 
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Changes in low-risk c-sections relative to the other comparison groups are insignificant and small 
in magnitude (at or below 0.5%). 
 I further test whether there is evidence of induced demand by exploring whether there is a 
larger increase in low-risk c-sections in areas with higher policy exposure (measured by the share 
of Medicaid patients), and in areas where c-sections are more profitable (measured by the price 
differential between c-sections and vaginal deliveries in the commercial sector). If physicians 
replace the volume of EEDs with low-risk c-sections, this suggests a positive income effect. Similar 
to the EED analysis, I add a three-way interaction multiplying the treatment, post-period, and a 
binary indicator for high policy exposure or high profitability of c-sections [6]. I find no evidence 
of induced demand. Results in Table 2-4 indicate that low-risk c-sections decline to a greater extent 
in the treatment group in areas with a higher share of Medicaid patients, but these differences are 
small and insignificant (below 1.0%). There is also a small, but insignificant, increase of low-risk 
c-sections in areas with a high price difference between c-sections and vaginal deliveries. This 
suggests that the policy’s effect on low-risk c-sections does not vary by policy exposure or c-section 
profits, which would be expected under the demand inducement hypothesis. 
2.5.4. Robustness Checks 
In this section, I assess robustness of the results. First, I repeat the analyses using multiple 
group propensity score weights proposed by Stuart et al. (2014). In Table 2-7, I measure whether 
covariate balance improved with propensity score weights using the standardized mean difference 
(SMD) between treatment and control means. I construct multiple group propensity score weights 
separately in the pre- and post-periods, using logistic regression models. I observe improved 
balance with propensity scores. SMDs are below the recommended threshold of 0.25 for the 
majority of covariates (Stuart, Lee, & Leacy, 2013). Results are robust to propensity score 
weighting, with treatment states experiencing a 3.27% reduction in EEDs relative to the main 
control (95% CI: -7.16, 0.89), versus 3.35% in the main analysis (Table 2-6).  
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Second, I repeat analyses as an event study to determine if results are robust to standardizing timing 
of policy implementation across states. I follow Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020), which measures 
the “group-time average treatment effect” by adding interaction terms between treatment, post-
period, and year of treatment implementation (Callaway & Sant’Anna, 2020). For control groups, 
I add a binary indicator for “never-treated.” Results were generally consistent with the main 
analysis, except with significantly larger spillovers in the event study, ranging from 14.35% to 
20.74% (Table 2-12; Figure 2-6 and Figure 2-7). The discrepancy in the event study result is likely 
driven by high pre-treatment EED rates in MS, the only state to enact the Medicaid payment policy 
in 2015 (rather than 2014). Since this event study approach assigns equal weight to each group-
time effect, MS receives disproportionate weight, thereby inflating point estimates (Sun & 
Abraham, 2020). Thus, I rely on the main analysis to make inferences on spillover magnitude. 
Next, I re-run analyses using alternate treatment groups, each with a treatment state omitted 
to assess whether a single state disproportionately influenced results. I find that estimated 
reductions in EEDs range from 2.34% to 4.46% in the main control group, although models without 
GA or MS were no longer significant. All other comparisons had estimates comparable in direction 
and magnitude to the main analysis (Table 2-9). Fourth, I re-estimate the models using individual 
quarterly rates for EEDs and low-risk c-sections, instead of a rolling four-quarter measure period. 
I find that models are not sensitive to the alternate measurement specification (Table 2-8). Fifth, I 
re-run the models with non-metropolitan State-MSAs, finding that results are robust to inclusion 
of these observations (Table 2-10). Sixth, I re-run analyses excluding all State-MSAs that did not 
report outcomes for all waves of data (Table 2-11). I observe a 2.83% decline in EEDs compared 
to the main control group (95% CI: -6.51, 0.88). This suggests that missing values of the outcome, 
driven by variation in public reporting requirements over time, did not systematically impact 
results. Finally, results were not sensitive to using hospital-quarter or patient, rather than State-
MSA, as the unit of analysis. Hospital and patient level analyses increased the sample size to 3,102 
and 91,561, respectively, and led to comparable inferences (Table 2-13). Robustness checks 
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showed no significant changes in low-risk c-sections across all specifications, and the magnitude 
and direction remained fairly constant. 
2.6. Discussion 
 In this paper, I study the indirect effects of a Medicaid nonpayment incentive implemented 
between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2015 for EEDs, compared to other financial and non-
financial incentives. I compare how the Medicaid payment policy impacted use of low-value 
childbirth deliveries in the commercial market relative to states with other Medicaid policies, 
including: no policy aimed at reducing EEDs, a hard stop policy, a quality improvement 
collaborative, or a pay-for-performance reform. 
First, I explore whether the Medicaid payment policy prompted a reduction of EEDs among 
privately insured patients. I find that the Medicaid payment policy in GA, IN, MO, and MS led to 
a 3.35% decline in all-payer EEDs compared to states with no EED policy. The Medicaid payment 
policy also reduced all-payer EEDs by 3.92% and 3.58% compared to states with a hard stop policy 
and pay-for-performance program, respectively. Effects did not vary between geographic areas 
with a higher versus lower share of Medicaid patients. This provides suggestive evidence that both 
Medicaid and commercial patients were impacted by the policy, and indicates a positive spillover 
to the privately insured population. 
Next, I assess whether there was evidence of physician-induced demand by examining if 
there was an increase in low-risk c-sections. I do not find statistically significant changes in the rate 
of privately insured low-risk c-sections. Effects do not increase in areas with high policy exposure 
or in areas where c-sections are more profitable, suggesting that physicians do not substitute the 
volume of EEDs with low-risk c-sections. Taken together, this offers no evidence of physician-
induced demand, which would be expected in areas where the decline in profits is high and the time 
cost is low. Sensitivity tests support the main conclusions. 
Finally, I explore whether the variation in spillovers was consistent with financial or 
reputational drivers. I find changes to be consistent with financial drivers. I test whether the decline 
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in EEDs was greater in areas with a higher share of for-profit hospitals, which would be expected 
if physician respond more strongly to incentives that align with hospital objectives. I find a greater 
reduction in EEDs in areas with more for-profit hospitals in treatment states compared to hard stop 
and pay-for-performance groups. The magnitude of this effect is 6.53% and 7.65%, respectively. 
One explanation is that physicians in for-profit hospitals, motivated primarily by financial 
objectives, respond more strongly to changes in financial incentives than those in non-profits. In 
prior studies, for-profit hospitals demonstrated a more significant reaction to changes in the 
financial environment by offering a greater volume of profitable services (Dranove et al., 2017; 
Horwitz, 2005). As Medicaid EEDs become less profitable, it is possible that for-profit hospitals 
respond by reducing the overall provision of EEDs. Another explanation is that non-profit hospitals 
prioritize reputation, regardless of whether financial incentives are present, prompting a lesser 
response to the Medicaid payment change (Newhouse, 1970). This may point to barriers in 
changing physician practice patterns when objectives are not aligned with the hospital’s. I also 
observe a larger decrease in EEDs in areas with a lower price differential between c-sections and 
vaginal deliveries in the commercial sector. This is notable because a lower price difference 
between these services means that high-value substitutes are relatively profitable. This suggests 
that physicians consider tradeoffs across the entire choice set when making treatment decisions. 
 As several states and payers continue to debate payment policies to reduce low-value care, 
the analysis suggests that nonpayment incentives can be successful on a large scale. The magnitude 
of the results, however, indicates that Medicaid reimbursement may have a relatively modest 
spillover to commercially insured patients, compared to the direct effect within Medicaid. The 
estimate of a 3.35% decline in EEDs is significantly smaller than those observed in Medicaid 
populations in Texas (14%) and South Carolina (16.6%) (Allen & Grossman, 2019; Dahlen et al., 
2017). The effect size is comparable to evaluations of the non-Medicaid population in Texas, which 
also found significantly larger effects on Medicaid versus non-Medicaid EEDs. The difference in 
Texas was attributed to the Medicaid population facing both hard stop and reimbursement changes, 
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while the non-Medicaid population faced only the hard stop policy, rather than a direct spillover 
(Byanova, 2015). In contrast, I do not find effects of the Medicaid payment policy on commercial 
c-sections. Prior work found a 13.1% increase in non-Medicaid c-sections in Texas, with effects 
concentrated in hospitals with more Medicaid births (Byanova, 2015). This contrast may be due to 
differences in how I measure c-sections; the prior study examines the total c-section rate, while I 
focus on low-risk c-sections. Low-risk c-sections provide a more precise measure of demand 
inducement by capturing overuse of a low-value service. Since c-sections can be appropriate for 
risky births, focusing on the total c-section rate limits the ability to make inferences about whether 
treatment intensity is higher than optimal (Goer, Romano, & Sakala, 2012). The results contribute 
to a growing empirical literature on financial incentives and physician behavior, showing that 
incentives can lead to positive spillovers across payers. 
 These results have several implications for efforts to expand non-FFS payment reforms. 
First, this analysis indicates that discontinuing payment for a low-value service has potential to 
reduce unwanted physician behaviors, compared to the status quo. This is notable because Medicaid 
nonpayment is a relatively large penalty, as most value-based programs offer little to no downside 
risk. This work also suggests that financial nonpayment can yield greater improvements in 
statewide quality than a range of other financial and non-financial incentives. The largest gains 
among treatment states were made relative to hard stop policies. Hard stop initiatives are voluntary 
and strategies vary between hospitals. In contrast, the Medicaid payment policy rollout is 
standardized within states, and participation is mandatory. Thus, mandatory programs may have 
greater potential to engage providers with the highest levels of low-value care. Literature focused 
on mandatory incentive programs is limited; in general, studies conclude that spending reductions 
are greater in voluntary programs than in mandatory ones, but effects on quality are inconclusive 
(Dummit et al., 2016; Finkelstein, Ji, Mahoney, & Skinner, 2018; Liao, Sommers, & Navathe, 
2018; Navathe et al., 2018, 2017). This study offers preliminary evidence that low-value care may 
be reduced more effectively under mandatory, rather than voluntary, policies. Further, these results 
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offer initial evidence that imposing clear, coordinated goals across health systems may lead to 
larger declines in low-value treatment.   
Second, given significant reductions in EEDs due to Medicaid nonpayment compared to 
pay-for-performance payment, financial penalties may lead to greater spillovers than bonuses. 
These results are consistent with prospect theory in behavioral economics, which posits that 
providers value gains and losses of the same magnitude asymmetrically, and will respond more 
strongly to penalties to avoid financial losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Empirical evidence 
supports this notion, but this is the first study to explore spillovers across payers under this 
framework (Rizzo et al., 2002). Finally, Medicaid nonpayment for EEDs is equally as successful 
as quality improvement programs in reducing EEDs. Since quality improvement targets behavior 
changes across all payers, this suggests that Medicaid-specific payment reform may lead to stronger 
spillovers to other payers. It may also highlight how a non-financial incentive, with the multi-
pronged approach of education, stakeholder engagement, and performance measurement, can 
achieve similar results to Medicaid payment reform. 
This analysis has several limitations and suggests potential avenues for future work. First, 
I cannot identify physicians in the Hospital Compare or MarketScan databases. This limits the 
ability to attribute effects to changes in physician, rather than hospital, behavior. Further, since 
regional distribution of for-profit hospitals is not uniform, it is possible that other geographic factors 
(e.g. hospital concentration, physician-hospital integration), may contribute to variation in 
spillovers (American Hospital Association, 2018; Fulton, 2017; Health Care Cost Institute, 2017; 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018). It will be useful for future work to address this gap 
and examine these effects at the physician level. Exploring this area would enable a better 
understanding of physician characteristics that drive variation in policy effects, and the potential 
mechanism behind behavioral changes.  
Second, I am only able to identify all-payer, rather than commercial insurance-specific, 
EED rates. This limits the ability to make inferences about spillovers to the privately insured. I 
 
 46 
argue that since policy effects do not vary by the share of Medicaid patients, this suggests a possible 
effect on non-Medicaid births. To be certain, additional research focusing on commercial-specific 
EED rates, is needed. Third, I focus on spillovers of Medicaid payment reform in childbirth, so 
results may not be generalizable to other clinical areas. I argue that perinatal care has characteristics 
that reduce potential for effects to stem from confounders, which can increase application of results 
to other settings. Additional work is needed to strengthen this claim, especially given the small 
sample size. Next, the DD design rests on the assumption that no unobserved factors contribute to 
the observed effect. I address this concern with several robustness checks. However, minimal 
availability of data in the pre-policy period weakens interpretation of results. Finally, treatment 
states have lower initial levels of quality, leading to questions of whether federal guidelines, rather 
than the Medicaid policy, drive the observed effect. I simulate the expected effect of the guidelines 
(in the absence of the Medicaid policy) by assuming that treatment states follow an analogous trend 
to control states with no EED policy in the post-period (Figure 2-5). The figures show a 
significantly smaller expected decline in EEDs relative to the observed effect with the Medicaid 
payment policy, suggesting that spillovers stem from Medicaid nonpayment. The broader empirical 
literature has shown no strong evidence of significant improvements from Choosing Wisely 
guidelines (Grimshaw et al., 2020; Hilal & Munoz, 2020), but more research is needed to evaluate 
how these guidelines work in tandem with financial incentives targeting low-value care. 
 Non-FFS payment reforms are becoming increasingly salient, but there are remaining 
questions about how to design incentives that promote high-value care and generate cost savings. I 
present evidence that Medicaid incentives can be effective in reducing low-value care in the 
commercial sector, without prompting unintended consequences such as physician-induced 
demand. While the results are specific to perinatal care, this study provides general guidance about 
financial and non-financial design. Continuing to build an understanding of these incentives and 




Figure 2-1 Unadjusted Trends in Rates of Early Elective Deliveries in Treatment and Control States 
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Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs are from Hospital Compare in 2013-2017. Data points are unadjusted, quarterly means. 
Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, 
ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality 
improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-




Figure 2-2 Unadjusted Trends in Rates of Low-Risk Cesarean Sections in Treatment and Control States 
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Notes: Sample estimates for Low-risk c-sections from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. 
Data points are unadjusted, quarterly means. Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no 
EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, 
MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and 




Table 2-1 Summary Statistics of Treatment and Control States, Pre and Post Medicaid Payment Policy Implementation 
 









Main Hard Stop QI P4P Medicaid 
Policy 
Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Maternal Characteristics          
% Maternal 
Age 35+ 
10.86 13.35  13.05  14.18 10.73 11.80 13.54 12.78 13.75 12.91 
% LOS > 4 3.64 3.27 4.26 3.99 3.42 4.37 3.57 4.52 4.96 3.35 
Avg. % Cost 
Sharing 
15.57 15.23 14.57 11.76 14.05 16.01 17.07 17.33 13.50 14.48 
           
Healthcare 
Characteristics 
         
% Medicaid 15.38 14.79 14.30 17.26 15.41 15.80 14.21 16.68 19.96 17.05 
% Hospitals 
Non-Profit 




39.98 43.85 52.82 48.54 62.16 39.66 39.39 50.66 72.65 58.42 
Beds per 
1,000 
2.90 2.91 2.15 2.11 1.72 2.96 3.05 2.35 2.16 1.73 
PCPs per 
1,000 
0.68 0.85 0.82 0.72 0.81 0.67 0.86  0.82 0.73 0.79 
Avg. Price 
Differential 
          
< $0 1.48 0.93 3.24 3.88 1.71 3.83 3.34 2.68 4.52 2.23 
$0 - $5,000 70.37 42.06 55.76 51.04 31.62 60.53 49.85 55.43 47.98 35.47 
≥ $5,000 28.15 57.01 41.01 45.07 66.67 35.65 46.81 41.89 47.49 62.29 





         
% < HS 
Education 
13.74 10.02 10.58 13.82 9.80 12.64 8.96 9.81 13.00 8.88 
% > College 
Education 




22.04 8.56 12.70 11.86 3.51 22.13 8.59 12.67 11.98 3.62 
           
Economic Characteristics          
% 
Uninsured 
18.52 14.81 13.97 16.94 13.88 13.20 10.28 8.66 9.60 7.17 
% 
Unemployed 
7.77  6.08 7.08 8.61 7.17 5.01 4.21 4.55 6.09 4.58 
% Poverty 18.23 13.61  16.07  16.76  13.26  16.09  12.25  14.24 15.00 11.66 
           
State-MSA-
Quarters 
135 107 278 335 117 418 329 857 1,017 358 
# of States 4 8 11 11 3 4 8 11 11 3 
Notes: Sample estimates are from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Maternal characteristics are from the Truven MarketScan commercial claims database, using data 
from births during the study period. Healthcare characteristics are from the AHA Annual Survey, AHRF, and the NPDB. Average price differential represents the mean difference 
in reimbursement between c-sections and vaginal deliveries among births in the Truven MarketScan data. Demographic and economic characteristics are from the U.S. Census 
ACS. Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy 
group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and 
(4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, CO, WI).
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Table 2-2 Spillover Effects of Medicaid Payment Policy on Low-Value Care Outcomes 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 









N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: % (SD)    
Pre: Treatment Mean 9.01 (9.50) 9.01 (9.29) 9.01 (9.29) 9.01 (9.29) 
Pre: Control Mean 4.96 (4.83) 4.60 (7.91) 8.01 (8.45) 3.39 (3.20) 
Post: Treatment Mean 1.67 (1.90) 1.67 (1.90) 1.67 (1.90) 1.67 (1.90) 
Post: Control Mean 2.03 (2.77) 1.61 (1.94) 2.12 (2.12) 1.73 (1.59) 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 









N 1,773 3,021 3,421 1,827 
     
Dependent Variable Mean (SD)    
Pre: Treatment Mean 19.80 (6.67) 19.80 (6.67) 19.80 (6.67) 19.80 (6.67) 
Pre: Control Mean 18.17 (9.23) 17.59 (7.81) 18.38 (6.20) 13.76 (7.05) 
Post: Treatment Mean 19.08 (6.36) 19.08 (6.36) 19.08 (6.36) 19.08 (6.36) 
Post: Control Mean 16.19 (6.84) 16.61 (6.61) 17.92 (6.91) 13.36 (5.27) 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 





Table 2-3 Variation in Spillover Effects of Early Elective Deliveries by Financial Market 
Characteristics 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
High vs. Low Share of Medicaid Patients 












   
N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: %    
    
High Medicaid Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Treatment 10.29 1.94 10.29 1.94 10.29 1.94 10.29 1.94 
Control 5.81 1.76 4.02 1.72 6.71 1.98 3.31 1.58 
     
Low Medicaid     
Treatment 8.18 1.39 8.18 1.39 8.18 1.39 8.18 1.39 
Control 4.46 2.18 5.21 1.51 10.29 2.37 3.45 1.84 
     
High vs. Low Price Difference: Commercial C-Sections vs. Vaginal Deliveries 












   
N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: %    
    
High Price 
Difference 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Treatment 6.71 1.40 6.71 1.40 6.71 1.40 6.71 1.40 
Control 4.04 2.05 3.65 1.63 6.48 2.05 3.30 1.60 
     
Low Price 
Difference 
    
Treatment 11.07 1.86 11.07 1.86 11.07 1.86 11.07 1.86 
Control 8.15 1.96 5.56 1.59 9.92 2.21 3.99 2.55 
     
High vs. Low % For-Profit Hospitals 













   
N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: %    
    
High % For-Profit 
Hospitals 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Treatment 13.32 1.74 13.32 1.74 13.32 1.74 13.32 1.74 
Control 6.70 1.85 5.05 1.65 10.52 2.25 1.97 1.14 
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Low % For-Profit 
Hospitals 
    
Treatment 5.49 1.59 5.49 1.59 5.49 1.59 5.49 1.59 
Control 3.84 2.15 4.39 1.60 6.00 2.02 3.66 1.85 
 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs are from Hospital Compare in 2013-2017. Table cells include DDD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Stratification 
variables are determined by a threshold of ≥ median in the pre-policy period (2010-2013). Price differential represents the mean 
difference in reimbursement between c-sections and vaginal deliveries among births in the Truven MarketScan data. Control groups 
are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, 
WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 





Table 2-4 Variation in Spillover Effects of Low-Risk Cesarean Sections: An Exploration of Physician-
Induced Demand 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
High vs. Low Share of Medicaid Patients 










     
N 1,773 3,021 3,421 1,827 




    
     
High Medicaid Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Treatment 21.66 20.92 21.66 20.92 21.66 20.92 21.66 20.92 
Control 19.34 17.25 17.56 16.82 18.11 17.52 14.81 14.77 
     
Low Medicaid     
Treatment 17.81 17.24 17.81 17.24 17.81 17.24 17.81 17.24 
Control 17.46 15.59 17.63 16.40 18.89 18.64 12.95 12.29 
     
High vs. Low Price Difference: Commercial C-Sections vs. Vaginal Deliveries 











     
N 1,773 3,021 3,421 1,827 




    
     
High Price 
Difference 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Treatment 18.58 17.91 18.58 17.91 18.58 17.91 18.58 17.91 
Control 17.94 16.13 16.15 14.53 17.85 17.71 14.09 13.63 
     
Low Price Difference    
Treatment 20.70 19.94 20.70 19.94 20.70 19.94 20.70 19.94 
Control 18.92 16.42 19.08 18.72 19.00 18.19 11.56 11.62 
Notes: Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. 
Table cells include DDD coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 
1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Stratification variables are determined by a threshold of ≥ median in the pre-policy period 
(2010-2013) to reduce endogeneity. Price differential represents the mean difference in reimbursement between c-sections and 
vaginal deliveries among births in the Truven MarketScan data. Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main 
control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, 
UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, 
WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, CO, WI). Covariates include all variables in 
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2.10. Appendix Figures and Tables 
2.10.1. Appendix Figures 
Figure 2-3 Residual versus Fitted Plot Values for Early Elective Deliveries 
 
 


































Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs are from Hospital Compare in 2013-2017. The residual versus fitted scatter plot maps the 
residuals from the main DD regression on the y-axis and the predicted values of the outcome from the main DD regression on the 
x-axis to assess whether the distribution of standard errors is similar at each value of the outcome. A scatter plot with a “random 
cloud” around the line y = 0 reflects homoscedasticity. Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control 
group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, 
IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, 
NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, CO, WI). Covariates include all variables in Table 2-
1, plus year and state fixed effects.  
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Figure 2-4 Residual versus Fitted Value Plots for Low-Risk Cesarean Sections  
 
 


















   

















Notes: Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. 
The residual versus fitted scatter plot maps the residuals from the main DD regression on the y-axis and the predicted values of 
the outcome from the main DD regression on the x-axis to assess whether the distribution of standard errors is similar at each 
value of the outcome. A scatter plot with a “random cloud” around the line y = 0 reflects homoscedasticity. Control groups are 
defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); 
(2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative 
(11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, 





Figure 2-5 Simulated Effect of Choosing Wisely Guidelines on Early Elective Deliveries in Treatment 
and Control States 
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Notes: Dotted lines show the simulated effect of federal policy aimed at reducing EEDs and low-risk c-sections, including 2014 
guidelines from the Choosing Wisely Campaign and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Sample estimates 
for EEDs are from Hospital Compare in 2013-2017. Data points are unadjusted, quarterly means. Control groups are defined by 
policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard 
stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 





Figure 2-6 Sensitivity Analysis - Event Study on Early Elective Deliveries 
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Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs are from Hospital Compare in 2013-2017. Data points are adjusted coefficients for 
treatment*year with 95% Confidence Intervals. Estimates overlapping 0 are not significant at the p=0.05 level. The event study 
design follows Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020), which measures the “group-time average treatment effect” by adding interaction 
terms multiplying the treatment, post-period, and year of treatment implementation. For control groups, I add a binary indicator 
for “never-treated.” Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: 
ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, 
OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid 
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Notes: Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. 
Data points are adjusted coefficients for treatment*year with 95% Confidence Intervals. Estimates overlapping 0 are not 
significant at the p=0.05 level. The event study design follows Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020), which measures the “group-time 
average treatment effect” by adding interaction terms multiplying the treatment, post-period, and year of treatment 
implementation. For control groups, I add a binary indicator for “never-treated.”  Control groups are defined by policy type, 
including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy 
group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, 
CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, CO, WI). Covariates 




2.10.2. Appendix Tables 
 
Table 2-5 Tests for Equality in Pre-Medicaid Payment Policy Trends in Low-Value Care Outcomes 
 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries (2013) 
Treatment * Quarter 0.35 (-0.52, 1.23) 0.41 (-0.47, 1.31) 0.65 (-0.39, 1.70) 0.17 (-0.69, 1.09) 
     
N 242 413 470 252 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: % (SD)    
    
Treatment 9.26 (9.50) 9.01 (9.29) 9.01 (9.29) 9.01 (9.29) 
Control 4.96 (4.83) 4.60 (7.91) 8.01 (8.45) 3.39 (3.20) 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections (2010-2013) 
Treatment * Quarter -0.06 (-0.50, 0.36) -0.16 (-0.38, 0.06) -0.09 (-0.31, 1.24) 0.07 (-0.25, 0.38) 
     
N 1,026 1,746 1,986 1,051 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: % (SD)    
    
Treatment 19.80 (6.67) 19.80 (6.67) 19.80 (6.67) 19.80 (6.67) 
Control 18.17 (9.23) 17.59 (7.81) 18.38 (6.20) 13.76 (7.05) 
 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections are from 
Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2013. Table cells include regression coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 









 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 
Treatment * Post -3.27 (-7.16, 0.89) -1.82 (-5.64, 2.04) 0.59 (-3.07, 4.05) -2.98* (-6.14, 0.28) 
     
N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 
Treatment * Post 0.01 (-3.15, 3.33) -0.33 (-3.06, 2.30) -0.57 (-3.09, 2.01)  1.10 (-3.95, 5.36) 
     
N 1,773 3,021 3,421 1,827 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 




Table 2-7 Covariate Balance Before and After Multiple Group Propensity Score Weights 
 
 Pre-Medicaid Policy (2013) Post-Medicaid Payment Policy (2015-2017) 
 
 Initial Balance Propensity Score Balance Initial Balance Propensity Score Balance 
             
 Treat. Control SMD Treat. Control SMD Treat. Control SMD Treat. Control SMD 
Main Control             
% < HS 
Education 
0.62 0.32 0.64 0.62 0.71 -0.18 0.65 0.27 0.82 0.65 0.89 -0.51 
% >College 
Education 
0.40 0.72 -0.67 0.40 0.31 0.18 0.45 0.75 -0.65 0.45 0.14 0.66 
% Population 
Black 
0.70 0.35 0.74 0.70 0.76 -0.12 0.71 0.34 0.81 0.71 0.85 -0.30 
% Uninsured 0.65 0.28 0.78 0.65 0.70 -0.10 0.82 0.61 0.47 0.82 0.94 -0.27 
% Unemployed 0.57 0.13 1.02 0.57 0.65 -0.18 0.50 0.15 0.81 0.50 0.82 -0.73 
% Poverty 0.65 0.25 0.88 0.65 0.71 -0.13 0.63 0.23 0.88 0.63 0.89 -0.58 
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 




0.49 0.44 0.09 0.49 0.77 -0.58 0.44 0.35 0.19 0.44 0.87 -0.88 
Beds per 1,000 0.62 0.73 -0.22 0.62 0.79 -0.36 0.65 0.73 -0.18 0.65 0.87 -0.48 
PCPs per 1,000 0.38 0.63 -0.51 0.38 0.33 0.10 0.40 0.71 -0.66 0.40 0.15 0.53 
% Maternal Age 
35+ 
0.45 0.48 -0.05 0.45 0.32 -0.27 0.47 0.49 -0.04 0.47 0.47 0.02 
Avg. % Cost 
Sharing 
0.30 0.44 -0.29 0.30 0.63 -0.67 0.50 0.43 0.13 0.50 0.55 -0.10 
             
Hard Stop             
% < HS 
Education 
0.62 0.52 0.21 0.62 0.62 0.00 0.65 0.53 0.25 0.65 0.65 0.01 
% > College 
Education 
0.40 0.53 -0.26 0.40 0.45 -0.10 0.45 0.52 -0.16 0.45 0.47 -0.04 
% Population 
Black 
0.70 0.47 0.48 0.70 0.68 0.04 0.71 0.47 0.50 0.71 0.71 0.01 
% Uninsured 0.65 0.56 0.18 0.65 0.63 0.03 0.82 0.41 0.94 0.82 0.83 -0.01 
% Unemployed 0.57 0.66 0.19 0.57 0.54 0.06 0.50 0.52 -0.04 0.50 0.44 0.12 
% Poverty 0.65 0.64 0.01 0.65 0.60 0.10 0.63 0.58 0.11 0.63 0.59 0.08 
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 






0.49 0.65 -0.35 0.49 0.50 -0.03 0.44 0.60 0.33 0.44 0.41 0.05 
Beds per 1,000 0.62 0.48 0.28 0.62 0.61 0.03 0.65 0.50 0.31 0.65 0.67 -0.05 
PCPs per 1,000 0.38 0.56 -0.37 0.38 0.33 0.10 0.40 0.57 -0.34 0.40 0.41 -0.03 
% Maternal Age 
35+ 
0.45 0.57 -0.23 0.45 0.44 0.02 0.47 0.55 -0.15 0.47 0.46 0.02 
Avg. % Cost 
Sharing 
0.30 0.60 -0.62 0.30 0.29 0.03 0.50 0.48 0.04 0.50 0.42 0.15 
             
QI             
% < HS 
Education 
0.62 0.39 0.47 0.62 0.61 0.03 0.65 0.41 0.51 0.65 0.62 0.07 
% > College 
Education 
0.40 0.56 -0.33 0.40 0.38 0.04 0.45 0.56 -0.23 0.45 0.44 0.01 
% Population 
Black 
0.70 0.70 0.00 0.70 0.72 -0.05 0.71 0.71 0.01 0.71 0.75 -0.09 
% Uninsured 0.65 0.30 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.14 0.82 0.42 0.90 0.82 0.83 -0.01 
% Unemployed 0.57 0.43 0.28 0.57 0.47 0.20 0.50 0.53 -0.05 0.50 0.47 0.07 
% Poverty 0.65 0.41 0.49 0.65 0.54 0.22 0.63 0.41 0.46 0.63 0.59 0.08 
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 




0.49 0.47 0.03 0.49 0.44 0.09 0.44 0.49 -0.09 0.44 0.46 -0.05 
Beds per 1,000 0.62 0.57 0.11 0.62 0.58 0.08 0.65 0.58 0.14 0.65 0.62 0.06 
PCPs per 1,000 0.38 0.54 -0.34 0.38 0.33 0.10 0.40 0.56 -0.31 0.40 0.37 0.06 
% Maternal Age 
35+ 
0.45 0.49 -0.08 0.45 0.48 -0.06 0.47 0.51 -0.07 0.47 0.47 0.01 
Avg. % Cost 
Sharing 
0.30 0.59 -0.60 0.30 0.39 -0.18 0.50 0.60 -0.21 0.50 0.51 -0.02 
             
P4P             
% Less Than HS 
Education 
0.62 0.17 1.05 0.62 0.83 -0.49 0.65 0.21 0.99 0.65 0.34 0.71 
% More Than 
College 
Education 
0.40 0.63 -0.48 0.40 0.16 0.49 0.45 0.56 -0.23 0.45 0.30 0.29 
% Population 
Black 
0.70 0.07 1.72 0.70 0.36 0.93 0.71 0.07 1.75 0.71 0.28 1.19 
% Uninsured 0.65 0.28 0.78 0.65 0.58 0.15 0.82 0.12 1.96 0.82 0.60 0.62 
% Unemployed 0.57 0.37 0.41 0.57 0.81 -0.50 0.50 0.39 0.23 0.50 0.20 0.61 
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% Poverty 0.65 0.16 1.15 0.65 0.53 0.29 0.63 0.16 1.11 0.63 0.57 0.13 
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 




0.49 0.73 -0.52 0.49 0.60 -0.23 0.44 0.75 -0.68 0.44 0.28 0.34 
Beds per 1,000 0.62 0.33 0.60 0.62 0.60 -0.04 0.65 0.30 0.74 0.65 0.56 0.19 
PCPs per 1,000 0.38 0.53 -0.31 0.38 0.16 0.44 0.40 0.50 -0.30 0.40 0.46 -0.13 
% Maternal Age 
35+ 
0.45 0.44 0.02 0.45 0.43 0.04 0.47 0.50 -0.06 0.47 0.50 -0.05 
Avg. % Cost 
Sharing 
0.30 0.55 -0.51 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.50 0.67 -0.36 0.50 0.49 0.01 
 
Notes: Propensity scores constructed using logistic regression. Covariates include binary indicators for each variable, coded as 1 if the value in a given MSA-Quarter is ≥ median 
and 0 if < median. Select covariates are excluded due to potential influence from the Medicaid payment policy in the post-period, including Medicaid share, commercial price 
difference, and OB malpractice payout. Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, 
KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, CO, WI). The estimate of interest is the Standardized Mean Difference (SMD), which 
provides an independent comparison between treated and control means.
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Table 2-8 Sensitivity Analysis - Spillover Effects of Medicaid Payment Policy: Individual Quarterly 
Measures of Low-Value Care Outcomes 
 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 
Treatment * Post -2.96* (-6.41, 0.37) -3.64*** (-6.30, -1.01) -1.25 (-3.89, 1.40) -4.07*** (-6.72, -1.61) 
     
N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 
Treatment * Post 1.30 (-1.68, 4.28) 0.43 (-1.48, 2.33) 0.49 (-1.20, 2.15)  0.95 (-1.34, 3.19) 
     
N 1,773 3,021 3,421 1,827 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 









 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 
Treatment * Post     
No MO -4.40** (-8.37, -0.59) -4.82*** (-8.48, -1.17) -2.32 (-5.99, 1.54) -4.10** (-7.54, -0.55) 
No MS -2.34 (-5.91, 1.01) -2.52* (-5.57, 0.38) 0.16 (-2.81, 3.24) -3.34** (-6.40, -0.29) 
No IN -4.46** (-8.23, -0.67) -5.65*** (-9.58, -1.77) -3.07 (-7.38, 1.08) -6.41*** (-11.25, -1.49) 
No GA -2.84 (-6.97, 0.99) -3.32 (-7.34, 0.53) -0.98 (-5.23, 3.05) -3.28* (-6.67, 0.12) 
     
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 
Treatment * Post     
No MO 1.15 (-1.49, 3.68) 0.16 (-1.73, 2.06) 0.22 (-1.61, 2.00) 0.74 (-1.79, 3.21) 
No MS 1.53 (-1.06, 4.09) 0.44 (-1.41, 2.33) 0.11 (-1.76, 1.96) 0.83 (-1.57, 3.12) 
No IN 1.22 (-1.74, 4.04) -0.03 (-2.25, 2.05) -0.22 (-2.31, 1.92) 0.07 (-2.86, 3.01) 
No GA -0.09 (-2.43, 2.19) -0.56 (-2.37, 1.23) -0.33 (-2.16, 1.53) -0.29 (-2.62, 2.15) 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 










 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 
Treatment * Post -3.54** (-6.73, -
0.37) 
-3.73*** (-6.67, -0.92) -1.71 (-4.60, 1.13) -3.92*** (-6.76, -
1.12) 
     
N 1,117 1,872 2,115 1,124 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 
Treatment * Post 1.05 (-1.09. 3.11) 0.24 (-1.35, 1.76) 0.09 (-1.53, 1.78)  0.59 (-1.60, 2.76) 
     
N 1,985 3,341 3,795 1,995 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 






Table 2-11 Sensitivity Analysis - Spillover Effects of Medicaid Payment Policy: Exclusion of 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas with Attrition 
 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 
Treatment * Post -2.83 (-6.51, 0.88) -4.02*** (-6.97, -1.20) -0.64 (-4.04, 2.79) -3.30** (-6.40, -0.26) 
     
N 800 1,328 1,552 848 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 
Treatment * Post 1.67 (-1.11, 4.37) 0.87 (-0.99, 2.59) 0.95 (-0.91, 2.70)  0.40 (-1.99, 2.68) 
     
N 1,400 2,324 2,716 1,484 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 





Table 2-12 Sensitivity Analysis - Spillover Effects of Medicaid Payment Policy: Event Study 
 
 
 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 








     
N 989 1,688 1,905 1,028 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 








     
N 1,773 3,021 3,421 1,827 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. The event 
study design follows Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020), which measures the “group-time average treatment effect” by adding 
interaction terms multiplying the treatment, post-period, and year of treatment implementation. For control groups, I add a binary 
indicator for “never-treated.” Control groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 
states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, 
TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) 
Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 states: WA, CO, WI). Covariates include all variables in Table 2-1, plus year and state 








 Main Hard Stop QI P4P 
Early Elective Deliveries 
Treatment * Post -1.76 (-5.02, 1.39) -2.60** (-5.32, -0.31) -1.25 (-4.48, 1.23) -2.97** (-5.45, -
0.47) 
     
N 3,102 5,728 7,620 3,377 
     
Low-Risk C-Sections 
Treatment * Post 0.60 (-1.62, 2.60) -0.56 (-1.76, 0.67) -0.20 (-1.39, 0.94)  -0.44 (-1.77, 1.22) 
     
N 91,561 243,109 184,823 99,677 
Notes: Sample estimates for EEDs from the Hospital Compare Database in 2013-2017. Sample estimates for low-risk c-sections 
are from Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2017. Table cells include DD coefficients with 95% 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses. Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped 1,000 times at the State-MSA level. Control 
groups are defined by policy type, including: (1) main control group with no EED policy (8 states: ID, ME, NE, NJ, RI, ND, SD, 
VA, WY); (2) hard stop policy group (11 states: AR, UT, DE, IA, MA, MI, MN, NC, OR, TN, OK) ); (3) quality improvement 
collaborative (11 states: AL, AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, KS, WV, OH, NH, and VT); and (4) Medicaid pay-for-performance group (3 





Table 2-14 Early Elective Delivery State Policy Timeline (2007-2017) 
 
State Policy Implementation Date 
Treatment   
Indiana Medicaid does not cover any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. July 2014 
Mississippi Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. January 2015 
Missouri Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. October 2014 
Midwest Health Initiative: Developed and disseminated “Policy Toolkit to Support Reduction of EEDs” 2012 
Georgia Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. January 2014 
   
Main Control   
Idaho N/A N/A 
Maine N/A N/A 
Nebraska N/A N/A 
New Jersey N/A N/A 
Rhode Island N/A N/A 
North Dakota N/A N/A 
South Dakota N/A N/A 
Virginia N/A N/A 
Wyoming N/A N/A 
   
Hard Stop Policy  
Arkansas ARbestHealth: Program mandating all Arkansas hospitals to pledge to prevent EEDs through a hard stop policy. 
Hospitals voluntarily submit EED rates to the ARbestHealth Hospital Quality Team 
February 2012 
Utah Maternal and Infant Health Program: Hospitals institute policies against EEDs 2009 
Delaware Delaware Healthy Mother and Infant Consortium: Mandate for hospitals to adopt guidelines to reliminate 100% of 
EEDs by December 2013  
2011 
Iowa Iowa Hospital Engagement Network: Urged participating hospitals to pledge to reduce EEDs. 2013 
Massachusetts Massachusetts Perinatal Quality Collaborative: Urged hospitals to adopt voluntary hard stop policies. May 2011 
Michigan Michigan Department of Community Health: implemented hard stop policy and required all Medicaid-enrolled 
birthing hospitals to utilize EED evidence-based guidelines 
Jan 2013 
Michigan Health and Hospital Association Keystone Obstetric Collaborative: Voluntary initiative for hospitals the 
prohibited elective c-sections and inductions before 39 weeks gestation.  
2009 
Minnesota Evidence-Based Childbirth Program: Law required hospitals to implement policies to minimize EEDs January 2012 
Blended reimbursement rate for c-sections and vaginal deliveries October 2009 
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North Carolina Pregnancy Medical Home Program: Overarching goal to improve birth outcomes and reduce costs. To qualify for 
participation, hospitals must adopt hard stop policy to eliminate EEDs. 
March 2011 
Oregon Oregon Perinatal Collaborative and March of Dimes 39 Weeks campaign: Urged hospitals to enact hard stop 
policy to eliminate EEDs 
February 2012 
Tennessee Tennessee Healthy Babies are Worth the Wait: Requested that all hospital CEOs in the state sign a pledge to adopt 
hard stop policies and submit data on hospital EED rate 
2013 
Oklahoma Every Week Counts Collaborative: Recruited hospitals for voluntary hard stop program to eliminate EEDs. April 2011 
   
Quality Improvement Collaborative  
Alabama Alabama Perinatal Excellence Collaborative: Created and disseminated guidelines for scheduling deliveries before 
39 weeks gestation to hospitals in the state 
January 2012 
Arizona Arizona Perinatal Trust: Integrates voluntary certification of guideline adherence, perinatal education, and 
perinatal data analysis to improve maternal and neonatal outcomes and quality 
January 2010 
California The California Maternal Quality Care Collaborative: Developed and disseminated toolkit for preventing statewide 
EEDs 
2010 
Patient Safety First: Voluntary collaborative to reduce EED rate below 5% by 2012 January 2010 
California Hospital Engagement Network: Initiative to reduce EED rate to <3% in the state March 2012 
Connecticut Participant of March of Dimes Perinatal Quality Improvement Initiative: Awareness campaign for obstetric 
providers on risks of EEDs. Tasked with integrating CMQCC Toolkit into hospitals. 
2011 
Florida Florida Perinatal Quality Collaborative: Educate providers on EED risks in collaboration with March of Dimes June 2010 
Illinois Illinois Perinatal Quality Collaborative: Quality improvement obstetric initiative focused on reducing EEDs 2012 
Midwest Health Initiative: Developed and disseminated "Policy Toolkit to Support Reduction of EEDs" 2012 
Midwest Business Group on Health: Collaborative between National Business Coalition on Health, Quality Quest 
for Health, the State of Illinois, and March of Dimes to prevent EEDs and improve maternal quality and outcomes 
2011 
Kansas Kansas Perinatal Quality Collaborative: Quality improvement initiative aimed at eliminating EEDs September 2012 
Kansas Healthcare Collaborative and Hospital Engagement Network: Set goal to reduce EED rate to <3% by end 
of 2013 
July 2012 
West Virginia West Virginia Perinatal Partnership: Initiated quality improvement program to reduce EEDs. Participation 
consisted of 14 hospitals, representing 70% of births in the state). 
2009 
Ohio Ohio Perinatal Quality Collaborative: Initiated the 39 Weeks Delivery Charter Project, which made efforts to 




Northern New England Perinatal Quality Improvement Network: A voluntary consortium of healthcare 
organizations committed to improving care for women and children. Offers education programs, best practice 
guidelines, benchmarking quality rates, and team-based approach to reducing poor outcomes. 
2007 
Vermont Northern New England Perinatal Quality Improvement Network: A voluntary consortium of healthcare 
organizations committed to improving care for women and children. Offers education programs, best practice 





Medicaid Pay-for-Performance Program  
Washington Safety Net Assessment Act: gave hospitals a 1% increase in their Medicaid reimbursement for reducing annual 
EEDs 
April 2010 
Blended reimbursement rate for uncomplicated c-sections and vaginal deliveries April 2009 
Washington State Perinatal Collaborative: Encouraged hospitals to sign pledge to reduce EEDs November 2010 
Wisconsin Obstetric Medical Home: Pays $1,000 bonus for each Medicaid patient that attends at least ten prenatal visits and a 
postpartum visit within 60 days of birth. Additional $1,000 bonus per positive birth outcome. 
Piloted 2011.  
Enacted January 2014. 





Partnership for Patients: A quality improvement program, led by the Colorado Hospital Association, aimed at 




Hospital Quality Incentive Payment Program: Offers volume-adjusted payments based on Medicaid discharges and 
quality achievement on EED performance. 
2011 
   
Excluded   
Louisiana Commercial and Medicaid insurers do not reimburse any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as 
medically necessary. 
Excluded due to multi-insurer effort; would not measure direct spillover. 
September 2014 
Maryland Maryland Perinatal System Standards: Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene develop and 
disseminate voluntary standards and hospitals participate in hard stop policy to eliminate EEDs 
Excluded due to Hospital Global Budget; potential contamination of policy effect. 
July 2012 
Montana Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. 
No Montana hospitals reported EED rates. 
October 2014 
New Mexico Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. 
Excluded due to Medicaid for maternity care based on one global budget; potential contamination of policy 
effect. 
January 2014 
Medicaid offers blended reimbursement rate for c-sections and vaginal deliveries April 2011 
Nevada Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. 
Excluded due to lack of availability of pre-policy data (no pre-policy data available prior to 2013). 
June 2012 
New York Medicaid reduced payments for EEDs by 10% unless documented as medically indicated 
Excluded due to lack of availability of pre-policy data (no pre-policy data available prior to 2013). 
July 2013 
Medicaid Redesign Team Reforms: quality improvement collaborative aimed at lowering statewide Medicaid 
spending. One initiative directed towards EEDs. 
January 2011 
South Carolina Medicaid and BlueCross BlueShield deny payment for non-medically necessary EEDs. January 2013 
South Carolina Birth Outcomes Initiative: Encouraged hospitals to adopt hard stop policy pledge to reduce EEDs. 
Excluded due to lack of availability of pre-policy data (no pre-policy data available prior to 2013). 
March 2011 
Texas Texas House Bill 1983 required all hospitals to implement practices to reduce EEDs September 2011 
Medicaid denies any claim submitted for EEDs if not properly documented as medically necessary. 




Kentucky Medicaid EEDs require prior authorization. 
Excluded due to potential for policy contamination; policy implementation occurs after 2015. 
September 2017 
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Hospital Engagement Networks Obstetric Adverse Events Collaborative: Used peer comparisons and 
quality reporting of EEDs to discourage their provision. 
Excluded due to non-parallel pre-policy trends in quality improvement comparison group; suggests 





3. Impacts of Mandatory Bundled Payments on Racial Disparities 
3.1. Introduction 
Decades of research has centered on racial disparities in healthcare and potential solutions, 
yet inequities remain pervasive (Kumar, Mahmoudi, & Rivera-Hernandez, 2019; Wasserman et al., 
2019). However, most existing work does not account for residential segregation at the 
metropolitan level, which generates significant variation in quality and access to care across 
settings (LaVeist, Pollack, Thorpe, Fesahazion, & Gaskin, 2011). Indeed, it is clear that the 
interaction of social determinants and structural inequities, economic and physical environments, 
and implicit biases among clinicians and healthcare organizations, create barriers that hinder timely 
receipt of effective clinical care, and often lead to poorer outcomes among minority patients 
(Damberg et al., 2015). Since these mechanisms are overlapping, focusing on effects of individual 
race without accounting for place-based racial composition hinders the ability to detect how the 
race and socioeconomic drivers combined produce disparities in health status and its indicators 
(LaVeist et al., 2011). In turn, healthcare policies targeting racial gaps in care delivery may be 
limited due to the confounding effects between geographic racial composition and socioeconomic 
status. 
One policy approach to improving value in healthcare is moving payment systems away from 
fee-for-service (FFS) towards reimbursement mechanisms that align spending with quality. Non-
FFS payment reforms have potential to address racial disparities by providing physicians with a 
financial incentive to change their behavior towards minority populations, thereby increasing 
healthcare quality and narrowing gaps in care (Damberg et al., 2015). Efforts to design such 
incentives have predominantly focused on improving quality for the “average” patient, rather than 
vulnerable populations such as racial minorities. Inattention to heterogeneity in effects across 
populations can lead to an inadequate understanding of the impacts of payment reforms. This may 
hamper the potential to leverage financial incentives as a tool for alleviating disparities. Evaluating 
the impact of value-based payment reforms on place-based racial disparities can highlight current 
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policy gaps in physician payment, and specifically, whether health reforms aimed at improving 
quality of care for the average patient narrow, or inadvertently widen, racial inequities. 
Evidence exploring the effects of value-based incentives on vulnerable populations is mixed. 
Some studies show that value-based payment has no effect on racial and socioeconomic disparities 
with respect to quality of care (Hsu et al., 2020; Stone, 2020). Other studies have found that 
providers who care for a disproportionate share of disadvantaged patients, including those who are 
dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, low-income, and racial minorities, tend to exhibit 
smaller gains in quality improvement, in turn widening disparities (Chaiyachati, Qi, & Werner, 
2018; Colla et al., 2012; Figueroa, Zheng, John Orav, Epstein, & Jha, 2018; McWilliams, Chernew, 
& Landon, 2017; Song, Rose, Chernew, & Safran, 2017). This result tends to be most prevalent 
when payment reform incorporates downside risk (Chaiyachati et al., 2018; Figueroa et al., 2018; 
Gaskin, Zare, Vazin, Love, & Steinwachs, 2018; Gilman et al., 2014; Gilman, Hockenberry, et al., 
2015; Gu et al., 2014; Joynt & Jha, 2011, 2013; Joynt Maddox, 2018; Joynt Maddox, Reidhead, 
Qi, & Nerenz, 2019), which is problematic because it has potential to redistribute payment away 
from providers with the highest resource needs (Damberg et al., 2015).  
Thus, value-based payment has potential to initiate a cycle of worsening disparities for socially 
and clinically vulnerable groups if the benefits of value-based care do not extend to these 
populations (Chaiyachati et al., 2018). Unintended consequences, including avoidance of 
vulnerable populations, are also possible, if physicians assume that treating these patients increases 
the likelihood of financial penalty (Hsiang et al., 2019; Lee, Polsky, Fitzsimmons, & Werner, 2020; 
Werbeck, Wübker, & Ziebarth, 2020; Werner, Kanter, & Polsky, 2019; Yasaitis, Pajerowski, 
Polsky, & Werner, 2016). A large literature explores the impacts of non-FFS payment reforms on 
racial and socioeconomic disparities separately, but only a small number of studies assess their 
effect on income and race-based inequities combined. Addressing this interaction can help to 
determine potential ways to leverage physician reimbursement policy to reduce variation in 
healthcare quality across vulnerable populations. 
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Exploring potential solutions for racial disparities is particularly important in perinatal care. 
While many high income countries have seen a decline in maternal deaths in recent years, the U.S. 
rate continues to climb (Rana, Alam, & Gow, 2018; Shaw et al., 2016). This issue is especially 
pervasive among Black mothers, who experience 3.7 times more deaths from pregnancy-related 
complications and more than twice the rate of severe maternal morbidity compared to White 
mothers (Howell, Egorova, Balbierz, Zeitlin, & Hebert, 2016; Kozhimannil et al., 2017; Min, 
Ehrenthal, & Strobino, 2015; Oribhabor, Nelson, Buchanan-Peart, & Cancarevic, 2020). Such 
deaths are often preventable, and racial disparities persist across income and education levels. 
Effective clinical care is critical for optimizing perinatal outcomes, yet for Black mothers, the care 
they receive often falls short of their medical needs. Black women are 20% less likely to receive 
adequate prenatal and postpartum care, and 5% more likely to receive low-value services like 
unnecessary cesarean sections compared to other racial groups (Getahun et al., 2009; Min et al., 
2015). These treatment patterns suggest that physician behavior is a potential driver, increasing the 
likelihood for financial incentives to address these inequities.  
I build on prior literature by assessing the impact of a state payment reform on place-based 
racial disparities in perinatal care. Using the 2010 to 2016 Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims 
database, I study whether a multi-payer mandatory bundled payment program in Arkansas affected 
areal-level racial disparities in perinatal treatment among three types of services: (1) low-risk c-
sections, (2) appropriate prenatal screenings, and (3) timely postpartum visits. I use a difference-
in-differences model to compare changes in perinatal care in Arkansas versus a group of control 
states created via multiple propensity score weights, in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with 
a high proportion of Black patients and MSAs with a high proportion of White patients. 
Implementation of the Arkansas episode-based payment program provides two broad results: (1) 
in the short-term, MSAs with a high proportion of Black residents exhibit worsening quality relative 
to MSAs with a high proportion of White residents, and (2) in the long-term, there are no significant 
effects on place-based racial disparities. The role of financial incentives on disparities has only 
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been assessed in clinical settings that rely on a binary indicator for receiving treatment; however, 
maternal care allows me to test whether areas with a high proportion of Black patients receive 
inferior treatment across a range of treatment options. In addition, by focusing on place-based, 
rather than individual disparities, I account for the joint effects of residential segregation based race 
and income, and in turn, barriers to accessing care across geographic environments (LaVeist et al., 
2011). This study aims to refine the understanding of the role of physician incentives on disparities, 
which is a critically important question given current inequalities in maternal care and the potential 
for payment policies to help close or widen this gap. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides background on the Arkansas episode-
based payment program. Section 3.3 describes the methods, including the analytic dataset, key 
variables, and empirical strategy. Section 3.4 discusses the main results, and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2. Background 
3.2.1. Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative in Perinatal Care 
In 2013, Arkansas introduced the Payment Improvement Initiative (APII), a mandatory, multi-
payer bundled payment program. Its goal was to reduce complication-related perinatal spending 
and improve the patient experience of care through better quality, access, and reliability. By 
offering a single, risk-adjusted case rate for the entire episode of childbirth, rather than reimbursing 
providers separately for each individual service, the program introduced supply-side cost sharing 
for the delivering obstetrician, who is responsible for any unnecessary expenditures (C. Carroll et 
al., 2018). 
A perinatal episode is triggered by a live birth, and spans forty weeks before through sixty 
days after the birth. The delivering obstetrician, called the Principal Accountable Provider (PAP), 
is held financially accountable for total risk-adjusted episode spending. A physician must have five 
or more eligible cases per year to qualify as a PAP. Risk-adjustment strives to alleviate the financial 
risk that PAPs face for complex patients. The algorithm is determined on an annual basis by 
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commercial insurers on the basis of documented patient comorbidities, but the methodology is not 
publicly available. Extremely high-risk episodes are also excluded from APII. Instead, these cases 
are paid on a FFS basis. Episode exclusion is based on co-morbidities (e.g. severe preeclampsia, 
end stage renal disease, cystic fibrosis) and complications (e.g. non-live birth, pulmonary 
embolism, puerperal infection) documented within one year of the delivery (Arkansas Blue Cross 
Blue Shield, 2014). One concern is that PAPs may “upcode” in an effort to increase allowable 
spending targets and/or to exclude costly episodes (Dafny, 2005). To date, no empirical work has 
found evidence of upcoding in either capacity. Carroll et al. (2018) found that results were robust 
to inclusion of high-cost outlier episodes, and probability of upcoding did not differ significantly 
in treatment versus controls. These findings suggest that gaming on the basis of episode exclusion 
was limited (C. Carroll et al., 2018). 
APII reimbursement is FFS with reconciliation. It employs a two-sided risk model that hinges 
upon whether a PAP’s mean risk-adjusted spending is acceptable, unacceptable, or commendable, 
relative to a set spending threshold determined from historical statewide perinatal costs. PAPs with 
acceptable spending are paid FFS without any adjustments; PAPs with unacceptable spending 
receive a financial penalty equal to 50% of the excess spending beyond the acceptable threshold; 
and PAPs with commendable spending are provided a financial bonus equal to 50% of the savings. 
Insurers send quarterly reports to PAPs, enabling them to track risk-adjusted spending and quality. 
Eligibility for gainsharing is tied to achieving a minimum quality score of 80% or higher on select 
outpatient quality measures, including prenatal screening rates for Group B. Streptococcus (Group 
B. Strep), Chlamydia, and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Otherwise, quality scores do 
not factor into reimbursement; however, PAPs are required to submit rates for additional prenatal 
screening measures (Hepatitis B, Gestational Diabetes, and Asymptomatic Bacturiuria (A. Bact.) 
and total c-section rate, to be included in the quarterly program reports (Arkansas Blue Cross Blue 
Shield, 2014). Historically, spending rates were mostly considered acceptable or commendable; in 
the first year of the program, only 9% of PAPs were penalized, while 69% were given a bonus 
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(ACHI, 2015). The program methodology was developed jointly between Medicaid and Arkansas 
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), the two main childbirth payers in the state. Although all private 
payers did not adopt the program, APII covered an estimated 70% of statewide births and 80% of 
births in the commercial sector. This is likely due to a consolidated private insurance market, with 
Arkansas BCBS possessing a 73% market share. In addition to BCBS, the third largest insurer in 
the state, QualChoice Arkansas, employed APII (C. Carroll et al., 2018). 
Policy implementation occurred in two phases. In 2013, the program was partially launched, 
predominantly for Medicaid beneficiaries. At that time, Medicaid covered 67% of births in the 
state. In 2014, Arkansas introduced a unique Medicaid expansion to individuals with incomes 
below 138% of the federal poverty line (FPL) via a “private option,” which gave beneficiaries 
premium assistance to purchase private plans on the exchange (Allison, 2013). There is minimal 
evidence that Medicaid expansion affected uninsurance among pregnant women, since many were 
already covered by Medicaid (C. Carroll et al., 2018). However, enrollment among pregnant 
women shifted from Medicaid to private exchange plans, resulting in a lower share of births covered 
by Medicaid after the private option was introduced (down to 50%). Select insurers in the 
commercial sector predominantly rolled out APII in 2014 by introducing it to fully-insured and 
self-funded groups (Allison, 2013). In this paper, I consider the program to be partially 
implemented in 2013, and fully implemented starting in 2014. This approach is consistent with 
prior literature, and enables me to measure whether effects of the policy and its impact on racial 
disparities varied across each stage of implementation (C. Carroll et al., 2018). Using this approach, 
I am able to capture whether there were spillovers from Medicaid to the commercial market in 
2013, compared to direct effects in the commercial sector alone after 2014. 
To date, only one study has evaluated the impact of the APII. Carroll et al. (2018) examine 
how the bundled payment incentive affected quality of care across the entire population, rather than 
exploring heterogeneity by MSA-level racial composition. The authors find no significant changes 
in prenatal, intrapartum, or postpartum quality in the average population. However, more work is 
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needed to highlight potential differences in magnitude and/or direction of effects in areas with 
varying populations (C. Carroll et al., 2018). 
3.2.2. Effects of Payment Reform on Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities 
Evidence exploring the effects of value-based incentives on vulnerable populations is mixed. 
With respect to income-based disparities, some studies have found that providers who care for a 
disproportionate share of disadvantaged patients tend to exhibit smaller gains in quality 
improvement. For example, Song et al. (2017) and Colla et al. (2012) demonstrated that bundled 
payments led to a smaller decline in unplanned readmissions in geographic areas with lower 
socioeconomic status and a higher proportion of patients dually enrolled in both Medicare and 
Medicaid, respectively (Colla et al., 2012; Song et al., 2017). In turn, providers that serve the 
highest quintile of dual beneficiaries were 18% more likely to receive financial penalties in the 
presence of downside risk (Gilman et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2014; Joynt & Jha, 2011, 2013; Joynt 
Maddox, 2018). Consistent with this result, McWilliams et al. (2017) also found that early savings 
in the Medicare Shared Savings Program were almost entirely concentrated among low-risk 
patients (McWilliams et al., 2017). In aggregate, this may redistribute payment away from 
providers with the highest resource needs (Damberg et al., 2015). 
An unintended consequence of this result is “cream skimming,” or the notion that physicians 
systematically choose patients based on characteristics other than their need for care, to bolster 
profits or reputation (Werbeck et al., 2020). In general, studies show that a growing number of 
physicians are less likely to accept low-income patients. Decker (2013) identified that 
approximately one-third of primary care physicians did not accept new Medicaid patients in 2011 
and 2012, using the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey Electronic Medical Records 
Supplement (Decker, 2013). A meta-analysis assessing 34 studies also found that Medicaid patients 
had a 1.6 and 3.3-fold reduced likelihood of successfully scheduling a primary care and specialty 
visit, respectively, compared to privately insured patients (Hsiang et al., 2019). This pattern 
persisted across settings and medical conditions. However, no consistent evidence has shown that 
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the practice of “cream skimming” takes place in the context of value-based payment reforms. 
Werner et al. (2019) found that physicians caring for a higher proportion of socially and clinically 
vulnerable patients (including dual eligible, racial minority, and low-income populations) were no 
less likely to participate in accountable care organizations (ACOs) than physicians groups that did 
not (Werner et al., 2019). Building on this work, Lee et al. (2020) established that after joining an 
ACO, physicians did not alter the proportion of vulnerable patients that they treated, including 
racial minorities and low socioeconomic status patients (Lee et al., 2020). However, in direct 
contrast to this finding, Yasaitis et al. (2016) found that physicians who practiced in areas where a 
higher percentage of the population was Black, living in poverty, uninsured, disabled, or had less 
than a high school education, were less likely to join commercial and Medicare ACOs (Yasaitis et 
al., 2016). It is important to determine whether payment reforms prompt unintended consequences 
for socially and clinically vulnerable groups, as health disparities may worsen if the benefits of 
value-based care do not extend to these populations. 
With respect to whether financial incentives affect racial disparities, results are mixed. Several 
studies have found no association between federal value-based incentive programs and changes in 
racial disparities for quality outcomes like healthcare-associated infection and rehospitalization 
rates (Hsu et al., 2020; Stone, 2020). Studies on the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program 
(HRRP) suggest that financial incentives may exacerbate racial disparities for medical conditions 
such as heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. In the initial implementation phase of HRRP, 
when only financial bonuses had been integrated, readmission rates for Black patients in safety net 
and non-safety net hospitals declined more rapidly, suggesting a small narrowing of racial 
disparities. However, once financial penalties were imposed, disparities in readmission rates 
worsened in safety net hospitals (Chaiyachati et al., 2018; Figueroa et al., 2018; Gaskin et al., 2018; 
Gilman, Hockenberry, et al., 2015; Joynt Maddox, Reidhead, Qi, et al., 2019). This line of work 
suggests that, at best, value-based payments neither improve, nor exacerbate, racial inequities. 
Since results varied across incentive structures (e.g. financial bonuses versus penalties) and clinical 
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settings, examining the impact of value-based reimbursement with mandatory participation on 
racial disparities is integral to understanding whether results can be generalized to future incentive 
design. 
While there is a large literature on the effects of value-based payment reforms on racial and 
socioeconomic disparities separately, few studies explore the joint impacts of financial incentives 
on income and race-based inequities. Addressing the interaction between socioeconomic and racial 
disparities is crucial to understanding the place-based context for observed treatment patterns, and 
potential ways to leverage physician reimbursement policy to reduce variation in healthcare quality 
across these populations. 
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. Data 
3.3.1.1. Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims 
The primary data for this analysis is the Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims database 
from 2010 to 2016, which links paid claims and encounter data with detailed patient information 
across sites and types of providers over time. Although the database is a convenience sample of 
enrollees in commercial health plans and large self-insured firms that opt to provide their data, the 
MarketScan data includes proprietary commercial claims (employer and health plan) from over 36 
million patient hospital discharges (Johns Hopkins, 2016). These data are collected across broad 
geographic areas to represent treatment patterns and costs in the U.S.  
The MarketScan data are advantageous for this analysis because they use consistent 
enrollee identifiers over time, enabling me to track patients across the full episode of care. One 
limitation is that a major insurer dropped out of the MarketScan data in 2015. To avoid differential 
selection into the database over time, I limit the sample to the employer population, which remains 
stable over the study period. Relying on the employer population also aims to ensure that the sample 
is minimally affected by changes in the insurance policy landscape, such as Medicaid expansion or 
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the private option in Arkansas. Another limitation is the lack of unique identifiers for payers and 
providers. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the insurer was a participant in APII. The 
consolidated market in Arkansas increases the likelihood that most of the sample consists of 
covered episodes in the commercial sector. It also limits the ability to make inferences about 
individual physician or hospital behavior; instead, I focus on aggregate behavior among providers, 
and the extent to which APII impacts racial disparities at the system level. 
3.3.1.2. U.S. Census American Community Survey 
I measure MSA-level racial composition from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American 
Community Survey (ACS), a dataset with publicly available measures on demographic and 
employment characteristics for all counties. Specifically, I calculate the percent of the population 
that is Black within an MSA from 2010 to 2012, and assign an MSA as “Black” if its share of Black 
residents is above 12.59% (the national mean during the survey period) and “White” if its share of 
Black residents is below this threshold (White residents are the majority). Given that the 
MarketScan data does not include a unique identifier for each non-metro area, the sample is 
restricted to micro and metropolitan areas, to ensure proper linkage of the MSA-level race variable. 
There is high variation in the share of the Black population across MSAs. It is likely that 
Black MSAs include a large proportion of White residents, prompting concerns that treatment 
patterns are not driven explicitly by race. In the sample, MSAs characterized as Black have a mean 
Black population of 25%, while MSAs characterized as White only have a mean Black population 
of 4%, suggesting a wide enough gap in racial composition for differences in utilization to be a 
function of metropolitan area racial composition. This demonstrates that use of the MSA-level race 
statistic is likely to capture a significant proportion of Black patients.  
3.3.2. Sample 
The analytic sample consists of 158,858 perinatal episodes between 2010 and 2016. This 
includes 2,031 episodes in the treatment group (1,064 in Black MSAs and 967 in White MSAs), 
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and 156,827 episodes in the control group (81,249 in Black MSAs and 75,578 in White MSAs). I 
use the MarketScan database to construct perinatal episodes using the methodology outlined in the 
Arkansas BCBS Perinatal Algorithm. First, I identify all live births between 2010 and 2016 using 
the relevant Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) codes, and pull all inpatient and outpatient claims in 
the period 40 weeks before the delivery through sixty days afterwards. I then collapse the data to 
the episode-level, using the date of birth for assignment to the pre- and post- periods.  
The sample includes low-risk births in the MarketScan Database, as defined by the Agency 
for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ). This population is limited to mothers with 
uncomplicated births (e.g. no abnormal presentation, preterm delivery, fetal death, multiple 
gestation, or breech procedure) who have never had a prior c-section. I exclude cases that are 
exempt from APII due to patient co-morbidities (e.g. sickle cell anemia, end stage renal disease, 
severe preeclampsia). Focusing on low-risk episodes that are reimbursed through the bundled 
payment program aims to confirm that all physicians in the treatment group face the same financial 
incentive. From a disparities standpoint, this inclusion criteria ensures that all mothers in the 
sample, to the best of my knowledge, should receive a consistent mix of clinical services. In other 
words, given that each mother in the sample has an uncomplicated delivery and lacks chronic 
conditions, a c-section would be considered an inappropriate treatment choice, based on the clinical 
information and patient risk available, regardless of race (Agency for Healthcare Quality and 
Research, 2016). 
3.3.3. Outcome Variables 
I construct eight outcome measures for each episode, all of which are adapted from the 
Maternity Care Performance Measure Set developed jointly by American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists and the National Committee for Quality Assurance. Outcomes consist of the 
following prenatal measures: whether a patient received three screenings linked to gainsharing 
(Group B Strep, Chlamydia, and HIV) and three screenings not linked to gainsharing (Hepatitis B, 
Gestational Diabetes, and A. Bact.). PAPs must report each of the prenatal screening rates to track 
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their performance, regardless of whether it is tied to reimbursement. There is one outcome in the 
postpartum period: whether the mother received any follow-up care within eight weeks of the 
delivery. All prenatal and postpartum outcomes are considered high-value components of the 
perinatal episode, which means that a higher rate is considered better.  
The last outcome is the low-risk c-section rate, which is evaluated during the intrapartum 
period. This measure identifies whether the mother received an inappropriate c-section (e.g. if she 
is nulliparous, with a full-term, singleton birth in the vertex position). This measure is derived from 
methodology developed by AHRQ, using Inpatient Quality Indicator (IQI) 33, which is endorsed 
by the National Quality Forum as a consensus standard for hospital care (Agency for Healthcare 
Quality and Research, 2016). Unlike the other outcomes, low-risk c-sections capture a dimension 
of low-value care, meaning that a lower rate is considered better. 
3.3.4. Covariates 
Covariates include the following maternal characteristics: insurance type (HMO, PPO, 
POS, and high-deductible health plan), age category (less than 25, 25-29, 30-34, and 35+), whether 
the hospital length of stay was over four days (the number of days typically covered by the insurer), 
and cost sharing quartile bins (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020). I also include a 
series of MSA-level controls, which account for healthcare, demographic, and economic variables 
that may influence physician practice patterns. Healthcare factors consist of hospital characteristics 
(percent of hospitals that are non-profit, percent of hospitals that provide obstetric services, percent 
teaching hospitals, number of federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), beds per 1,000, and 
percent of patients that are insured by Medicaid), practitioner information (primary care 
practitioners per 1,000), and malpractice risk quartile bins, defined as the average obstetric-related 
malpractice payout. Demographic characteristics refer to the percent of the population with less 
than a high school education and percent of the population with more than a college education. 
Finally, economic characteristics include the percent of the population that is uninsured, the percent 
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unemployed, and the percent with income below the FPL. Covariates were selected to be consistent 
with Carroll et al., (2018). 
Covariates were derived from several data sources, including the ACS, the Health 
Resources and Services Administration’s Area Health Resource File (AHRF), the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, and the National Practitioners Data Bank (NPDB) 
(AHA, 2018; HRSA, 2019; NPDB, 2019; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). 
3.3.5. MSA-Level Race Variable 
I rely on MSA-level racial composition, rather than individual patient race, to capture 
differences in the effects of APII according to variation in the percent of the population that is 
Black at the geographic level. This approach adequately allows me to assess differences in MSAs 
that are driven jointly by race and other market characteristics, such as poverty levels, differences 
in population density, healthcare utilization norms, and healthcare facility and market 
characteristics. This helps to create a full picture of the place-based context under which disparities 
occur, such as the social determinants of health that may impact quality and access to care. 
The MSA-level race measure is also large enough to ensure consistency between area of 
residence and healthcare use. Measuring racial composition with smaller geographic units may bias 
results if individuals have a propensity to seek healthcare outside of their neighborhood or county 
of residence. The U.S. has a longstanding history of housing policies dating back to Jim Crow laws 
and other racially-restrictive codes that led to institutionalized residential segregation. Although 
policy efforts such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968 aimed to eliminate housing discrimination, 
research suggests that 92.8% of the White population and 79.7% of the Black population continued 
to live in non-integrated neighborhoods as of 2015 (Massey, 2015; Reardon et al., 2008). This has 
spilled over into the provision of healthcare, where, in the case of childbirth, 75% of Black women 
give birth at hospitals that serve predominantly Black populations (Howell et al., 2016). A patient’s 
hospital selection is a function of many factors; although proximity to one’s home is important, 
research shows that individuals are willing to travel further for shorter wait times and better quality 
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of care (Bühn, Holstiege, & Pieper, 2020; Finlayson, Birkmeyer, Tosteson, & Nease, 1999; Magee, 
Davis, & Coulter, 2003; Shalowitz, Nivasch, Burger, & Schapira, 2018; Varkevisser & Van Der 
Geest, 2007; Victoor, Delnoij, Friele, & Rademakers, 2012; Victoor et al., 2014). Further, because 
there is wide variation in the number of hospitals per capita, many residents may need to travel 
outside of their neighborhood or county for adequate access to care. Examining racial composition 
at the MSA-level ensures that there is concordance between the MSA in which a person lives and 
the hospital where they seek perinatal care. 
The MSA-level race variable may also inform participation for future bundled payment 
programs. Assignment to prior programs, such as the Medicare Comprehensive Joint Replacement 
program, is designated at the MSA-level using areal-level healthcare costs, to determine which 
areas would benefit most from the incentive to reduce overall spending. Thus, examining variation 
in effects of APII by MSA-level racial composition is valuable in considering whether MSAs with 
a larger Black population would benefit from future enrollment with respect to disparities. 
3.3.6. Control Group 
The control group consists of twelve states that did not implement APII (California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, Texas, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin). States were selected on the basis of having at least one “Black” MSA 
and one “White” MSA in the MarketScan sample, to guarantee adequate representation of both 
race categories. This group also represents a diverse set of states across multiple regions, which 
may increase external validity. 
I constructed the comparison group using a modified version of the multiple propensity 
score weighting approach proposed by Stuart et al. (2014), to ensure that control states are similar 
to treatment states across observable covariates (Stuart et al., 2014). This method sought to mitigate 
the concern that selection into treatment and control groups may be confounded by baseline 
characteristics, which can lead to biased estimates. This can occur if treatment and comparison 
groups vary in ways that impact trends over time, or within-group composition changes over time. 
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By matching treatment to control units on a set of shared factors, propensity scores aimed to 
replicate the pre-policy values of the outcome’s determinants. The resulting weights helped to 
generate a synthetic sample in which treatment assignment is independent from measured baseline 
covariates (Austin & Stuart, 2015; Stuart et al., 2014, 2013; Zhang, Kim, Lonjon, & Zhu, 2019).  
I fit two multinomial logistic regression models – one in the pre-period and the other in the 
post-period – to predict the probability of being assigned to the treatment group in each time frame. 
I adjusted for all covariates included in the main model, except for those that that could potentially 
be influenced by APII in the post-period. I also added interaction terms that multiply an indicator 
for Black MSA with each covariate. For observation i, the weight used in the analysis was obtained 
using the following calculation, where 𝐸1(𝑋𝑖) is the probability that an observation is assigned to 





          [7] 
By implementing propensity score weights without use of the outcome variables, I detach 
the study design from the analysis, and create the best opportunity for feasible, robust, and unbiased 
estimates (Stuart et al., 2014). 
3.3.7. Empirical Strategy 
The identification strategy is a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) framework 
comparing Black and White MSAs in treatment and control states, pre-APII implementation (2010-
2012) versus post-APII implementation (2013-2016). APII acts as a source of exogenous variation, 
as physicians in Arkansas are subject to mandatory bundled payments, while control states are not, 
leading to a quasi-experimental design. This approach is modeled on earlier work comparing 
average effects of APII on spending and utilization (C. Carroll et al., 2018).  
In a standard difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, I would test for parallel pre-trends to 
indicate whether treatment states would have similar trends to the control group if the policy had 
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not been implemented. The more complex DDD framework is protected in a sense, because the 
comparison of interest is the difference between Black versus White MSAs, rather than strictly 
focusing on differential changes in treatment versus control groups. Instead, following Paik et al. 
(2016), I compared pre-trends in disparities between Black versus White MSAs for each outcome 
in treatment and controls, to test whether the racial gap between treatment and control states would 
have evolved similarly over time in the absence of the policy (Paik, Black, & Hyman, 2016). 
I estimated the impact of APII for Black and White MSAs using the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Partial𝑡 ⋅ Black𝑚 + 𝛽2 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Partial𝑡 ⋅ White𝑚 + 𝛽3 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅
Full𝑡 ⋅ Black𝑚 + 𝛽4 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Full𝑡 ⋅ White𝑚 + 𝛽5 ⋅ Treat𝑠 + 𝛽6 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽7 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽8 ⋅
Treat𝑠 ⋅ Partial𝑡 + 𝛽9 ⋅ Black𝑚 ⋅ Partial𝑡 + 𝛽10 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽11 ⋅ Black𝑚 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽12 ⋅
Black𝑚 ⋅ Treat𝑠 + ⋅ 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗 ⋅ 𝑍𝑚 + µ ⋅ 𝑉𝑠 + 𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡      [8] 
  In [8], 𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡  is the expected value of the outcome. It is indexed by the episode i, State-
MSA m; in state s; at time t, which is representative of pre/post policy implementation. Treat is a 
binary variable that denotes the presence of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative, while 
Partial and Full are binary variables that indicate the post-periods, including partial implementation 
in 2013 when APII was launched in Medicaid only, or full implementation from 2014-2016 when 
APII was active among both commercial and Medicaid insurers. Black𝑚  and White𝑚, defined 
earlier, refer to MSAs with a high Black or White population, respectively.  𝑉𝑠 and 𝑇𝑡  are state and 
quarter-year fixed-effects, respectively. 𝑃𝑖 is a vector of episode-level maternal characteristics. 𝑍𝑚 
is a vector of time-varying State-MSA-level controls, which account for healthcare,  demographic, 
and economic variables that may influence physician practice patterns. To account for covariance 
in standard errors between time periods by geographic areas, I clustered standard errors at the State-
MSA level. All models were estimated using logistic regression. 
The coefficients of interest were 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 − 𝛽4, which respectively, represent the 
aggregate effect of APII in Black versus White MSAs after partial and full implementation. I 
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calculated these estimates using a linear combination. For high-value outcomes, a negative value 
for the difference in these coefficients indicates that White MSAs experienced greater quality gains 
than Black MSAs in Arkansas relative to controls. A positive value for the same estimates suggests 
that Black MSAs experiencing higher quality gains than White MSAs in Arkansas compared to 
controls. In contrast, for low-value outcomes, a positive value for the difference in the coefficients 
of interest indicates a greater improvement in quality for White MSAs compared to Black MSAs 
in Arkansas versus controls. Interpretation of each linear combination for specific outcomes can be 
found in Figure 3-3. 
3.3.8. Robustness Checks 
I pursued a variety of robustness checks. First, I repeated the analyses without multiple 
group propensity score weights. Second, I re-ran analyses using alternate comparison groups by 
dropping one control state at a time. Third, I re-estimated the models with MSA-level racial 
composition as a continuous measure, to examine whether results were robust to variable 
specification and the cutoff point for classifying Black and White MSAs. Finally, I re-ran analyses 
with episodes that were excluded from APII reimbursement to assess whether results varied based 
on patient risk level. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-1 summarizes sample characteristics in Black and White MSAs among treatment and 
control states, before and after implementation of APII. Differences between treatment and control 
states are relatively small in magnitude during the pre-policy period across maternal characteristics, 
and MSA-level healthcare and economic factors, in both Black and White MSAs. Prior to APII, 
Black MSAs in both treatment and control groups had a higher proportion of HMO enrollees and 
births with a length of stay over 4 days. Black MSAs in both groups also had more Medicaid 
patients, more non-profit and teaching hospitals, more hospitals that provide obstetric care, more 
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hospital beds per 1,000, a greater number of FQHCs, and a higher density of primary care 
physicians. On average, the population in Black MSAs was more educated and less likely to be 
uninsured or impoverished compared to White MSAs in both treatment and control groups; this 
population was also more likely to be unemployed. These patterns are consistent with a higher 
concentration of Black residents in urban areas (Leibbrand, Massey, Alexander, Genadek, & 
Tolnay, 2020). These areas also tend to include a higher concentration of universities and academic 
medical centers, suggesting that because these institutions are more likely to hire workers with 
higher education, the overall population is likely to be more educated and of higher socioeconomic 
status. 
There is little evidence of differential changes in the sample after implementation of APII. The 
gap in percent of HMO enrollees, length of stay over 4 days, as well as Medicaid share decreased, 
while the difference in the percent of non-profit hospitals increased. Average percent cost sharing 
and education level rose across all groups, while the uninsurance and unemployment rates dropped. 
In general, gaps between groups declined. For example, the difference in the percent of mothers 35 
or older was 5.76% and 5.23% in Black and White MSAs, respectively, in the pre-period, but these 
differences were reduced to 2.91% and 0.20% in the post-period. Otherwise, maternal, healthcare, 
demographic, and economic characteristic evolved similarly over time. 
Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 summarize unadjusted rates of quality measures, pre- and post-APII. 
For high-value quality measures, Black MSAs in Arkansas had higher unadjusted levels of quality 
at baseline than White MSAs. For example, the Group B Strep screening rate in the pre-period for 
Black MSAs was 80.43% compared to 64.06% in White MSAs. Similarly, the rate of HIV 
screenings prior to APII among Black MSAs was 78.02%, and 59.62% among White MSAs. In the 
post-period, unadjusted quality rates improved in both Black and White MSAs. However, quality 
improvement was larger in White MSAs than in Black MSAs; in fact, White MSAs had higher 
unadjusted quality rates for five of the six prenatal screening measures in the post-period. In the 
first year after APII was implemented, the Group B Strep screening rate in White MSAs was 
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82.04% compared to 78.76% in Black MSAs. For HIV screenings, the increase in White MSAs 
was even larger in the same time frame, with an unadjusted rate of 74.85% compared to 71.50% in 
Black MSAs. In control states, the difference in unadjusted quality rates between Black and White 
MSAs was less significant. In the pre-policy period, five of the six prenatal screening measure rates 
were higher in White MSAs compared to Black MSAs, but differences were minor. For example, 
the A. Bact. screening rate was 89.32% in Black MSAs and 90.44% in White MSAs, representing 
relatively similar baseline quality rates across these measures. In the post-APII period, quality rates 
improved to a small extent in both Black and White MSAs, but to a lesser degree than Black and 
White MSAs in the treatment group (Table 3-2 and Table 3-3). 
For low-value care, in which a lower rate is considered better, Black MSAs had poorer 
unadjusted quality rates at baseline compared to White MSAs, in both treatment and control groups. 
In the pre-APII period, the low-risk c-section rate in Black MSAs in Arkansas was 27.35% 
compared to 17.76% in White MSAs. In control states, Black MSAs experienced a low-risk c-
section rate of 21.09%, relative to 16.18% in White MSAs. In the post-APII period, quality 
remained worse among Black MSAs. In 2013, the unadjusted low-risk c-section rate in Arkansas 
was 28.50% in Black MSAs compared to 13.17% in White MSAs. In the same year, control states 
showed greater improvements among Black MSAs, with a rate of 18.36% relative to 18.12% in 
White MSAs (Table 3-3). 
Overall, these patterns suggest that Black MSAs experienced smaller improvements in both 
high- and low-value quality of care compared to White MSAs after partial implementation of APII. 
However, it is important to note that baseline quality rates were higher for prenatal and postpartum 
measures among Black MSAs, suggesting that White MSAs had greater room for improvement 
after the implementation of APII. 
3.4.2. Validity of Study Design  
To strengthen the assessment of covariate balance in Table 3-1, I evaluated the propensity 
score weights to ensure that there were no systematic differences in characteristics between 
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treatment and controls in the pre- and post- periods. Table 3-5 shows the standardized mean 
differences (SMDs) between treatment and control groups before and after applying the propensity 
score weights. The threshold for an acceptable SMD is somewhat subjective, but in general, the 
consensus is that a covariate is considered balanced if the SMD is below 0.25, and ideally, below 
0.10 (Austin & Stuart, 2015; Stuart et al., 2014, 2013; Zhang et al., 2019). Initially, the pre- and 
post-policy samples had an average SMD of 0.52 and 0.34, respectively, with only 47% of 
covariates yielding an SMD below 0.25. After constructing the propensity score weights, the mean 
SMD was reduced to 0.16 and 0.09 in the pre- and post-periods, respectively. In addition, 79% of 
covariates in the pre-period and 89% in the post-period had SMDs below 0.25, with the majority 
of SMDs below 0.10. Implementing propensity score weights significantly improved covariate 
balance in the sample. The final sample shows relatively small differences in characteristics 
between treatment and control units. 
I also tested the DDD assumption that trends in racial disparities between treatment states 
and control states would remain similar in the absence of the treatment policy. Although this cannot 
be tested directly, I analyzed differences in pre-policy trends between Black and White MSAs in 
treatment and control groups, to assess validity of the analysis. Figure 3-1 plots unadjusted 
quarterly means of the outcomes in treatment and control states for Black and White MSAs 
separately, where the red lines represent trends in the treatment group and the blue lines represent 
outcome trends in the control group. Visual inspection suggests that all of the outcomes had similar 
gaps in pre-policy trends between Black and White MSAs in Arkansas and control states (Figure 
3-1). To verify that the disparity in trends was statistically similar, I ran formal regressions similar 
to the main model, with inclusion limited to the pre-policy period (Table 3-4). The coefficient of 
interest was the interaction between treatment, Black MSA, and a linear quarter-year time trend. I 




3.4.3. Effect of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative on Supply of 
High-Value Care 
 In Table 3-2 and Table 3-3, I study the effect of APII on supply of high-value care in Black 
versus White MSAs. I find that under partial APII implementation, Black MSAs exhibited smaller 
improvements in prenatal screenings and postpartum visits compared to White MSAs under APII. 
There is a statistically significant decrease in the log odds of receiving four of the six prenatal 
screenings in Black MSAs relative to White MSAs after partial APII implementation, in Arkansas 
versus controls (Table 3-2). This includes receipt of screenings for HIV (log odds: -0.622; standard 
error (SE): 0.274; p-value<0.05), Hepatitis B (log odds: -0.587; SE: 0.297; p-value<0.05), A. Bact. 
(log odds: -0.573; SE: 0.324; p-value<0.10), and Gestational Diabetes, (log odds: -0.557; SE: 
0.308; p-value<0.10). Compared to the pre-policy period, the log odds of receiving a timely 
postpartum visit after partial implementation was significantly lower among Black MSAs 
compared to White MSAs, in Arkansas versus control states (log odds: -0.604; SE: 0.273; p-
value<0.05) (Table 3-3). Because prenatal screening and postpartum visit rates were increasing 
across all groups, this result can be interpreted as a smaller increase among Black MSAs versus 
White MSAs in the treatment group compared to controls. 
After APII had been fully implemented in both commercial and Medicaid markets, only 
two of the six prenatal screenings showed disproportionate gains among White MSAs compared to 
Black MSAs relative to the pre-policy period. Gestational diabetes (log odds: -1.450, SE: 0.389; p-
value<0.01) and Group B Strep (log odds: -0.773; SE: 0.285; p-value<0.01) showed a statistically 
significant decrease in Black MSAs relative to White MSAs. Four of the six prenatal screenings 
and receipt of timely postpartum care showed no differences in the effect of APII on quality of care 
by MSA-level racial composition. 
These results suggest that both Black and White MSAs experienced quality gains in high-
value care, but Black MSAs took more time to see improvements. After partial implementation, 
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there were greater quality gains in prenatal and postpartum care in White MSAs relative to Black 
MSAs in the treatment group compared to controls. All prenatal screenings with significant results, 
except for HIV, were measures not linked to the payment incentive. This finding indicates that 
physicians in White MSAs were able to increase quality for high-value care measures, regardless 
of whether they were tied to payment, while physicians in Black MSAs had relatively more success 
improving quality for measures linked to reimbursement. This potentially suggests that the payment 
incentive was successful in encouraging physician behavior change in physician populations in 
both Black and White MSAs. Based on this result, it is possible that tying quality directly to 
reimbursement has potential to counteract disparities. After full implementation, only two measures 
showed persistently greater quality gains in White MSAs relative to Black MSAs, suggesting that 
Black MSAs were eventually able to close the quality gap. 
3.4.4. Effect of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative on Supply of 
Low-Value Care 
I also assess whether there is an association between APII and an MSA’s racial 
composition in low-value care (Table 3-3). Relative to the control group, I find that the log odds of 
receiving a low-risk c-section increased by 48.4% in Black MSAs compared to White MSAs in the 
treatment group after partial implementation in 2013 (log odds: 0.484; SE: 0.239; p-value<0.05). 
There is a smaller, insignificant decrease in the log odds of receiving a low-risk c-section in Black 
MSAs after full implementation (log odds: -0.202; SE: 0.196; p-value>0.10). These results are 
consistent with treatment patterns observed for high-value outcome measures. 
3.4.5. Place-Based Disparities 
In Figure 3-2, I explore the change in disparities between Black versus White MSAs in 
Arkansas compared to controls through an event-study analysis. For high-value care outcomes, I 
add to the main regression in [8] a three-way interaction between indicators for the treatment, White 
MSA, and year, for each year in the study period. To ensure consistency in interpretation, I use a 
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different interaction term for low-value care outcomes; this inverts the direction of the coefficient 
since a lower rate is considered better for these measures. I multiply indicators for treatment, Black 
MSA, and year. Thus, for all outcome measures, a positive coefficient indicates a larger disparity 
between Black and White MSAs in Arkansas compared to controls, and a negative coefficient 
shows a smaller disparity. Figure 3-2 shows the difference in adjusted quality between Black and 
White MSAs in Arkansas versus control states, by year. The 2013 coefficient, depicted by yellow 
shading in the figure, represents the racial disparity after partial APII implementation, and the 2014 
through 2016 coefficients, depicted by red shading in the figure, represent the racial disparity after 
full APII implementation. Taken together, this analysis shows a year-over-year trend in how place-
based racial disparities evolve across the study period. This analysis is intended as a supplement to 
the main DDD analysis because it addresses how adjusted quality rates differ in the pre-period 
compared to the post-period. In contrast, results described in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 highlight the 
change in the level of quality across each outcome in Black and White MSAs, in the treatment 
relative to control group, but do not take into account the differences in baseline quality rates. 
I find some evidence of rising disparities. Results in Figure 3-2 show an increase in place-
based disparities for low-risk c-sections in Arkansas compared to controls after partial 
implementation of APII. The difference in the low-risk c-section rate between Black and White 
MSAs in Arkansas was 72% higher than the equivalent gap in control states (p-value<0.01) in 2012, 
and 115% after partial APII implementation in 2013 (p-value<0.01). By the end of the post-policy 
period in 2016, the disparity returned to its initial magnitude. 
Results were mixed for measures of high-value care. For prenatal screenings, place-based 
disparities in Arkansas during the pre-period were smaller than or equal to those in control states. 
Three measures (Group B. Strep, Gestational Diabetes, and A. Bact. screenings) showed a 
significantly higher disparity in Arkansas versus controls at the end of the study period (Group B. 
Strep – log odds: 1.34; p-value<0.05; Gestational Diabetes – log odds: 1.10; p-value<0.01; A. Bact. 
– log odds: 1.61; p-value<0.01). Two screening measures (HIV and Hepatitis B) experienced a 
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temporary increase in disparities in 2013. Respectively, these measures showed a 59% (p-
value<0.10) and 54% (p-vale<0.05) higher gap in place-based racial disparities in Arkansas relative 
to controls, but these disparities dissipated by 2014. Disparities were no different in Arkansas 
versus controls for Chlamydia screenings. For postpartum care, disparities remained lower in 
Arkansas versus controls over the entire study period. 
Thus, I observe rising disparities after APII implementation across the majority of outcome 
measures. Disparities tended to be higher in Arkansas compared to control states in the short-term 
after partial implementation of APII. However, while both Black and White MSAs experienced 
quality improvement during the study period, racial disparities in Arkansas did not differ 
significantly from those in control states by the time APII had been implemented in both Medicaid 
and commercial markets.  
3.4.6. Robustness Checks 
 Results are robust to alternate specifications and samples. This includes repeating 
analyses without multiple group propensity score weights (Table 3-6) and with MSA-level racial 
composition as a continuous, rather than binary, measure (Table 3-9). I also test alternate samples 
by re-running models with alternate comparison groups (Table 3-9), and with inclusion of episodes 
that are excluded under APII reimbursement (Table 3-7).  Since results are consistent across each 
of these models, it suggests that inferences from the main models can be generalized more broadly. 
3.5. Discussion 
This paper studies the effect of a 2013 mandatory, multi-payer bundled payment program 
in Arkansas (APII) on place-based racial disparities in perinatal quality of care. Analyses compare 
how APII impacted the supply of low-value and high-value prenatal, intrapartum, and postpartum 
services in the commercial market in predominantly Black versus White metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs), in Arkansas relative to states with no change in reimbursement. I examine these 
changes in two stages of policy implementation: after the policy was implemented among Medicaid 
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births only (partial implementation), and after it was enacted in Medicaid and commercial markets 
(full implementation). Assessing place-based, rather than individual racial disparities, enables me 
to study how the interaction between race and socioeconomic drivers contributes to variation in 
program effects across markets. The study uses an MSA-level measure of racial composition to 
create a full picture of the place-based context under which disparities occur, such as the social 
determinants of health that may impact quality and access to care, and to ensure concordance 
between area of residence and healthcare use.  
Findings show that after partial implementation of APII, MSAs with a high proportion of 
Black residents were less likely to experience improvements in quality than MSAs with a high 
proportion of White residents. Specifically, for four of six prenatal screening measures (HIV, 
Hepatitis B, Gestational Diabetes, and A. Bact.), Black MSAs had a 55.7% to 62.2% lower 
probability of improving quality relative to White MSAs, in Arkansas versus control states. I found 
similar patterns for receipt of timely postpartum care and low-risk c-sections, with Black MSAs 
being 60.4% and 48.4% less likely to improve quality for these services, respectively. There was 
no strong evidence that disproportionate gains among White MSAs persisted after full 
implementation, with only two measures (Group B Strep and Gestational Diabetes screenings) 
displaying long-term improvements in White relative to Black MSAs. This study also compares 
the differential effects of episode-based payment between Black and White MSAs on quality 
measures that are linked to payment versus those that are not. Measures linked to gainsharing were 
less likely to show differential improvement across Black and White MSAs than those not tied to 
reimbursement. However, quality rates for all measures increased in both Black and White MSAs 
across the study period. 
Results are consistent with prior work on the effects of value-based incentives on 
vulnerable populations. Existing studies offer conflicting findings. Some work shows that the 
introduction of non-FFS reimbursement leads to smaller gains in quality improvement for providers 
that treat a high proportion of marginalized patients (Chaiyachati et al., 2018; Colla et al., 2012; 
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Figueroa et al., 2018; Gaskin et al., 2018; McWilliams et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017), especially 
when the program incorporates a financial incentive with downside risk (e.g. penalizes physicians 
for poor quality or high spending) (Chaiyachati et al., 2018; Figueroa et al., 2018; Gaskin et al., 
2018; Gilman et al., 2014; Gilman, Hockenberry, et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2014; Joynt & Jha, 2011, 
2013; Joynt Maddox, 2018; Joynt Maddox, Reidhead, Qi, et al., 2019). Other studies find no 
association between financial incentives and changes in racial and socioeconomic disparities (Hsu 
et al., 2020; Stone, 2020). Results in this study provide some reconciliation for these disparate 
findings. I observe that while both Black and White areas experience quality improvement as a 
result of APII, areas with more Black residents experience smaller gains in quality in the first year 
after implementation. However, in subsequent years, these differences dissipate. It is possible that 
although quality is steadily improving in all areas, racial disparities temporarily widen at the 
program’s onset, but are reduced to pre-policy levels over longer periods. These findings build on 
previous work by examining differential quality improvement among Black and White MSAs in 
response to a mandatory, non-Medicare bundled payment program. 
If results can be generalized, then findings suggest that mandatory bundled payments 
increase quality within both Black and White MSAs, yet areas with a high proportion of Black 
residents experience less initial improvement. The most plausible explanation for these findings is 
that geographic areas with lower quality at baseline make the largest initial gains because they have 
greater room for quality improvement. Contrary to expectations, Black MSAs have better quality 
in the pre-policy period, for all outcome measures except for low-risk c-sections. This may be 
attributable to systematic differences in health systems; areas with a high proportion of Black 
residents tend to be large metropolitan areas, with more non-profit and academic medical centers. 
Theoretically, these institutions place greater emphasis on reputation and quality in the absence of 
a financial incentive (Horwitz, 2005; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 1998, 2006; Newhouse, 1970). It is 
possible that given higher baseline quality rates, Black MSAs experience “topping out” of quality 
measures upon APII implementation (Damberg et al., 2014; Golding, Nicola, Duszak, & 
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Rosenkrantz, 2020; McGlynn et al., 2003; Rathi, 2021). If this is the case, it suggests that the 
bundled payment program is functioning as designed; it incentivizes physicians with the lowest 
quality at baseline to change their behavior, leading to higher quality overall. Nonetheless, this 
study shows some evidence that White MSAs in Arkansas surpass Black MSAs on select quality 
measures, suggesting that Black MSAs may have more room for improvement, after all. 
Another potential explanation is that physicians in White MSAs can more easily change 
their behavior in anticipation of the program’s full implementation. Differences in physician 
behavior across Black and White MSAs is a function of marginal patient costs; providers in White 
MSAs may have the ability to make early modifications in quality of care, due to less complex 
patient populations, requiring smaller average investments in these patients. This is potentially 
conceivable given that measures with the most significant gains in White MSAs relative to Black 
MSAs are those not linked to gainsharing (Hepatitis B, Gestational Diabetes, and Asymptomatic 
Bacteriuria). Physicians in Black MSAs may face higher marginal patient costs to improve quality, 
so it makes sense that initially, they would prioritize the limited set of measures linked to 
gainsharing. One caveat is that Black MSAs tend to include a higher proportion of academic 
medical centers, which, on average, possess greater absolute healthcare resources due to higher 
payments from public and private payers. However, recent work has found an inverse relationship 
between hospital profits and academic medical center status, driven by disproportionately high 
spending. These facilities are more expensive than general acute care hospitals because they are 
tertiary care centers that attract severely ill, more expensive patients (Rosko et al., 2020).  
This explanation potentially counters the earlier narrative that Black MSAs experience 
“topping out” of quality measures. It is important to note that urban areas with a greater share of 
academic medical centers may concurrently exert exceptional focus on quality in the absence of 
financial incentives, and experience cost-related challenges in improving quality for complex 
patient populations. Future work should continue to consider how areal-level racial and 
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socioeconomic composition interact to create heterogeneity in episode-based payment program 
effects, and potential effects across different hospital types.  
Alternately, these findings may be driven by the program’s staggered rollout. APII was 
predominantly implemented in the Medicaid market in 2013, followed by the commercial market 
in 2014. Therefore, the initial quality gains in White MSAs relative to Black MSAs in the treatment 
group may represent a spillover from Medicaid to commercial enrollees. In the case of a spillover, 
it is expected that larger effect would be observed in the commercially insured population as the 
share of Medicaid patients rises. In this study, the opposite occurs, as Black MSAs in Arkansas 
have a higher share of Medicaid patients (21.25%) relative to White MSAs (12.84%), diminishing 
the likelihood of this explanation. Future analyses may benefit from exploring the mechanism for 
the main result. 
 As several states and payers continue to debate episode-based payments and other bundled 
payment policies, this analysis suggests that these incentives may be successful on average, but 
policymakers should consider the variation in effects. Specifically, APII led to differential short-
term effects between Black and White MSAs; while overall quality seemed to rise, effects were 
significantly larger among MSAs with a smaller Black population, especially after partial 
implementation. This general pattern is consistent with a prior evaluation of the program’s average 
effects, which also found larger (albeit, null) quality gains after partial implementation (C. Carroll 
et al., 2018). This difference may be due to masked heterogeneity leading to attenuation, or use of 
a different control group (Markovitz & Ryan, 2017). Notably, this study is the first to explore 
effects of multi-payer mandatory bundled payments on place-based racial disparities. Results 
contribute to a growing empirical literature on racial disparities and physician behavior, showing 
that long-term financial incentives may improve perinatal quality overall, but I find no evidence 
that this program narrows racial disparities. 
Results have implications for efforts to expand bundled payment reforms. This analysis 
indicates that while bundled payments may be successful on some dimensions, there is no evidence 
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that they mitigate racial disparities. This suggests a need for payment policies to more directly 
target racial equity. Prenatal screenings linked to gainsharing were less likely to show 
disproportionate gains among White MSAs, suggesting that tethering specific measures to payment 
may be an effective strategy for bolstering quality without intensifying disparities. There were 
smaller changes in disparities among prenatal screening measures tied to reimbursement, 
suggesting that directly linking a financial incentive to racial equity may be a promising approach 
to narrow disparities.  
This result also offers evidence against risk-adjusting quality measures on the basis of race, 
which is a controversial topic. Proponents argue that risk-adjustment “levels the playing field” and 
encourages physicians to take on patients with different clinical and social profiles, as it avoids 
imposing penalties for high-risk patients (Cher, Ryan, Hoffman, & Sheetz, 2020; Glance et al., 
2016; Hoffman, Hsuan, Braun, & Ponce, 2019; Hu, Gonsahn, & Nerenz, 2014; Joynt Maddox, 
Reidhead, Hu, et al., 2019; J. R. Martin et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2018; Sills et al., 2017). 
Meanwhile, critics are concerned that risk-adjustment can mask differential treatment of patients 
according to racial and social characteristics, and may lower quality standards for disadvantaged 
patients (Anderson, Li, Romano, Parker, & Chang, 2016; Bynum & Lewis, 2018; Meddings et al., 
2017; Tran, 2020). Results from this study suggest that outlining clear goals for physicians on 
dimensions racial equity (e.g. reducing disparities), rather than risk-adjusting for these differences, 
may be a central component of future bundled payment design. Future work exploring payment-
related solutions to racial disparities, and potential implications of risk-adjustment, is critically 
important given current inequalities in healthcare. 
This work also suggests that interventions focused on patient education and engagement 
may be helpful in accompanying the financial incentive. Gestational diabetes reflected the most 
persistent increase in place-based disparities. Notably, this is the most time intensive prenatal 
screening, as it involves fasting for eight hours before the test, followed by an initial blood glucose 
test, drinking a syrupy glucose solution, and then re-testing blood glucose levels one hour later. 
 
 112 
Borderline or concerning results require a more intensive three-hour follow-up test. From a 
physician behavior perspective, widening disparities may be a function of unequal patient education 
and expectation-setting for patients in Black and White MSAs (e.g. racial discrimination). Patients 
in Black MSAs may experience disproportionately high barriers to accessing this type of care, 
including time constraints and health literacy issues. Prior work generally supports the notion that 
supply and demand side factors contribute to disparities in childbirth, but this study is the first to 
make strides towards isolating supply side drivers under an econometric framework. 
 This analysis has several limitations and suggests potential avenues for future work. First, 
I can only identify MSA-level, rather than patient-level, race data. This limits the ability to make 
inferences about within-MSA disparities. I argue that since Black and White residential areas 
remain largely segregated, and this pattern has spilled over to the healthcare sector, the MSA-level 
race statistic provides valuable information about whether differential trends in quality by MSA 
are related to patient race and neighborhood context. In the sample, Black MSAs are 25% Black, 
while White MSAs are only 4% Black, suggesting a wide enough gap in racial composition for 
differences in utilization to potentially stem from racial composition. Still, there are several possible 
explanations for the observed differential practice patterns by MSA, including unobserved 
differences between areas (e.g. cultural norms and preferences surrounding prenatal testing, 
physician characteristics, variation patient-physician communication, health literacy and access to 
information about appropriate treatment options, and demographic or family dynamics that impact 
behavior outside of the healthcare system).  
Further, the MarketScan database does not identify individual payers or physicians. This 
blurs the distinction between physician and broader health system behavior changes and limits the 
ability to attribute the observed effects to physician behavior. It will be useful for future work to 
address this gap and examine these effects among individual physicians. Next, I focus on Arkansas 
payment policy in perinatal care, so results may not be generalizable to other clinical or geographic 
areas. From a demographic perspective, Arkansas may be poorly suited to exploring racial 
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disparities, since it is small with a predominantly White population. Additional work is needed to 
strengthen this claim, potentially in more diverse states. Finally, the DDD design rests on the 
assumption that no unobserved factors contribute to the results. I address this concern by using a 
doubly robust propensity score weighting approach, supplemented with several robustness checks. 
However, this approach does not account for time-varying unobserved factors, which may weaken 
interpretation of results. 
 Non-FFS payment reforms are becoming increasingly salient, but there are remaining 
questions about how to design incentives that promote racial equity. I present evidence that current 
incentives lead to disproportionate gains in areas with more White residents in the short-term, but 
these gaps remain unchanged in the long-term. While results are specific to perinatal care, this 
study provides general guidance about whether bundled payments can serve as a tool for reducing 
racial disparities. Continuing to build an understanding of these incentives and the variation in their 





Figure 3-1 Trends in Prenatal, Intrapartum, and Postpartum Quality for Black versus White 
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Figure 3-2 Change in Place-Based Racial Disparities Pre- versus Post-Implementation of the 
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Notes: Sample estimates are from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. 
Coefficients are modeled using logistic regression and are displayed as log odds. Coefficients and 95% Confidence 
Intervals for the DDD results are shown, and can be interpreted as the perfect difference in Black versus White MSAs 
in Arkansas versus Controls in a given year. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Black 
population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a 
threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 3-1, plus 




Table 3-1 Summary Statistics of Arkansas and Control States, Pre- and Post- Implementation of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative 
 
 Pre APII (2010-2012) Post APII (2013-2016) 
 Arkansas Control States Arkansas Control States 
 Black MSAs White MSAs Black MSAs White MSAs Black MSAs White MSAs Black MSAs White MSAs 
Maternal Characteristics 
% Maternal Age 35+ 9.92 14.38 15.68 9.15 11.00 15.38 13.91 15.18 
% LOS > 4 1.88 0.63 1.33 0.51 1.88 1.01 2.02 0.98 
Health Plan         
HMO 3.22 0.63 3.51 1.27 1.88 0.61 1.86 0.76 
PPO 74.26 68.65 71.71 75.75 69.32 65.18 68.05 69.09 
POS 13.94 4.65 11.36 11.19 11.87 5.87 8.65 9.16 
High Deductible 8.58 16.08 13.42 7.94 16.93 28.34 21.44 21.00 
% Cost Sharing 18.21 17.57 16.06 19.26 21.40 24.08 19.85 21.52 
         
MSA-Level Healthcare Characteristics 
% Medicaid 21.25 12.84 17.44 13.73 16.96 13.17 14.60 13.24 
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 
52.23 23.05 39.66 36.96 52.63 25.55 49.77 27.33 
% Hospitals Provide 
OB Services 
31.89 31.40 34.78 32.43 33.82 34.52 32.99 31.85 
% Teaching Hospitals 11.23 0.00 11.87 4.74 11.28 0.00 9.20 4.27 
# of FQHCs 34.39 14.13 48.77 86.57 39.53 41.03 141.72 267.07 
Beds per 1,000 5.46 3.05 4.06 1.69 5.57 3.10 2.64 1.85 
PCPs per 1,000 0.74 0.68 0.91 0.67 0.78 0.72 0.82 0.65 
         
MSA-Level Demographic Characteristics 
% < HS Education 11.41 15.26 14.52 19.96 10.46 14.79 11.06 17.81 
% > College 
Education 
27.82 27.20 29.27 19.79 28.39 28.34 34.40 23.84 
% Population Black         
         
MSA-Level Economic Characteristics 
% Uninsured 17.51 21.72 17.34 23.23 11.70 15.89 13.36 20.06 
% Unemployed 7.18 6.20 8.87 7.42 5.52 4.71 5.89 5.88 
% Poverty 15.17 18.26 15.61 17.29 15.30 16.78 14.45 16.98 
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Episodes 373 473 24,834 27,950 691 494 56,415 47,628 
# of MSAs 3 3 45 93 3 3 46 95 
 
Notes: Sample estimates are from the Truven MarketScan commercial claims database, using data from births during the study period. Healthcare characteristics are from the 
American Hospital Association Annual Survey, the Area Health Resource File, and the National Practitioner Data Bank. Demographic and economic characteristics are obtained 




Table 3-2 Prenatal Care: Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas with a 
High Black Population versus a High White Population 
 
 
 Linked to Gainsharing Not Linked to Gainsharing 
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N 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,85
8 
158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 
             
Dependent Variable Mean: % 
Black 
MSAs 
            
             
Pre-APII             
   
Treatment 
80.43 80.43 66.22 66.22 78.02 78.02 78.55  78.55 75.87 75.87 89.81 89.81 
   Control 84.24 84.24 62.61 62.61 73.52 73.52  73.67 73.67 76.01 76.01 89.32 89.32 
             
Post-APII             
   
Treatment 
78.76 85.94 73.06 77.31 71.50 73.90 72.02 76.51 76.17 80.32 84.97 93.98 
   Control 81.20 86.26 58.33 68.10 73.24 61.22 69.76 74.79 80.13 84.97 88.36 90.97 
             





            
             
Pre-APII             
   
Treatment 
64.06  64.06 31.50 31.50 59.62 59.62  60.47 60.47 65.96 65.96 76.32 76.32  
   Control 82.97 82.97 67.76 67.76 84.46 84.46  81.73 81.73  83.90 83.90 90.44 90.44  
             
Post-APII             
   
Treatment 
82.04 87.46 58.08 66.36  74.85 58.72 74.85 63.91 77.84 84.71 89.22  92.66  
   Control 86.72 86.11 73.03 74.05 83.84 76.58 84.52 87.12 83.74 75.17 92.93 91.01 
             
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, 
prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 3-1, plus mean 
malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3-3 Intrapartum and Postpartum Care: Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment 
Improvement Initiative Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas with a High Black 
Population versus a High White Population 
 
 Intrapartum Care Postpartum Care 
 Low-Risk C-Sections Postpartum Visit Within 8 Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post     
























     
N 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: % 
Black MSAs     
     
Pre-APII     
   Treatment 27.35 27.35 55.23 55.23 
   Control 21.09 21.09 53.06 53.06 
     
Post-APII     
   Treatment 28.50 22.49 61.66 67.47 
   Control 18.36 17.10 71.14 72.49 
     
     
White MSAs     
     
Pre-APII     
   Treatment 17.76  17.76 45.67  45.67 
   Control 16.18  16.18 64.24 64.24 
     
Post-APII     
   Treatment 13.17  18.35 53.29  58.41 
   Control 18.12 15.18 65.23 71.43 
     
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include 
DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the 
State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, prior to policy 
implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all 
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3.9. Appendix Figures and Tables 
3.9.1. Appendix Figures 
Figure 3-3 Interpretation Matrix for Linear Combinations of Coefficients in Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Analysis Comparing Effects 






Result Interpretation for High-Value 
Outcomes 
Interpretation for Low-Value 
Outcomes 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 Partial (2013) < 0 White MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than Black 
MSAs as a result of APII 
Black MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than White 
MSAs as a result of APII 
> 0 Black MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than White 
MSAs as a result of APII 
White MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than Black 
MSAs as a result of APII 
𝛽3 − 𝛽4 Full (2014-2016) < 0 White MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than Black 
MSAs as a result of APII 
Black MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than White 
MSAs as a result of APII 
> 0 Black MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than White 
MSAs as a result of APII 
White MSAs experience greater 
improvement in quality than Black 
MSAs as a result of APII 
 
Notes: Coefficients used in linear combinations are from Equation [8]. High-value outcomes refer to all prenatal and postpartum quality measures. Low-value outcomes refer to the 
intrapartum low-risk c-section quality measure.
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3.9.2. Appendix Tables 
Table 3-4 Tests for Equality in Pre-Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative Trends in Quality of Care Outcomes: Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
with a High Black versus High White Population 
 
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include pre-policy treatment-quarter trend coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black 
residents from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in 
Table 3-1, plus mean malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




 Linked to Gainsharing Not Linked to Gainsharing   
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Hepatitis B Gest. Diabetes A. Bact. Low-Risk C-
Sections 
Postpartum 
Care Within 6 
Weeks 
Treat * Quarter         
































         
















         
N 53,630 53,630 53,630 53,630 53,630 53,630 53,630 53,630 
         
Black MSAs         
         
Pre-APII         
   Treatment 80.43 66.22 78.02 78.55 75.87 89.81 27.35 55.23 
   Control 84.24 62.61 73.52 73.67 76.01 89.32 21.09 53.06 
         
         
White MSAs         
         
Pre-APII         
   Treatment 64.06  31.50 59.62 60.47 65.96 76.32 17.76 45.67 
   Control 82.97 67.76 84.46 81.73 83.90 90.44 16.18 64.24 
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Table 3-5 Covariate Balance Before and After Multiple Propensity Score Weights 
 
 Pre-Medicaid Policy (2010-2012) Post-Medicaid Policy (2013-2016) 
 Initial Balance Propensity Score Balance Initial Balance Propensity Score Balance 
 Treatment Control SMD Treatment Control SMD Treatment Control SMD Treatment Control SMD 
Maternal Characteristics            
Maternal Age 35+ 0.09 0.14 -0.15 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.15 0.09 0.09 -0.01 
LOS > 4 0.01 0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Health Plan             
HMO 0.02 0.30 -0.84 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.19 -0.60 0.01 0.01 0.00 
PPO 0.77 0.48 0.62 0.77 0.74 0.06 0.68 0.49 0.39 0.68 0.68 -0.02 
POS 0.09 0.10 -0.04 0.09 0.11 -0.09 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.02 
High Deductible 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.22 0.27 -0.12 0.22 0.21 0.01 
% Cost Sharing 0.64 0.45 0.39 0.64 0.66 -0.04 0.79 0.54 0.54 0.79 0.79 0.00 
             
MSA-Level Healthcare Characteristics           
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 
0.05 0.51 -1.19 0.05 0.08 -0.08 0.26 0.51 -0.53 0.26 0.28 -0.04 
% Hospitals Provide 
OB Services 
0.13 0.46 -0.80 0.13 0.19 -0.15 0.12 0.40 -0.67 0.12 0.14 -0.04 
% Teaching Hospitals 0.38 0.59 -0.44 0.38 0.44 -0.12 0.49 0.52 -0.06 0.49 0.57 -0.16 
# FQHCs 0.46 0.86 -0.92 0.46 0.43 0.08 0.76 0.88 -0.30 0.76 0.76 0.01 
Beds per 1,000 1.00 0.45 1.56 1.00 0.91 0.25 1.00 0.47 1.50 1.00 0.79 0.58 
PCPs per 1,000 0.50 0.45 0.11 0.50 0.54 -0.08 0.64 0.51 0.26 0.64 0.61 0.06 
             
MSA-Level Demographic 
Characteristics 
           
% Less Than HS 
Education 
0.65 0.75 -0.22 0.65 0.76 -0.23 0.48 0.46 0.04 0.48 0.49 -0.03 
% More Than College 
Education 
0.00 0.42 -1.20 0.00 0.26 -0.75 0.38 0.64 -0.52 0.38 0.48 -0.20 
             
MSA-Level Economic Characteristics            
% Uninsured 1.00 0.77 0.78 1.00 0.89 0.36 0.38 0.48 -0.20 0.38 0.63 -0.50 
% Unemployed 0.38 0.92 -1.38 0.38 0.52 -0.37 0.19 0.27 -0.19 0.19 0.17 0.06 
% Poverty 0.62 0.57 0.11 0.62 0.71 -0.18 0.43 0.38 0.11 0.43 0.45 -0.03 




Notes: Propensity scores constructed using logistic regression. Covariates include binary indicators for each variable, coded as 1 if the value in a given MSA-Quarter is ≥ median 
and 0 if < median. Select covariates are excluded due to potential influence from the Medicaid payment policy in the post-period, including Medicaid share and OB malpractice 
payout. The model also included interaction terms for each of the covariates listed in Table 3-5 with an indicator for High Black MSA, to increase covariate balance between High 
White and High Black MSAs. The estimate of interest is the Standardized Mean Difference (SMD), which provides an independent comparison between treated and control means. 
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Table 3-6 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
with a High Black Population versus High White Population: Unweighted Analysis 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Low-Risk C-Section 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post         
































         
















         
N 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 
         
 Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
 Hepatitis B Gestational Diabetes Asympt. Bact. Postpartum Visit within 6 
Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post         
































         

















         
N 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 
         
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, 
prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 3-1, plus mean 
malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3-7 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
with a High Black Population versus High White Population: With Excluded Episodes 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Low-Risk C-Section 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post         
































         
















         
N 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 
         
 Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
 Hepatitis B Gestational Diabetes Asympt. Bact. Postpartum Visit within 6 Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post         
































         
















         
N 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 227,817 
         
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, 
prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 3-1, plus mean 




Table 3-8 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
with a High Black Population versus High White Population: Testing the Percent of Population Black as a Continuous Variable 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Low-Risk C-Section 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post 

















         
N 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 
         
 Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
 Hepatitis B Gestational Diabetes Asympt. Bact. Postpartum Visit within 6 
Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post 

















         
N 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 158,858 
         
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, 
prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 3-1, plus mean 




Table 3-9 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative 
Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas with a High Black Population versus High White 
Population: Alternate Control Groups 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
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    Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
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Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include 
DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the 
State-MSA level. High Black population is determined by share of Black residents from 2010-2012, prior to policy 
implementation being above a threshold of 12.59%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all 




4. Geographic Variation in Effects of Mandatory Bundled Payments by 
Baseline Performance 
4.1. Introduction 
Since the Affordable Care Act (ACA), provider reimbursement has moved away from fee-
for-service (FFS) towards payment models that incentivize value. One key approach has been 
bundling payments for specific clinical episodes, which shifts financial risk to physicians by 
offering a single, risk-adjusted case rate for the entire course of care, rather than reimbursing 
separately for each individual service (C. Carroll et al., 2018). Under this policy design, providers 
that keep costs below a risk-adjusted target threshold and meet certain benchmarks on quality 
measures earn a portion of the savings, while those that exceed it incur a financial penalty. Holding 
providers accountable for quality and costs of care during the episode creates a financial incentive 
to coordinate care and improve the patient experience across both dimensions (Agarwal, Liao, 
Gupta, & Navathe, 2020). 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has promoted bundled payments 
as a flagship policy approach for value-based payment reform. Medicare launched three major 
bundled payment programs in 2009, 2013, and 2016, respectively. The Acute Care Episode (ACE) 
Demonstration and Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) are voluntary initiatives that 
cover all Medicare charges for hospitalizations and post-acute care (PAC) across select surgical 
and cardiac clinical episodes; and the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model is 
a mandatory program for hip and knee replacements, in which hospitals are responsible for all 
Medicare inpatient spending plus 90 days post-discharge. CJR hospitals were selected based on 
location within a high-spending region (Agarwal et al., 2020). With the exception of CJR, these 
programs rely on voluntary participation, which can introduce selection issues if participating 
hospitals differ from non-participating hospitals. Specifically, if unobservable characteristics are 
driving a hospital’s choice to participate in a bundled payment program, then estimates of the 
program effects may be biased by factors that cannot be captured in a dataset. As a result, the impact 
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of bundled payments gleaned from current studies may differ from the general provider population, 
and pathways for achieving success may be misleading. This poses a challenge for policymakers, 
who may not be fully informed as to whether bundled payments can work in today’s healthcare 
landscape (Glickman, Dinh, & Navathe, 2018). 
Empirical studies have found that federal bundled payment programs have led to modest 
reductions in spending (Barnett et al., 2019; Curtin, Russell, & Odum, 2017; Dummit et al., 2016; 
Navathe et al., 2018, 2017; Odum, Hamid, Van Doren, & Spector, 2018; Siddiqi et al., 2018), but 
effects on quality are mixed (Barnett et al., 2019; Bhatt et al., 2017; Bolz & Iorio, 2016; Bronson 
et al., 2019; Chen, Ryan, Shih, Thumma, & Dimick, 2018; Courtney, Ashley, Hume, & Kamath, 
2016; Curtin et al., 2017; Jubelt et al., 2017; Kee, Edwards, & Barnes, 2017; B. I. Martin, Lurie, 
Farrokhi, McGuire, & Mirza, 2018; Odum et al., 2018; Siddiqi et al., 2018). However, most existing 
work focuses on the impact of bundled payments for the “average” self-selected participant, but 
little is known about how effects vary across providers. Further, results are specific to the Medicare 
population, leading to concerns that findings cannot be generalized to younger, non-Medicare 
populations. BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to be large, high-volume, non-profit, 
teaching facilities with integrated PAC facilities (Navathe et al., 2018). Further, within this self-
selected group, the greatest spending reductions are concentrated among top performers at baseline 
(Navathe et al., 2017). While these successes are important, they do not clearly indicate whether 
bundled payments address spending and quality among providers facing the biggest challenges, 
such as low quality, a high-risk patient population, and limited resources.  
To shed light on the effects of bundled payments across all providers, it is critical to assess 
the impact of episode-based payments with mandatory, rather than voluntary participation. 
Evaluating mandatory bundled payments to explore whether provider behavior varies by baseline 
levels of quality is key to determining the net social welfare effects of these incentives (e.g. 
maximizing benefits and minimizing harms). The answer to this question is not straightforward; 
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providers with lower quality at baseline face a higher marginal cost to change behavior, but they 
also have greater room for improvement. 
In this study, I test whether baseline provider quality is associated with heterogeneity in 
effects on quality and spending outcomes of a mandatory bundled payment program. It is important 
to explore variation in these effects, since the “average” effect may attenuate towards the null if 
providers with different baseline characteristics experience divergent effects (Markovitz & Ryan, 
2017). To achieve the study aims, I leverage a unique, multi-payer, state-level episode-based 
payment program for perinatal care, with compulsory provider participation for Medicaid and 
commercially insured enrollees. This policy is distinct from the conventional bundled payment 
structure because participation was required across all providers and targeted younger patients 
insured by Medicaid and private payers (C. Carroll et al., 2018). Further, this context allows me to 
decompose the drivers of episode-based cost savings by quantity and price, to determine whether 
the mechanism for cost savings varies between low and high quality providers at baseline. I use a 
difference-in-differences design and a large commercial claims database. Overall, this study seeks 
to inform whether the effects of mandatory versus voluntary payment reform are expected to vary, 
to offer insight into future state and federal bundled payment design.   
4.2. Study Data and Methods 
4.2.1. Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative Overview 
The Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative (APII) is a statewide multi-payer episode-
based payment program with compulsory provider participation. APII was introduced in 2013 for 
select episodes in Medicaid and private insurers, including perinatal care. Under APII, insurers set 
episode-level spending targets and hold a Principal Accountable Provider (PAP) responsible for a 
portion of excess spending for perinatal episodes. Specifically, PAPs are held responsible for half 
of total risk-adjusted episode spending, either losing half of the excess spending or earning half of 
the savings. Further, PAPs are only eligible to receive payment conditional upon achieving 80% 
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screening rates for the following prenatal process measures: Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV), Group B Streptococcus (Group B Strep), and chlamydia. The program was implemented in 
two distinct stages: (1) in 2013, Medicaid implemented APII across nearly all beneficiaries, and (2) 
in 2014, participating private insurers launched APII among self-insured and fully-insured groups. 
Due to its stepwise rollout, I assess effects of APII in two separate time periods: (1) after partial 
implementation in 2013 (only Medicaid enrollees were covered by APII), and (2) after full 
implementation in 2014 (Medicaid and commercial enrollees were both covered by APII). Previous 
research examining APII has found a decline in average perinatal spending in Arkansas by a 
significant 3.8% compared to surrounding states, with a small but insignificant increase in quality 
of care. Researchers attributed savings to reduced inpatient prices, as opposed to significant 
declines in per episode quantity of care (C. Carroll et al., 2018).  
4.2.2. Effects of Medicare Bundled Payments on Spending and Quality 
Empirical studies on Medicare bundled payments provide evidence on the association 
between bundled payments and episode savings, with greater spending reductions in voluntary 
programs relative to mandatory ones. Five studies showed a significant decrease in episode 
spending for lower extremity joint replacements among BPCI participants (Curtin et al., 2017; 
Dummit et al., 2016; Navathe et al., 2017; Odum et al., 2018; Siddiqi et al., 2018). One multi-center 
analysis found a 4% decline in per episode spending ($1,166) among BPCI participants compared 
to non-participants, with the largest savings concentrated in the post-acute care (PAC) setting 
(Dummit et al., 2016). Three single-center studies also showed significant reductions in episode 
spending among BPCI participants, ranging from $1,717 to $3,263 per episode (Curtin et al., 2017; 
Siddiqi et al., 2018). Savings were primarily driven by reductions in length of stay, PAC use, and 
internal hospital costs, and were limited to uncomplicated episodes (Navathe et al., 2017). Current 
work suggests that savings did not extend to the ACE program or other types of clinical episodes, 
so generalizability of BPCI results for joint replacements may be limited (Joynt Maddox, Orav, 
Zheng, & Epstein, 2018; Navathe et al., 2018, 2017). Research on CJR is suggestive of episode 
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savings, but since the program is relatively new, findings are less conclusive. One study on CJR 
demonstrated a significant 3.6% reduction in spending ($1,084) (Barnett et al., 2019). Another 
study comparing BPCI with CJR determined $234 greater savings per episode in BPCI, but the 
difference was not significant (Finkelstein et al., 2018). Like BPCI, spending reductions in CJR 
were driven by lower PAC expenditures (Barnett et al., 2019; Finkelstein et al., 2018).  
The association between bundled payments and quality improvement are mixed. Six 
studies showed significant reductions in readmission rates, ranging from 0.6% to 7.0% (Barnett et 
al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018; Curtin et al., 2017; Jubelt et al., 2017; Odum et al., 2018; Siddiqi et al., 
2018), while eleven studies did not (Bhatt et al., 2017; Bolz & Iorio, 2016; Bronson et al., 2019; 
Courtney et al., 2016; Dummit et al., 2016; Finkelstein et al., 2018; Gray, Prieto, Duncan, & 
Parvataneni, 2018; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; Kee et al., 2017; B. I. Martin et al., 2018; Navathe 
et al., 2017). Changes on other dimensions of quality, including complication rates (Barnett et al., 
2019; Chen et al., 2018; Finkelstein et al., 2018; Gray et al., 2018), mortality (Barnett et al., 2019; 
Chen et al., 2018; Dummit et al., 2016; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018), and emergency department 
visits (Barnett et al., 2019; Dummit et al., 2016; Finkelstein et al., 2018; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; 
Navathe et al., 2017), have not been observed. 
I extend this literature by exploring variation in the effects of mandatory bundled payments 
by providers’ baseline performance. Assessing such heterogeneity seeks to establish whether the 
“average” effects that have been explored to date mask divergent effects within the provider 
population. This question is critical to assessing whether episode-based payments with mandatory, 
rather than voluntary participation require different approaches across providers with different 
baseline characteristics, which is critically important in determining the net social welfare effects.  
4.2.3. Commercial Claims Data 
The primary data for this analysis is the Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims database 
from 2010 to 2016, which links paid claims and encounter data with detailed patient information 
across sites and types of providers over time. Although the database is a convenience sample of 
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enrollees in commercial health plans and large self-insured firms that opt to provide their data, the 
MarketScan data includes proprietary commercial claims (employer and health plan) from over 36 
million patient hospital discharges (Johns Hopkins, 2016). These data are collected across broad 
geographic areas to represent treatment patterns and costs in the U.S. The MarketScan data are 
advantageous for this analysis because they use consistent enrollee identifiers over time, enabling 
us to track patients across the full episode of care. One limitation is that a major insurer dropped 
out of the MarketScan data in 2015. To avoid differential selection into the database over time, the 
sample is limited to the employer population, which remains stable over the study period. Relying 
on the employer population also aims to ensure that the sample is minimally affected by changes 
in the insurance policy landscape, such as Medicaid expansion or the private option in Arkansas. 
4.2.4. Sample 
The analytic sample consists of 119,309 perinatal episodes between 2010 and 2016. This 
includes 2,031 episodes for providers in Arkansas and 117,278 episodes in control states. I use the 
MarketScan database to construct perinatal episodes using the methodology outlined in the 
Arkansas BCBS Perinatal Algorithm. First, I identify all live births between 2010 and 2016 using 
the relevant Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) codes, and pull all inpatient and outpatient claims in 
the period 40 weeks before the delivery through sixty days afterwards. I then collapse the data to 
the episode-level, using the date of birth for assignment to the pre- and post- periods (Arkansas 
Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2014).  
The sample includes low-risk births in the Truven MarketScan Database, defined by the 
Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ). This population is limited to mothers with 
uncomplicated births (e.g. no abnormal presentation, preterm delivery, fetal death, multiple 
gestation, or breech procedure) who have never had a prior c-section. Following Carroll et al. 
(2018), I exclude cases that are exempt from APII reimbursement due to patient co-morbidities 
(e.g. sickle cell anemia, end stage renal disease, severe preeclampsia). Focusing on this population 
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guarantees that all physicians in the treatment group face the same financial incentive, and that all 
quality measures are appropriate for this population (C. Carroll et al., 2018). 
4.2.5. Outcome Variables 
The primary outcome measure is total episode spending. Consistent with Carroll et al. 
(2018), I define this as the sum of all payments during the episode window. Further, I examine 
spending subcategories, including: intrapartum inpatient facility, intrapartum inpatient 
professional, total prenatal, and total postpartum. Intrapartum facility includes reimbursement to 
the hospital where the childbirth took place. Variation in intrapartum facility spending is driven by 
hospital prices, as well as the mode of delivery (e.g. because DRG payments are higher for c-
sections than vaginal deliveries). Intrapartum professional spending includes the global maternity 
fee, which is a one-time billing for routine prenatal, intrapartum, and postpartum care. The global 
maternity fee is often triggered when the physician delivers the baby, and it can vary by delivery 
method and across physician groups that negotiate different fee schedules. Total prenatal spending 
encompasses all payments prior to the birth outside of the global maternity fee (e.g. laboratory tests, 
inpatient stays, or emergency department visits). Accordingly, total postpartum spending refers to 
all payments after the birth that occur outside of the global maternity fee. 
I also construct eight quality outcome measures for each episode, all of which are adapted 
from the Maternity Care Performance Measure Set developed jointly by the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the National Committee for Quality Assurance. Quality 
outcomes consist of the following prenatal measures: whether a patient received three screenings 
linked to gainsharing (Group B Strep, Chlamydia, and HIV) and three screenings not linked to 
gainsharing (Hepatitis B, Gestational Diabetes, and Asymptomatic Bacteriuria). PAPs must report 
each of the prenatal screening rates to track their performance, regardless of whether it is tied to 
reimbursement. In the postpartum period, examine whether the mother received any follow-up care 
within eight weeks of the delivery. All prenatal and postpartum outcomes are considered high-value 
components of the perinatal episode, which means that a higher rate is considered better.  In the 
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intrapartum period, I measure low-risk c-sections, which identifies whether the mother received an 
inappropriate c-section. A c-section is not appropriate if the mother has a singleton, uncomplicated 
birth, and has never had a c-section before. I follow the methodology developed by AHRQ, using 
Inpatient Quality Indicator (IQI) 33, which is endorsed by the National Quality Forum as a 
consensus standard for hospital care (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research, 2016). Unlike 
the other outcomes, low-risk c-sections capture a dimension of low-value care, meaning that a 
lower rate is considered better. 
4.2.6. Covariates 
Covariates include the following maternal characteristics: insurance type (HMO, PPO, 
POS, and high-deductible health plan), age category (less than 25, 25-29, 30-34, and 35+), whether 
the hospital length of stay was greater than four days (the number of days typically covered by 
insurers), and cost sharing quartile bins. I also included a series of MSA-level controls, which 
account for healthcare, demographic, and economic variables that may influence physician practice 
patterns. Healthcare factors consisted of hospital characteristics (percent of hospitals that are non-
profit, percent of hospitals that provide obstetric services, percent teaching hospitals, number of 
federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), beds per 1,000, and percent of patients that are insured 
by Medicaid), practitioner information (primary care practitioners per 1,000), and malpractice risk 
quartile bins, defined as the average obstetric-related malpractice payout. Demographic 
characteristics referred to the percent of the population with less than a high school education and 
percent of the population with more than a college education. Finally, economic characteristics 
included uninsurance rate, percent unemployed, and percent with income below the federal poverty 
line. Covariates were selected to be consistent with Carroll et al., (2018). They were derived from 
several data sources, including the U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS), the Health 
Resources and Services Administration’s Area Health Resource File (AHRF), the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, and the National Practitioners Data Bank (NPDB) 
(AHA, 2018; HRSA, 2019; NPDB, 2019; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). 
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4.2.7. High Performance Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
I assess whether the effects of APII on spending and quality differ between providers located 
in high performing geographic areas, compared to low performing geographic areas, measured at 
the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. To determine whether an MSA is high or low 
performing, I created a quality performance score, derived as an equally weighted composite of 
seven perinatal quality measures in the study period prior to APII implementation (2010-2012): 
low-risk c-sections, prenatal screenings (Group B. Strep, Asymptomatic Bacteriuria, Hepatitis B, 
Gestational Diabetes, HIV1), and postpartum follow-up within 8 weeks. Six of the seven measures 
are considered high-value, in which expected benefits outweigh expected harms, and thus, a higher 
rate is considered better. One measure, low-risk c-section rate, is a measure of low-value care, in 
which expected harms outweigh expected benefits, so a lower rate is considered better. For 
consistency in scoring, I invert the low-risk c-section measure by subtracting the rate from 100%. 
An MSA is assigned as high performing if it has a composite score greater than or equal to the 
sample mean score of 68.68%. 
4.2.8. Control Group 
I constructed the control group by adapting Stuart et al.’s (2014) multiple propensity score 
weighting approach. This method aimed to ensure that control states were similar to treatment states 
across observable covariates (Stuart et al., 2014). Absent this approach, selection into treatment 
and control groups could be confounded by baseline characteristics, thereby biasing estimates. 
First, I fit separate multinomial logistic regression models in the pre- and post-APII period, to 
predict the probability of being assigned to the treatment group in each time frame. The models 
adjusted for all covariates included in the main model, except for those that could potentially be 
                                               
1  Chlamydia screenings were not included in the quality performance composite score due to low rates at baseline, 
leading to a small sample size in the “high performing” group. In the study sample, the rate of chlamydia screenings 
in the pre-policy period was 46.81% in the treatment group and 54.43% in the control group. The APII quality 
threshold goal rate is 80%. 
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influenced by APII in the post-period. Second, I divided the predicted values of each logistic 
regression by its inverse to generate the propensity score weight. The resulting weights helped to 
generate a synthetic sample in which treatment assignment was independent from measured 
baseline covariates. The control group consisted of fifteen states that did not implement a bundled 
payment policy (California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming). This group represents a diverse set of states across multiple regions, which may 
increase external validity. 
4.2.9. Statistical Analyses 
I first sought to understand whether spending and quality differed between episodes in 
high-performing vs. low-performing MSAs upon implementation of APII. To answer this question, 
I used a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model comparing high and low performing 
MSAs in treatment and control states, pre-policy implementation (2010-2012) versus post-policy 
implementation (2013-2016). In the main DDD model, I estimated separate effects of APII after 
partial implementation (2013), when the program had mainly been rolled out in Medicaid, and full 
implementation (2014-2016), when the policy had also been initiated among commercial payers. 
This approach enabled me to assess whether there were spillovers from Medicaid onto 
commercially insured enrollees, and is modeled on earlier work comparing average effects of APII 
on spending utilization (C. Carroll et al., 2018).  
I estimated the impact of APII for high and low performing MSAs using the following 
equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Partial𝑡 ⋅ High𝑚 + 𝛽2 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Partial𝑡 ⋅ Low𝑚 + 𝛽3 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅
Full𝑡 ⋅ High𝑚 + 𝛽4 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Full𝑡 ⋅ Low𝑚 + 𝛽5 ⋅ Treat𝑠 + 𝛽6 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽7 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽8 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅
Partial𝑡 + 𝛽9 ⋅ High𝑚 ⋅ Partial𝑡 + 𝛽10 ⋅ Treat𝑠 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽11 ⋅ High𝑚 ⋅ Full𝑡 + 𝛽12 ⋅ High𝑚 ⋅
Treat𝑠 + ⋅ 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗 ⋅ 𝑍𝑚 + µ ⋅ 𝑉𝑠 + 𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡       [9] 
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  In [9], 𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡  is the expected value of the outcome. It is indexed by the episode i, State-
MSA m; in state s; at time t, which is representative of pre/post policy implementation. Treat is a 
binary variable that denotes the presence of APII, while Partial and Full are binary variables that 
indicate the post-periods, including partial implementation in 2013, or full implementation in 2014-
2016. High𝑚 and Low𝑚, defined earlier, refer to high and low performing MSAs, respectively.  𝑉𝑠 
and 𝑇𝑡  are state and quarter-year fixed-effects, respectively. 𝑃𝑖 is a vector of episode-level maternal 
characteristics. 𝑍𝑚 is a vector of time-varying State-MSA-level controls, which account for 
healthcare, demographic, and economic variables that may influence physician practice patterns. 
To account for covariance in standard errors between time periods by geographic areas, standard 
errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. All models of healthcare spending are estimated using 
a one-part generalized linear model (GLM) with a Gamma distributional family and log link. All 
models of perinatal quality are estimated using logistic regression. 
In the main model, the coefficients of interest are 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 − 𝛽4, which respectively, 
represent the aggregate effect of APII in high versus low performing MSAs after partial and full 
implementation. I calculated these estimates using a linear combination. For spending variables 
and low-value quality measures (e.g. low-risk c-sections), a negative value suggests that high 
quality MSAs experienced greater savings and/or quality gains. For high-value quality outcomes, 
including prenatal and postpartum measures, a positive value indicates that high quality MSAs 
experienced greater quality gains than low quality MSAs as a result of APII. 
After examining overall savings, I performed analyses to decompose whether intrapartum 
savings were achieved through a reduction in prices and/or quantity of care supplied. To estimate 
price changes, I modified [9] by adding a fixed effect for each DRG. To estimate quantity changes, 
I modified equation [9] by adding a fixed effect for standardized intrapartum facility claims, using 
the median DRG payment. This approach was adapted from Carroll et al., (2018), and sought to 
determine whether holding intrapartum utilization or prices constant affected the main result (C. 
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Carroll et al., 2018). These analyses enabled me to explore whether the mechanism for savings 
varied between high and low performing MSAs. 
I also performed several additional tests. First, I repeated the analyses without multiple 
group propensity score weights. Second, I re-ran analyses using alternate comparison groups by 
dropping one control state at a time. Third, I tested whether results were sensitive to inclusion of 
non-metropolitan areas. Fourth, I re-estimated the models using a continuous measure for 
composite performance. Finally, I re-ran analyses with episodes that are excluded from APII 
reimbursement. 
4.3. Study Results 
4.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Overall, the analyses examined 119,309 low-risk pregnancy episodes. This included 2,031 
episodes for providers in Arkansas and 117,278 episodes in the control group. In the treatment 
group, there were 1,131 episodes in high performing MSAs and 900 in low performing MSAs. In 
the control group, there were 104,622 episodes in high performing MSAs and 12,656 in low 
performing MSAs. 
Table 4-1 summarizes sample characteristics in high and low performing MSAs in treatment 
and control states, before and after implementation of APII. Differences between groups were 
relatively small in magnitude during the pre-policy period, when comparing low performing and 
high performing MSAs, respectively, in the treatment group versus the control group. This was true 
for episode-level maternal characteristics, and MSA-level healthcare and economic factors. Prior 
to implementing APII, high performing MSAs in both treatment and control groups had a higher 
proportion of HMO enrollees and births with a LOS over 4 days. High performing MSAs in both 
groups also had more Medicaid patients, more non-profit and teaching hospitals, more hospitals 
that provide obstetric care, more hospital beds per 1,000, a greater number of FQHCs, and a higher 
density of primary care physicians. On average, the population in high performing MSAs was less 
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likely to have received less than a high school or more than a college education. The population in 
high performing MSAs was also more likely to be Black, and less likely to be uninsured or 
impoverished compared to low performing MSAs in both treatment and control groups. I anticipate 
that these differences are explained by inherent differences between large, metropolitan areas and 
small, micropolitan ones. 
There is little evidence of differential changes in the sample after APII implementation. In 
general, gaps between groups declined. For example, the difference in percent of HMO enrollees, 
LOS over 4 days, as well as Medicaid share decreased. Average percent cost sharing and education 
level rose across all groups, while the uninsurance and unemployment rates dropped. Other 
maternal, healthcare, demographic, and economic characteristics evolved similarly over time. To 
strengthen the assessment of covariate balance in Table 4-1, I evaluated the propensity score 
weights to ensure that there were no systematic differences in characteristics between treatment 
and controls in the pre- and post- periods (Table 2-7). The standardized mean differences (SMDs) 
between treatment and control groups showed significant improvement in covariate balance. After 
constructing the propensity score weights, all but three covariates had SMDs below 0.25, with the 
majority of these variables under 0.10 (Austin & Stuart, 2015; Stuart et al., 2014, 2013; Zhang et 
al., 2019). 
Among high performing MSAs, unadjusted overall spending per episode was lower in 
Arkansas relative to control states prior to APII implementation ($9,666 vs. $11,507) (Table 4-2). 
Overall spending increased in both treatment and control groups after APII implementation. In 
Arkansas, per episode spending rose to $10,023 and $11,453 in Arkansas after partial and full 
implementation of APII, respectively. In control states, overall spending in high performing MSAs 
increased to $13,138 in the partial implementation period and $13,749 in the full implementation 
period. Among low performing MSAs, this trend was also evident. In Arkansas, pre-APII spending 
was, on average, $7,877, and increased to $10,227 and $11,833 after partial and full implementation 
of APII, respectively. In control states, per episode spending was $10,150 prior to APII, and 
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increased to $12,837 and $15,650 in the partial and full APII implementation periods, respectively. 
Trends in overall episode spending by year, across groups, can be observed in Figure 4-1. These 
patterns persisted across categorical spending. 
Among low performing MSAs, unadjusted quality of care was higher in Arkansas relative to 
control states, for all but three measures (gestational diabetes screenings, low-risk c-sections, and 
receipt of timely postpartum care). After implementation of APII, quality of care was higher in 
Arkansas for all prenatal screening measures, and remained lower for intrapartum and postpartum 
measures. Among low performing MSAs, unadjusted quality of care prior to APII was lower in 
Arkansas relative to control states for five of the eight quality measures, including chlamydia, HIV, 
and hepatitis B screenings, low-risk c-sections, and receipt of timely postpartum care. Low 
performing MSAs had lower quality rates compared to high performing MSAs for all measures, 
except for low-risk c-sections. This finding is likely a function of equally weighting each quality 
measure in the composite performance score. In the post-APII period, quality of care among low 
performing MSAs in Arkansas surpassed high performing MSAs for gestational diabetes screening 
rate after full implementation (83.39% vs. 81.30%, respectively). Trends in quality of care by year 
and across groups can be observed in Figure 4-1. 
4.3.2. Association Between Bundled Payments and Healthcare Spending 
 Analyses on the effect of APII on per episode spending showed 16.2% greater overall 
savings in high performing MSAs relative to low performing MSAs after partial implementation 
(Standard Error (SE): 0.059; p-value<0.01) (Table 4-2). However, there was no evidence of 
differential savings in high versus low performing MSAs after full implementation of APII, relative 
to the pre-policy period. Savings during the partial implementation period appeared to be 
distributed across intrapartum facility spending (log odds: -0.321; SE: 0.074; p-value<0.01) and 
postpartum spending (log odds: -1.073; SE: 0.542; p-value<0.05). 
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4.3.3. Association Between Bundled Payments and Perinatal Quality 
 Analyses on the effect of APII on prenatal quality showed significant variation between 
high and low performing MSAs after partial implementation of APII (Table 4-3). Two of the three 
measures linked to gainsharing showed significantly greater improvements in low performing 
MSAs compared to high performing MSAs, in Arkansas relative to control states. Chlamydia and 
HIV screenings increased 75.6% and 97.5% more, respectively, in low performing MSAs 
compared to high performing MSAs for episodes paid under APII (Chlamydia – SE: 0.329; p-
value<0.05; HIV – SE: 0.356; p-value<0.01). Two of the three prenatal screenings that were not 
linked to gainsharing showed the opposite effect, as high performing MSAs improved quality to a 
greater extent than low performing MSAs. After partial implementation of APII, gestational 
diabetes screenings increased significantly in high performing MSAs compared to low performing 
MSAs (log odds: 0.889; SE: 0.365; p-value<0.01). After full implementation of APII, Hepatitis B 
screenings increased significantly among high performing MSAs compared to low performing 
MSAs, for episodes paid under APII (log odds: 1.068; SE: 0.218; p-value<0.01). No other quality 
measures showed differential changes in prenatal quality after full implementation compared to the 
pre-APII period. There was no variation in effects between in high and low performing MSAs for 
intrapartum and postpartum quality of care measures (Table 4-4). 
4.3.4. Decomposing Price and Quantity Effects 
 Decomposition analyses showed that savings in high performing MSAs was attributable to 
declines in both intrapartum prices and quantity of care (Table 4-5). After partial implementation 
of APII, intrapartum prices and quantity decreased 28.5% and 31.9% more, respectively, in high 
performing MSAs compared to low performing MSAs under APII relative to control states (Price 
– SE: 0.062; p-value<0.01; Quantity – SE: 0.080; p-value<0.01). There were no differential 
changes in price or quantity between high and low performing MSAs after full implementation of 
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APII, suggesting that the approach for achieving savings between high and low performing MSAs 
varied in the partial implementation post-period only. 
4.3.5. Robustness Checks 
Results were robust to alternate specifications and samples (Appendix). This included 
repeating analyses without multiple group propensity score weights (Table 4-8) and with MSA-
level composite performance as a continuous, rather than binary, measure (Table 4-10). I also tested 
alternate samples by re-running models with alternate comparison groups (Table 4-11), and with 
inclusion of episodes that are excluded under APII reimbursement (Table 4-9).  Since results were 
consistent across each of these models, it suggests that inferences from the main models can be 
generalized more broadly. 
4.4. Discussion 
 This article presents evidence on the association between geographic variation in baseline 
performance and healthcare spending and quality among providers paid under a mandatory, multi-
payer bundled payment program for perinatal episodes in Arkansas. This paper contributes to 
understanding the ways in which mandatory participation in bundled payments relates to total 
medical spending and utilization across the healthcare system. I find 16.2% greater healthcare 
savings overall among episodes in high performing areas compared to low performing areas as part 
of the episode-based payment program in the initial implementation period. Savings among high 
performing areas were due to declines in both hospital prices and intrapartum utilization. I also find 
short-term improvements in quality among low performing areas relative to high performing areas 
for prenatal screening measures that are linked to reimbursement as part of the bundled payment 
program. However, these quality gains are offset by smaller improvements for prenatal screening 
measures not tied to the payment incentive, relative to high performing areas. The results were 
generally consistent across model specifications and patient populations. 
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 The results on healthcare spending appear to be consistent with existing studies. Prior 
research on the effects of bundled payments on spending found that participation is associated with 
greater savings in programs with voluntary, rather than mandatory participation (Finkelstein et al., 
2018). Among voluntary bundled payment programs, participating hospitals tend to be large, non-
profit, teaching hospitals with high patient volume and integrated PAC facilities (Navathe et al., 
2017). Within this self-selected group, the greatest spending reductions are concentrated among 
top performers at baseline (Navathe et al., 2018). This research suggests that high performing 
healthcare systems may be more likely to both participate in bundled payment programs, and 
achieve greater savings within a given episode. My study confirms this result by demonstrating that 
high performing geographic areas reduce overall spending to a greater extent than low performing 
areas under bundled payments, at least in the short-term. This finding adds to the literature by 
exploring variation in savings across the full provider population facing a mandatory bundled 
payment incentive, and it also decomposes the mechanism for these savings. 
Potential reasons for why low performing areas experienced smaller declines in healthcare 
spending are multifaceted. The most plausible explanation is that high performing areas had higher 
spending at baseline, so providers in this group had more opportunity for cost savings. Savings 
could be achieved through multiple avenues, such as a reduction in expensive, elective procedures 
and hospital prices. A related explanation is that areas with low performing providers had fewer 
opportunity to reduce spending without compromising quality. These areas had lower rates of low-
risk c-sections at baseline in both treatment (18.37% versus 25.72%) and control groups (13.22% 
versus 15.62%) and fewer patients with an extended length of stay. Thus, it is conceivable that rates 
of other low-value, elective procedures may have been relatively limited as well. Without 
widespread “low hanging fruit” to pursue savings, these areas may have had fewer pathways to 
achieve reductions in episode spending.  
Further, it is possible that savings in low performing areas were counteracted by the 
increased provision of high quality services for specific patient populations. For example, the 
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financial incentive may have encouraged obstetricians to recommend use of a midwife or doula for 
socially underserved birthing people, who may have previously been unaware of this option or 
experienced barriers to access (Darling et al., 2019). Doula and midwifery assistance is associated 
with better birth outcomes via emotional, physical, and informational support, including lower 
likelihood of maternal complications and/or having a low birthweight baby (K. J. Gruber, Cupito, 
& Dobson, 2013). Analyses were unable to isolate the extent to which net savings were offset by 
an increase in the use of these safe, hospital-based childbirth services for vulnerable patients. If this 
mechanism were present, it would suggest that physicians responded to the financial incentive as 
intended, by improving care coordination over the entire episode. 
Differential cost savings between high and low performing areas were not sustained 
beyond the first year of program implementation. A myriad of factors may have contributed. One 
possible reason is that high performing areas may have experienced a spillover from Medicaid to 
commercial enrollees after partial program implementation, while low performing areas did not. 
This explanation is plausible, since high performing areas had higher Medicaid enrollment (20.08% 
versus 13.13%), increasing the likelihood that physicians extended care practices across payer 
populations. Another explanation is the delayed onset of cost savings by providers in low 
performing areas. Further delineation for why differences in cost savings between high and low 
performing areas dissipated in the long-term warrants careful scrutiny. 
This study provides greater context on the relationship between bundled payments and 
quality of care, especially as prior studies have shown mixed effects. Among low performing areas, 
I find greater rates of quality improvement for prenatal measures that are linked directly to the 
episode-based payment, and smaller rates of quality improvement for prenatal measures that do not 
directly contribute to reimbursement under the bundled payment design. This suggests that the 
financial incentive can be effective in encouraging low performing providers to offer better quality 
of care throughout the episode, but these improvements may be achieved at the expense of other 
important measures. It is unclear why low performing areas lag behind high performing areas for 
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measures that are not tied to gainsharing. This variation could be due to the limited ability for low 
performers to prioritize a wide set of measures, in which case it makes sense to focus on measures 
that have payment implications. This result could also be driven by clinical complexity of patient 
populations or screening measures. Areas with high performing providers tend to have a higher 
proportion of Black patients, which, given current racial disparities in maternal care, complicates 
this narrative. Consistent with spending outcomes, effects of the episode-based payment on quality 
are not sustained beyond the first year of implementation. It is important for future work to address 
the factors contributing to this finding. 
If results can be generalized, then these findings suggest that mandatory bundled payments 
may disadvantage low performers at baseline. This has several implications for efforts to expand 
bundled payment reforms. In terms of quality, low performers experience smaller quality 
improvement for measures not tied to reimbursement and greater gains for measures linked to 
payment, which suggests that linking measures to payment may be an effective strategy for 
bolstering quality among low performers at baseline, through the entire episode and across 
healthcare settings. Implications for spending are more complex because it is unclear whether 
modest cost savings among low performers at baseline are due to access-improving increases in 
utilization for their patients (e.g. increased prenatal testing, higher midwife and doula access, more 
comprehensive hospital care). Thus, it is important to assess the factors contributing to changes in 
spending over time. For example, if smaller healthcare savings are driven by the increased 
provision of services that improve patient outcomes, then it may be worthwhile for future bundled 
payment design to focus predominantly on unnecessary spending, rather than total spending. 
Analyses had several limitations. The primary limitation was that the study may have been 
underpowered to detect policy-relevant differences in healthcare spending and quality for the high 
and low performing MSAs in the APII group compared to the controls. Part of this was related to 
the inherently high variability in the outcomes, which necessitated a large sample to detect 
significant differences. Another contributor was using Arkansas as the treatment state, which 
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prompted concerns about whether the results of APII are generalizable to other geographic areas. 
Arkansas is a small, relatively rural state, and the MarketScan database only includes geographic 
indicators for micro and metropolitan areas. Thus, analyses did not include rural episodes, which 
may have biased results. 
Some additional limitations to the analyses were related to the quality of the data. First, I could 
not identify individual payers or physicians in the MarketScan database. This blurred the distinction 
between physician and broader health system behavior changes and limited the ability to attribute 
the observed effects to physician behavior. It will be useful for future work to address this gap and 
examine these effects among individual physicians. Other limitations were related to the external 
validity of these findings. I focused on perinatal care, which, by definition, only applies to women. 
Only a segment of the population was eligible to enroll, thereby limiting the generalizability of my 
findings to this setting. Perinatal care has characteristics that reduce the likelihood for effects to 
stem from confounders, which may increase the extent to which results apply to other settings (e.g. 
it has high variation in costs and quality, as well as practical, elective treatment substitutes across 
delivery methods). These are factors that tend to be associated with supply-side, rather than 
demand-side, responses to financial incentives. 
Finally, from a methods perspective, the DDD design rests on the assumption that no 
unobserved factors contribute to the observed effect. I addressed this concern by using a validated 
propensity score weighting approach, supplemented with several robustness checks. However, this 
approach does not account for time-varying, unobserved factors, which may weaken interpretation 
of results. 
 With high and rising healthcare spending in the U.S., generating savings through non-FFS 
payment reforms, like bundled payments, remains a priority, but there are uncertainties on best 
practices for incentive design. One such question is whether participating in bundled payment 
programs should be mandatory or voluntary, if high performing providers systematically choose to 
participate. This study presents evidence that under mandatory episode-based payments, 
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geographic areas with high performing providers at baseline generate significantly greater savings 
through reduced hospital prices and volume of services. Geographic areas with low performing 
providers at baseline achieve larger improvement in quality measures directly linked to payment. 
However, neither of these differential effects are sustained in the long-term. The results underscore 
the need to delve further into factors that drive savings in low performing areas, and whether there 
is room to further reduce spending without compromising quality. The results are specific to 
perinatal care, but findings offer guidance on bundled payment design and participation for the 
general provider population. Continuing to explore variation in the effects of bundled payments 
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Table 4-1 Summary Statistics of Arkansas and Control States, Pre and Post Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: High Performing versus 
Low Performing Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
       
 
 Pre APII (2010-2012) Post APII (2013-2016) 
 Arkansas Control States Arkansas Control States 
 High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf. 
Maternal Characteristics 
% Maternal Age 35+ 11.54 13.26 12.01 10.94 11.33 15.11 13.91 10.82 
% LOS > 4 1.68 0.70 1.35 0.98 1.82 1.06 2.09 1.61 
Health Plan         
HMO 3.13 0.47 3.58 0.16 1.68 0.85 2.46 0.81 
PPO 74.76 78.60 75.36 75.64 68.81 65.74 66.60 63.15 
POS 12.74 4.88 12.01 12.71 11.33 6.38 9.41 5.08 
High Deductible 9.38 16.05 9.04 11.48 18.18 27.02 21.53 30.96 
% Cost Sharing 18.94 16.80 17.86 18.71 21.97 23.34 19.68 22.34 
         
MSA-Level Healthcare Characteristics 
% Medicaid 20.08 13.13 17.15 11.07 16.86 13.13 17.48 12.56 
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 
46.05 26.12 37.04 31.34 48.54 30.40 52.84 53.13 
% Hospitals Provide 
OB Services 
25.59 37.44 28.30 26.75 29.22 41.55 33.43 32.52 
% Teaching Hospitals 10.06 0.00 8.88 0.01 10.90 0.00 11.15 2.08 
# of FQHCs 33.44 13.03 124.44 1.67 39.85 40.62 246.05 7.04 
Beds per 1,000 5.49 2.78 3.18 2.04 5.60 2.92 1.73 0.59 
PCPs per 1,000 0.77 0.64 0.89 0.57 0.80 0.68 0.90 1.75 
         
MSA-Level Demographic Characteristics 
% < HS Education 12.13 14.95 11.65 14.48 10.82 14.46 10.68 14.36 
% > College 
Education 
26.88 28.04 33.05 23.34 28.23 28.58 36.16 23.07 
% Population Black 19.82 6.30 16.41 9.13 20.94 7.48 18.57 9.56 
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MSA-Level Economic Characteristics 
% Uninsured 18.09 31.57 16.14 23.43 11.80 15.95 10.72 16.84 
% Unemployed 7.13 6.14 7.54 6.28 5.39 4.86 5.57 5.78 
% Poverty 15.40 18.35 14.68 19.87 15.15 17.08 13.87 17.12 
         
Episodes 416 430 24,644 4,015 715 470 79,978 8,641 
# of MSAs 3 3 125 26 3 3 125 26 
 
Notes: Sample estimates are from the Truven MarketScan commercial claims database, using data from births during the study period. Healthcare characteristics are from the 
American Hospital Association Annual Survey, the Area Health Resource File, and the National Practitioner Data Bank. Demographic and economic characteristics are obtained 
from the U.S. Census American Community Survey 
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Table 4-2 Episode Spending: Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: Variation Between Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas with High Performance versus Low Performance at Baseline 
 
 Overall Categorical Spending 
 Total Spending Intrapartum Facility Intrapartum Professional Total Prenatal Total Postpartum 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post           




























































           
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
           
Dependent Variable Mean: %         
High Performing MSAs          
           
Pre-APII           
   Treatment 9,666 9,666 4,559 4,559 2,918 2,918 1,765 1,765 424.30 424.30 
   Control 11,507 11,507 5,598 5,598 2,928 2,928 2,499 2,499 481.19 481.19 
           
Post-APII           
   Treatment 10,023 11,453 4,903 5,297 3,141 3,222 1,660 2,399 318.31 535.52 
   Control 13,138 13,749 6,229 6,400 3,430 3,712 2,855 3,129 625.06 508.56 
           
           
Low Performing MSAs          
           
Pre-APII           
   Treatment 7,877 7,877 3,991 3,991 2,171 2,171 1,501 1,501 214.26 214.26 
   Control 10,150 10,150 4,034 4,034 2,863 2,863 2,875 2,875 377.87 377.87 
           
Post-APII           
   Treatment 10,227 11,833 5,413 5,634 2,717 3,287 1,623 2,431 473.97 481.02 
   Control 12,837 15,650 5,154 7,383 3,765 3,425 3,393 3,875 525.33 967.66 
           
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Spending models are estimated using a one-part generalized linear model with a log link and Gamma distributional family. Coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in 
spending, pre- versus post-APII implementation. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance score 
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from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 4-1, 
plus mean malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-3 Prenatal Quality of Care: Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: Variation Between Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas with High Performance versus Low Performance at Baseline 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance score from 2010-
 Linked to Gainsharing Not Linked to Gainsharing 
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N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
             
Dependent Variable Mean: % 
High Performing MSAs            
             
Pre-APII             
   Treatment 81.25 81.25 65.14 65.14 76.20 76.20 77.40 77.40 75.96 75.96 90.87 90.87 
   Control 78.29 78.29 53.62 53.62 67.41 67.41 69.51 69.51 76.38 76.38 83.00 83.00 
             
Post-APII             
   Treatment 81.68 87.02 74.35 77.48 73.30 73.09 73.82 76.72 77.49 81.30 86.91 94.27 
   Control 75.38 85.13 60.38 66.91 67.17 49.26 68.32 66.50 74.90 80.14 82.64 86.47 
             
             
Low Performing MSAs            
             
Pre-APII             
   Treatment 61.63 61.63 29.07 29.07 59.53 59.53 59.77 59.77 64.88 64.88 73.95 73.95 
   Control 58.36 58.36 55.24 55.24 67.45 67.45 70.00 70.00 58.40 58.40 68.64 68.64 
             
Post-APII             
   Treatment 78.70 85.71 56.80 65.12 72.78 58.80 72.78 62.46 76.33 83.39 86.98 92.03 
   Control 70.67 70.90 52.37 71.15 64.29 49.95 74.56 72.66 76.35 70.12 80.59 78.07 
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2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 4-1, plus mean 
malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-4 Intrapartum and Postpartum Quality of Care: Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment 
Improvement Initiative: Variation Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas with High 
Performance versus Low Performance at Baseline 
 
 
 Intrapartum Care Postpartum Care 
 Low-Risk C-Sections Postpartum Visit Within 6 Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post     
   High Perf. -0.816* (0.471) -0.626** (0.291) -0.576 (0.403) -0.459* (0.242) 
   Low Perf. -0.810*** (0.222) -1.048* (0.557) 0.068 (0.153) -0.186 (0.390) 
   Difference -0.007 (0.363) 0.421 (0.436) -0.644* (0.355) -0.273 (0.279) 
     
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
     
Dependent Variable Mean: % 
High Performing MSAs    
     
Pre-APII     
   Treatment 25.72 25.72 56.49 56.49 
   Control 15.62 15.62 68.77 68.77 
     
Post-APII     
   Treatment 26.18 22.71 60.73 66.22 
   Control 16.52 15.52 72.34 76.53 
     
     
Low Performing MSAs    
     
Pre-APII     
   Treatment 18.37 18.37 43.49 43.49 
   Control 13.22 13.22 48.77 48.77 
     
Post-APII     
   Treatment 15.98 17.61 54.44 59.80 
   Control 14.35 20.01 55.90 68.24 
     
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include 
DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the 
State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance score from 2010-2012, prior to policy 
implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all 




Table 4-5 Price-Quantity Decomposition of Intrapartum Facility Spending 
  
 Intrapartum Facility Spending 
 Price Effect Quantity Effect 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
Treat * Post     
   High Perf. -0.141** (0.068) -0.090* (0.050) -0.166* (0.094) -0.164*** (0.058) 
   Low Perf. 0.145 (0.044) -0.010 (0.051) 0.153*** (0.054) -0.257*** (0.067) 
   Difference -0.285*** (0.062) -0.080 (0.068) -0.319*** (0.080) 0.093 (0.077) 
     
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
     
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include 
DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Spending models are estimated using a one-part generalized linear model 
with a log link and Gamma distributional family. Coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in spending, pre- versus 
post-APII implementation. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a 
composite performance score from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the 
corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 4-1, plus mean malpractice payout, and quarter-year 
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4.8. Appendix Tables 
Table 4-6 Tests for Equality Prior to Implementation of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: Quality and Spending Outcomes for High 
versus Low Performing Metropolitan Statistical Areas at Baseline 
 
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include pre-policy treatment-quarter trend coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. Spending models are estimated using a one-part generalized linear model with a log link and Gamma distributional family and coefficients can be 
interpreted as the percent change in spending, per quarter, pre-APII implementation. Quality models are estimated using multiple logistic regression. Standard errors are clustered 
at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance score from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 
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 Group B 
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A. Bact. Low-Risk  
C-Sections 
Postpartum Care 
within 8 weeks 
Total Spending 
Treat * Quarter         


































          














0.003 (0.401) 0.027 (0.020) 
          
N 29,505 29,505 29,505 29,505 29,505 29,505 29,505 29,505 29,505 
          
High Performing MSAs         
          
Pre-APII          
   Treatment 81.25 65.14 76.20 77.40 75.96 90.87 25.72 56.49 9,666 
   Control 78.29 53.62 67.41 69.51 76.38 83.00 15.62 68.77 11,507 
          
          
Low Performing MSAs         
          
Pre-APII          
   Treatment 61.63 29.07 59.53 59.77 64.88 73.95 18.37 43.49 7,877 
   Control 58.36 55.24 67.45 70.00 58.40 68.64 13.22 48.77 10,150 
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68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 4-1, plus mean malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-7 Covariate Balance Before and After Applying Multiple Group Propensity Score Weights 
 
 
 Pre-APII (2010-2012) Post-APII (2013-2016) 
 Initial Balance Propensity Score Balance Initial Balance Propensity Score Balance 
 Treatment Control SMD Treatment Control SMD Treatment Control SMD Treatment Control SMD 
Maternal 
Characteristics 
            
Maternal Age 35+ 0.09 0.13 -0.15 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.15 0.09 0.09 -0.01 
LOS > 4 0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
Health Plan             
HMO 0.02 0.30 -0.85 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.17 -0.57 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
PPO 0.77 0.53 0.51 0.77 0.76 0.03 0.68 0.54 0.28 0.68 0.65 0.06 
POS 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.12 -0.13 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.08 
High Deductible 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.22 0.24 -0.04 0.22 0.26 -0.11 
% Cost Sharing 0.64 0.40 0.49 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.79 0.51 -0.07 0.79 0.80 -0.03 
             
MSA-Level Healthcare 
Characteristics 
           
% Hospitals Non-
Profit 




0.13 0.53 -0.96 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.49 -0.86 0.12 0.19 -0.14 
% Teaching 
Hospitals 
0.38 0.53 -0.31 0.38 0.23 0.30 0.49 0.46 0.06 0.49 0.34 0.30 
# FQHCs 0.46 0.85 -0.89 0.46 0.46 0.00 0.76 0.84 -0.21 0.76 0.56 0.50 
Beds per 1,000 1.00 0.47 1.51 1.00 0.83 0.48 1.00 0.51 1.39 1.00 0.61 1.10 
PCPs per 1,000 0.50 0.53 -0.05    0.64 0.60 0.09 0.64 0.56 0.17 
             
MSA-Level Demographic 
Characteristics 
           
% Less Than HS 
Education 
0.65 0.74 -0.20 0.65 0.71 -0.12 0.48 0.51 -0.07 0.48 0.61 -0.27 
% More Than 
College Education 
0.00 0.37 -1.07 0.00 0.25 -0.74 0.38 0.66 -0.57 0.38 0.40 -0.03 
             
MSA-Level Economic 
Characteristics 
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% Uninsured 1.00 0.73 0.87 1.00 0.88 0.37 0.38 0.39 -0.03 0.38 0.35 0.06 
% Unemployed 0.38 0.92 -1.37 0.38 0.43 -0.15 0.19 0.25 -0.15 0.19 0.16 0.07 
% Poverty 0.62 0.55 0.15 0.62 0.67 -0.10 0.43 0.38 0.11 0.43 0.57 -0.28 
% Population 
Black 
0.44 0.36 0.17 0.44 0.37 0.15 0.58 0.41 0.35 0.58 0.48 0.21 
 
Notes: Propensity scores were constructed using logistic regression. Covariates include binary indicators for each variable, coded as 1 if the value in a given MSA-Quarter is ≥ 
median and 0 if < median. Select covariates are excluded due to potential influence from APII in the post-period, including Medicaid share and OB malpractice payout. The model 
also included interaction terms for each of the covariates listed in Table 4-7 with an indicator for High Performing MSA, to increase covariate balance between High Low 
Performing MSAs. The estimate of interest is the Standardized Mean Difference (SMD), which provides an independent comparison between treated and control means.  
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Table 4-8 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: Variation Between Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas with High Performance versus Low Performance at Baseline: Unweighted Analysis 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Low-Risk C-Section 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
         
Treat * Post         
















































         
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
 Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
 Hepatitis B Gestational Diabetes Asympt. Bact. Postpartum Visit within 8 
Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
         
Treat * Post         
















































         
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
 Episode Spending 
 Overall Categorical  
 Total Spending Intrapartum Facility Intrapartum Professional Total Prenatal Total Postpartum 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-
2016 
           
Treat * Post           































































           
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
 
Notes: Sample estimates from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Spending models are estimated using a one-part generalized linear model with a log link and Gamma distributional family. Coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in 
spending, pre- versus post-APII implementation. Quality models are estimated using multiple logistic regression. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are 
clustered at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance score from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a 
threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 4-1, plus mean malpractice payout, and quarter-year and state fixed 
effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4-9 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: Variation Between Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas with High Performance versus Low Performance at Baseline: Inclusion of High-Risk Episodes 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Low-Risk C-Section 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
         
Treat * Post         
















































         
N 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 
 Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
 Hepatitis B Gestational Diabetes Asympt. Bact. Postpartum Visit within 6 Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
         
Treat * Post         
















































         
N 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 
 Episode Spending 
 Overall Categorical  
 Total Spending Intrapartum Facility Intrapartum Professional Total Prenatal Total Postpartum 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
           
Treat * Post           






























































           
N 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 167,403 
 
Notes: Sample estimates are from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance 
score from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 





Table 4-10 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: Variation Between Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas with High Performance versus Low Performance at Baseline: Baseline Performance as Continuous Variable 
 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 
 Group B Strep Chlamydia HIV Low-Risk C-Section 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
         


















         
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
         
 Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 
 Hepatitis B Gestational Diabetes Asympt. Bact. Postpartum Visit within 6 Weeks 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
         


















         
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
         
 Episode Spending 
 Overall Categorical  
 Total Spending Intrapartum Facility Intrapartum Professional Total Prenatal Total Postpartum 
 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-2016 
           






















           
N 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 119,309 
         
 
Notes: Sample estimates are from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include DDD coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance 
score from 2010-2012, prior to policy implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all variables in Table 




Table 4-11 Sensitivity Analysis - Variation in Effects of the Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative: 
Variation Between Metropolitan Statistical Areas with High Performance versus Low 
Performance at Baseline: Alternate Control Groups 
 Prenatal Screenings: Linked to Gainsharing Intrapartum Care 





2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-
2016 
Treat * Post * [High – Low Quality]       
































































































































































































































































         
    Prenatal Screenings: Not Linked to Gainsharing Postpartum Care 






2013 2014-2016 2013 2014-
2016 
Treat * Post *  [High – Low Perf.]      


































































































































































































































































         
 Episode Spending 
 Overall Categorical 















Treat * Post *  [High – Low Perf.]        



































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Sample estimates are from the Truven MarketScan claims, using data from births between 2010-2016. Table cells include 
DDD coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are displayed as log odds. Standard errors are clustered at the 
State-MSA level. High Performing MSAs are determined by a composite performance score from 2010-2012, prior to policy 
implementation being above a threshold of 68.68%, which was the corresponding national average. Covariates include all 






Contemporary policy debates are grappling with the design of physician payment 
incentives to balance the dual considerations of beneficiaries’ access and quality of care, adequacy 
of payment rates to support provider costs and access to capital, and efficient use of healthcare 
services. Policy at the local, state, and federal levels have experimented with many different 
approaches. This dissertation examined examples of financial incentive policies to better 
understand the indirect, downstream effects on beneficiaries insured by other payers, racial 
minorities, and populations with low quality of care. 
5.1. Summary of Chapters 
The first chapter used passage of a 2014 and 2015 Medicaid payment reform in four states 
that discontinued payment for Early Elective Deliveries (EEDs), a low-value service in perinatal 
care, to evaluate the spillover effects on low-value quality measures in private insurance markets. 
The results showed a small, but significant 3.4% impact on decreasing rates of EEDs in the 
commercial sector. These spillover effects were present relative to a voluntary hard stop policy and 
a pay-for-performance bonus incentive, but not compared to a quality improvement initiative. 
There was also no evidence of physician-induced demand, under which the rate of more profitable 
services would increase in response to negative income shocks. These changes were the result of 
aligned financial objectives between physicians and for-profit hospitals, leading to positive impacts 
on healthcare quality for patients outside of the policy’s target population.  
The second chapter examined the effect of a 2013 multi-payer bundled payment program 
for perinatal episodes in Arkansas on place-based racial disparities in private insurance markets. 
The episode-based payment sought to shift financial risk to physicians by offering a single, risk-
adjusted case rate for the entire course of care, rather than reimbursing providers separately for 
each individual service. Results showed disproportionate quality gains in areas with a high 




patients were able to close the gap in the long-term. This study highlights the role of physician 
payment on racial disparities, and suggests a need for financial incentives that are directly tied to 
racial equity. 
The third chapter leveraged a multi-payer episode-based payment program in Arkansas 
with compulsory provider participation to test whether baseline quality was associated with 
divergent impacts on quality and spending. Findings demonstrated that geographic areas with high 
performing providers at baseline were able to generate 16.2% greater savings through reduced 
hospital prices and volume of services. However, areas with low performing providers at baseline 
achieved larger improvements in quality measures directly linked to payment. Analyses suggest 
that “average” effects observed in prior research masked heterogeneity across physicians. Future 
bundled payment programs with mandatory participation may experience challenges containing 
costs and improving quality among low performing providers. 
Across these three studies, this dissertation suggests that financial incentives in physician 
payment are an important determinant of healthcare delivery for populations that were not directly 
targeted by the payment program. The first chapter showed that lowering the Medicaid price of a 
low-value service had welfare-improving effects in private insurance markets. It demonstrated that 
setting different fee schedules for high- and low-value services has potential to benefit commercial 
enrollees to a greater extent than other incentives, including voluntary non-financial incentives and 
financial bonuses.  
The structure of financial incentives can also have differential implications for vulnerable 
populations. All physicians in Arkansas faced the same bundled payment incentive structure; 
however, as reflected in chapters two and three, physicians treating a high proportion of racial 
minorities, as well as those with lower quality at baseline, experienced delayed onset of quality 
improvement and cost savings compared to the average physician. Putting this into the context of 
the economic framework presented in the introduction, this dissertation has shown that physician 




and quality of medical care over time. As physician payment shifted towards value-based incentive 
structures, physicians adapted their behavior, even for populations not directly targeted by the 
payment change. This occurred across payers and disadvantaged populations. As future public 
policies are deliberated, it will be important to consider physician behavior in relation to all patient 
populations as the need for value continues to rise. 
5.2. Takeaways and Policy Implications 
The dissertation’s implications for physician reimbursement policy and incentive design 
are nuanced. Overall, findings suggest that private and public payment reforms have potential to 
generate welfare-improving advances in healthcare spending and quality beyond the target 
population, but improvements are not equally experienced by all patients. In particular, my 
examination of multiple value-based payment reforms highlights the variation in positive spillovers 
from Medicaid to commercial markets across incentive structures and patients, the importance of 
tethering payment to specific quality metrics for vulnerable groups, and the potential tradeoffs 
between quality improvement and cost savings. 
First, this work demonstrates the presence of positive spillovers from Medicaid payment 
incentives onto privately insured beneficiaries, across incentive designs and populations. I found 
that a Medicaid fee change discontinuing payment for a low-value service led to positive spillovers, 
but effects were small. In contrast, bundled payment reform led to large spillovers from Medicaid 
to commercial enrollees, with respect to cost savings and quality gains, but benefits were 
disproportionately felt by socially advantaged populations. While this dissertation has made strides 
towards understanding spillovers in the context of financial incentives, drivers of this phenomenon 
remain incompletely understood. Several complex factors contribute to quality improvement and 
cost containment. From an individual perspective, the patient-clinician interaction is crucial in 
determining treatment decisions. More broadly, this interaction is affected by health system 
characteristics, the culture of healthcare delivery, and individual patient and clinical factors. 




equitable health outcomes across diverse patients and providers is an exciting area for future 
research. 
Second, it is important that quality measures are directly tied to physician reimbursement, 
across the continuum of care, especially for vulnerable patients. Achieving quality improvement 
for socially and medically disadvantaged patients is complex, and requires more than a simple 
financial incentive. Nonetheless, it is clear that financial incentives send a signal to physicians in 
regards to prioritization of quality measures and patient care goals, paving the way for more 
efficient gains among high-risk populations. This dissertation showed the range of physician 
responses to gainsharing measures across patient and provider characteristics, as well as incentive 
types. In response to a Medicaid reform discontinuing payment for a low-value service, reductions 
in overuse were concentrated among for-profit hospitals, underscoring the importance of shared 
financial objectives between physicians and hospitals. Further, physicians with more complex 
patient populations achieved greater initial success on dimensions of quality that were linked to 
payment, relative to measures that were not. Meanwhile, physicians with low-risk patients were 
able to realize quality gains across all measures, regardless of payment implications. Effectively, 
the financial incentive initiated early program success and avoided a period of worsening disparities 
for vulnerable populations and providers. Policymakers and insurers have faced measure selection 
challenges due to the added administrative burden and variation in what is considered “appropriate” 
treatment for different patient groups. This dissertation highlights the importance of concentrating 
on gainsharing measures most critical for high-risk populations, given finite resources. 
Third, this dissertation illuminates the challenges of efforts to simultaneously contain costs 
and improve quality of care. Since financial incentives are often linked to both savings and quality, 
the physician must weigh the tradeoffs between saving healthcare dollars and improving quality, 
and in turn, deciding how to allocate efforts. In many cases, quality improvement requires increased 
healthcare spending which may further complicate decisions about allocation of effort. These 




physician discretion, which is often immeasurable.  Further, decisions vary across physicians’ 
baseline performance; in my examination of the Arkansas bundled payment program, I found that 
physicians with high quality and low spending at baseline experienced slower efficiency gains, 
potentially because remaining improvements in performance are likely to be costly and more 
difficult (e.g. limited gains remain from “low hanging fruit”). Thus, physicians excelling in one 
area (e.g. high quality at baseline) may forego further progress in that space to concentrate on areas 
with more room for improvement, highlighting the imminent tradeoff between cost savings and 
quality. Future research should leverage qualitative data to assess the association between physician 
beliefs and attitudes on the response to financial incentives. 
This dissertation contributes to a growing literature on financial incentives and physician 
behavior, with a focus on indirect effects of value-based payment reforms. Theoretically, value-
based payment aligns incentives to maximize both profits and patient well-being, but socially and 
medically complex patients often require higher marginal effort to achieve these objectives. As a 
result, physicians may serve as especially sub-optimal agents for these populations, further raising 
concerns about inequity as payment reforms become more ubiquitous. This dissertation highlights 
the importance of assessing heterogeneity in direct and indirect effects of financial and non-
financial incentives across providers in order to design performance improvement programs that 
account for these instances of imperfect physician agency and contribute to reaching the objective 
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